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Abstract 
 
Aim. This study aims to investigate self-understanding in young males with 
high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and to determine whether 
self-understanding is related to social functioning and theory of mind (ToM).  
In addition, this study aims to examine the characteristics and abilities of 
young males with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder 
(AD) to determine whether there are significant differences in self-
understanding and whether self-understanding is related to social functioning 
and ToM between these two groups.  The results have important implications 
for social skills interventions for young people with ASD. 
 
Method. Forty three young males diagnosed with one of the ASD (25 
diagnosed with HFA and 18 diagnosed with AD) were compared with 38 TD 
males.  Participants were assessed using the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R), the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT), the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS), the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-
Third Edition (PPVT-III), Damon and Hart’s Self-understanding Interview, and 
two false-belief ToM tasks.   
 
Results. Children with ASD had difficulties recognising and attributing their 
own mental states and failed to integrate various aspects of the self.  
  xix 
Specifically, the ASD group produced fewer self-statements that reflected 
agency (the awareness and understanding that one is in control of their 
actions), social aspects of self (such as personality characteristics and group 
membership) and psychological aspects of self (such as emotions, thoughts 
and cognitive processes).  Instead, children with ASD produced more 
concrete physical self-statements (such as body characteristics and material 
possessions).  A significant positive relationship was found between self-
understanding and social functioning for the ASD group.  Within the ASD 
group, the relationship held for the HFA group only.  In terms of ToM, children 
with ASD were less able to correctly answer the second-order false-belief 
ToM question compared to the TD group. For the ASD group, there was a 
significant positive correlation between self-understanding and ToM.  Within 
the ASD group, the relationship held for the HFA group only. 
 
Conclusions. The results show young males with high-functioning ASD are 
less aware of their own and others’ mental states perhaps reflecting a general 
delay in the development of self-understanding and ToM.  Furthermore, a 
more developed self-understanding may translate to improved social 
functioning and ToM ability for young males with high-functioning ASD.  For 
young males with HFA, self-understanding and ToM may stem from a 
common underlying cognitive framework.  Consequently, treatments aimed at 
improving self-understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice 
  xx 
versa.  For individuals with AD there may be a separate cognitive mechanism 
responsible for self-understanding and another for ToM.  Therefore, different 
interventions may be required; one to improve self-understanding and 
another to improve the understanding of others’ minds.  Overall, these results 
may assist in the development of practice parameters for social skills training 
for those with ASD. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The present study aims to systematically investigate self-understanding in 
young males with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and 
determine whether self-understanding is related to theory of mind (ToM).  In 
addition, this study aims to examine the characteristics and abilities of young 
males with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder (AD) to 
determine whether there are significant differences in self-understanding and 
ToM between these two groups. 
 
ASD are lifelong developmental disorders that affect the way a person 
communicates and relates to other people and the world around them.  
People affected by ASD typically display major impairments in social 
interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication and restricted, repetitive 
and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities.  The term ASD 
is an umbrella description which includes autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder and Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified 
(PDD-NOS) including atypical autism as specified in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth 
Edition-Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
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When Kanner (1943) first described autism, he recognised that individuals 
with this condition could be high-functioning in terms of their language and 
intellectual skills.  Since Kanner’s original account, researchers and clinicians 
have discovered that individuals with high-functioning autism (HFA) have 
different needs and behaviours compared with more typical children with 
autism (Everard, 1976; Levy, 1986).  The term HFA is commonly applied to 
those individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder (as per 
DSM-IV-TR) and whose full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) is 70 or above 
(Tsai, 1992).   
 
AD is defined by qualitative impairments in social interaction and restricted 
repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities.  In 
contrast with the definition for HFA the criteria for AD states there is no 
evidence of clinically significant language delay (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  Current criteria for AD also state that there be no delay 
in: cognitive development, the development of age appropriate self-help skills, 
adaptive behaviour (other than social interaction), and curiosity about the 
environment in childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
 
The validity of AD as a distinct diagnostic entity from HFA has generated 
considerable debate and remains controversial.  Numerous studies have 
been conducted in which direct comparisons have been made between 
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individuals diagnosed with HFA and AD.  Most of this research, however, is 
limited by a lack of consistent diagnostic criteria making the results very 
difficult to interpret and compare across studies (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 
2004).  The present study adopted strict operational definitions for HFA and 
AD and applied these to the realm of self-understanding and ToM.  The 
results will add to the growing body of research on the similarities and 
differences between HFA and AD and will assist in determining whether the 
two conditions are separate diagnostic entities that can be reliably 
differentiated.    
 
The deficit in reciprocal social interaction is a core feature of ASD and 
improvements in social functioning have been identified as one of the most 
critical areas needing remediation.  A thorough understanding of the social 
difficulties experienced by young people with ASD is required to enable 
interventions to specifically treat the social deficits.  It has been hypothesised 
that a restricted understanding of self contributes to the social difficulties 
experienced by young people with ASD.  However, there are only a few 
studies located on how young people with ASD conceptualise themselves 
and there were no studies located on how self-understanding relates to their 
social functioning. 
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Self-understanding is a multifaceted construct comprising several dimensions 
that define a person’s view of his or her “personhood” or individuality.   
Damon and Hart’s model of self-understanding (1982; 1988) provides a 
comprehensive framework for studying both the structural organisation and 
developmental changes along multiple, interacting dimensions of the self 
concept.   
 
Hobson (1990) claims that children with autism lack the prerequisites for self-
understanding and thus fail to develop an “interpersonal self”.  He suggests 
that children with autism fail to see themselves as subjects of experience and 
lack the capacity to think of themselves as thinkers.   
 
There have only been a few studies located on self-understanding in ASD, 
and most of these studies have focused on low functioning children.  There 
has been one study on high-functioning children with ASD, however, strict 
diagnostic criteria was not applied.  The present study, applied strict 
operational definitions for HFA and AD to address the issue of how young 
people with high-functioning ASD understand themselves.   
 
Another explanation for the social impairments experienced by young people 
with ASD is the difficulty in understanding the psychological states of others 
which is also known as ToM (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  This ability 
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appears to be a prerequisite for normal social interaction, communication, 
(Bloom, 1998; Frith & Happe, 1994,1999) and educational success 
(Astington, 1988).   
 
Dennett (1978) proposed that the “acid test” of whether a child has ToM 
arises in situations involving false-belief; the understanding that others hold a 
belief whose content contradicts reality.  The ability to attribute false-beliefs to 
others is considered a particularly important milestone in the development of 
ToM.   
 
An increasing number of studies have shown that children with ASD have 
particular difficulties in reasoning about mental states.  Furthermore, it has 
been proposed that the deficit in ToM underlies the social impairments and 
many of the other developmental abnormalities characteristic of ASD.   
 
Hobson (1982) proposed an order in which children come to understand the 
social world.  He suggested that self-understanding (or self-knowledge) is 
critical and underlies the ability to understand the mental states of others.  
Hobson claimed that because children with autism lack a sense of 
“themselves” as potential objects of other people’s evaluations they fail to 
develop ToM.   However, there is little research relating to self-understanding 
and ToM.  The question of how children’s developing self provides the 
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infrastructure for ToM has not been addressed in young people with high-
functioning ASD.  The present study will investigate the relationship between 
self-understanding and ToM in young males with high-functioning ASD.  For 
young males with ASD self-understanding and ToM may be related and stem 
from a common underlying cognitive framework.  That is, detecting one’s own 
attitudes may engage the same cognitive mechanism as detecting other 
people’s mental states (Frith & Happe, 1999; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994). 
Consequently, social skills interventions aimed at improving self-
understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice versa.  This will be 
the first study to investigate the relationship between self-understanding and 
ToM in young people with high-functioning ASD.   
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Chapter 2 
Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are lifelong developmental disorders that 
affect the way a person communicates and relates to other people and the 
world around them. People affected by ASD typically display major 
impairments in social interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication and 
restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and 
activities.  The term ASD is an umbrella description which includes autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder (AD) and Pervasive Developmental Disorder-
Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) including atypical autism as specified in 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders Fourth Edition-Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Kanner (1943) originally identified the 
syndrome of early infantile autism.  In the year after Kanner’s first description 
of autism, Asperger (1944/1991) published his findings on a similar condition 
which he called autistic psychopathologies in children.  Since Kanner’s and 
Asperger’s original descriptions a vast amount of work has attempted to 
understand these conditions.   
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2.2 A spectrum of autism disorders 
The concept of a continuum of autism was first discussed in 1979 (Wing & 
Gould, 1979), and in 1988, the terms “autism spectrum disorder” and “autistic 
continuum” were introduced (Allen, 1988).  Wing used the term ASD to refer 
to a broad group of conditions sharing the “triad of impairments” in social 
interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication and imagination, which 
implied a continuum of disturbance in each of the three domains (Wing, 
1997). For Wing, these conditions included pervasive developmental 
disorders, but also disorders of empathy, attention, motor control and 
perception. 
 
The term ASD is now commonly used to describe the spectrum of 
behavioural phenotype and severity that is part of the continuum from 
“normal” to “disordered” development in reciprocal social interactions, verbal 
and non-verbal communication and restricted, repetitive and stereotyped 
patterns of behaviour, interests and activities (Wray, Silove, & Knott, 2005).  
ASD are generally accepted to include autistic disorder (also known as 
infantile autism or childhood autism), AD and PDD-NOS (including atypical 
autism) as specified in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000).  These diagnoses are classified under “pervasive developmental 
disorders” because currently the term ASD does not appear in the DSM-IV-
TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
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The behavioural characteristics presented in individuals with ASD are 
considered to be the result of neurological differences of organic cause and 
point to multiple interrelated factors (Howlin, 1999). For example, autistic 
disorder is recognised as a possible endpoint of several organic diseases, 
including fragile X, tuberous sclerosis, congenital rubella, phenylketonuria 
and postnatal encephalitis.  Twin studies have consistently documented a 
strong genetic component in the aetiology of ASD with evidence suggesting 
that several genes contribute to the underlying genetic risk of developing 
autistic disorder; with possibly more than 10 genes involved (Wray et al., 
2005). 
 
2.3 Epidemiology of autism spectrum disorders 
2.3.1 The prevalence of autism spectrum disorders 
Prevalence data reflect the proportion of individuals in a population who suffer 
from a defined disorder at a particular point in time and is useful to estimate 
needs and to plan services.  According to the (British) Medical Research 
Council’s Review of Autism Research (Medical Research Council, 2001) 
prevalence estimates depend on exact assessment tools and ascertainment 
methods, and variations across studies can reflect such methodological 
differences. 
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Until recently, autism has been considered a rare disorder with an estimated 
prevalence of approximately four per 10,000 children (Prior, 2003). Currently, 
there appears to be fairly good agreement that ASD affect approximately 60 
per 10,000 children under eight years (Medical Research Council, 2001).  A 
recent American prevalence study estimates one in 150 eight year old 
children have one of the ASD (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2007).  Similarly, a recent Australian prevalence study estimates one in 160 
children between six and 12 years have one of the ASD (MacDermont, 
Williams, Ridley, Glasson, & Wray, 2007).  Any perceived increase in 
prevalence may be owing to increased awareness of ASD, changes in 
diagnostic criteria, more sophisticated screening and diagnostic assessment 
tools, and possibly environmental factors that may trigger a genetic 
predisposition (Wray et al., 2005).  
 
2.3.2 The incidence of autism spectrum disorders 
In contrast to prevalence, incidence measures the number of new cases of a 
condition occurring in the population over a specified period of time. 
According to a recent study on the incidence of ASD in Australian children, a 
large number of children were newly identified with ASD in two Australian 
states, New South Wales (NSW) and Western Australia (WA), between 1999 
and 2000 (Williams et al., 2005).  In WA, 252 children aged 0-14 years were 
identified with ASD (169 with autistic disorder and 83 with AD or PDD-NOS), 
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while in NSW there was 532 (400 with autistic disorder and 132 with AD or 
PDD-NOS) (Williams et al., 2005). According to the authors, these figures are 
similar to rates reported in the United Kingdom.   
 
Fombonne (2005) argues that the available epidemiological evidence does 
not strongly support the hypothesis that the incidence of autism has 
increased.  He claims that recent increases in prevalence rates cannot be 
directly attributed to an increase in the incidence of the disorder.  Changes in 
diagnostic criteria, diagnostic substitution, changes in the policies for special 
education and the increasing availability of services are more likely to be 
responsible for higher prevalence rates. 
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2.4 A brief historical account of autism 
2.4.1 Kanner’s original description  
Leo Kanner (1894–1981) was an Austrian-American psychiatrist and 
physician who had a special interest in child psychiatry.  His seminal 1943 
paper ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’ described eleven children 
who presented from the age of two years and sharing “unique” and previously 
unreported patterns of behaviour.  These children were observed to have had 
poor relations with people, delays in language, abnormal patterns of speech, 
repetitive behaviour and obsessive preoccupations.  He named this pattern of 
clinical features ‘early infantile autism’. 
 
For Kanner, the core characteristic of early infantile autism was a profound 
lack of affective contact with other people.  Kanner claimed that these 
children at a young age appeared to be aloof and different to other children.  
He wrote, “there is, from the start an extreme autistic aloneness that, 
wherever possible, disregards, ignores, shuts out anything that comes to the 
child from outside” (Kanner, 1943).  Specific features of the social impairment 
included poor or total avoidance of eye contact, few if any communicative 
gestures, inadequate imitative ability, and the overriding preference to be 
apart from other people.   
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In contrast to their poor relation with people, Kanner (1943) noted how these 
children tended to have a good relation with objects.  He observed that the 
children become intensely attached to specific objects or collections of similar 
objects and showed resistance to interference with their possessions.  
Kanner observed that these objects were only used for repetitive activities 
such as spinning them or arranging them in straight lines.  Kanner also noted 
an anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness.  This was 
evidenced in the children’s repetitiveness and rigidity which was associated 
with resistance to change in daily routine or in repetitive activities. 
 
Another core characteristic of early infantile autism was a kind of language 
that did not seem intended to serve interpersonal communication.  Kanner 
noted a characteristically abnormal pattern of speech in those children who 
came to acquire language.  Kanner (1943) reported that children with early 
infantile autism were generally delayed in spontaneously putting two or more 
words together.  According to Kanner (1943) some of these children could 
form sentences, but used parrot-like repetitions of what they had heard. 
Sometimes their repetitions were echoes of what they had immediately heard 
(immediate echolalia) whilst other times they were stored word combinations 
(delayed echolalia).  Additionally, spontaneous words tended to have 
meanings that were rigid or inflexible, and personal pronouns were repeated 
as heard, so the children would refer to themselves as “you” and to others as 
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“I”.  The overall impression was that language was not employed as a tool to 
communicate with others. 
 
Kanner (1943) described additional clinical features, but did not consider 
these features as essential criteria for early infantile autism.  Some of these 
additional features included odd responses to sensory stimuli, stereotyped 
movements of limbs and body and aggressive behaviours.  Kanner 
commented on the cognitive profiles of these children.  He noted that “good 
cognitive potential manifested in those who could speak, by feats of memory 
or, in the mute children, by their skill on performance tests” (Kanner, 1943). 
 
2.4.2 Current diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder 
Since Kanner’s original report, clinical observation and research has led to 
two major diagnostic classifications of this pervasive developmental disorder: 
childhood autism as detailed in the World Health Organization’s International 
Classification of Disease (World Health Organization, 1992a) and autistic 
disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). These 
two systems agree on the definition of autism, partly as a result of the DSM-
IV-TR autism and pervasive developmental disorders field trial (Boelte & 
Poustka, 2000).  In addition they have a fundamental continuity with the 
original description of autism made by Kanner (1943).  The key elements in 
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these conceptually equivalent definitions include a triad of abnormal 
functioning in each of the following three domains:  
• qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction; 
• qualitative impairment in communication; and 
• restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, 
and activities. 
 
For a diagnosis of autistic disorder, a person must meet a specified number 
of symptoms within each domain.  In addition they must have a delay or 
abnormal functioning in one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 
three years:  
• social interaction; 
• language as used in social communication; and 
• symbolic or imaginative play. 
 
Further, the disturbance should not be better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder 
or Childhood Disintegrative Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). 
 
The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for the 
identification of qualitative impairment in social interaction, to which much of 
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this thesis is devoted, involves identifying at least two of the following 
features:  
a) Marked impairment in the use of multiple non-verbal behaviours such as 
eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to 
regulate social interaction;  
b) Failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level;  
c) Lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or 
achievements with other people (for example, by a lack of showing, 
bringing, or pointing out objects of interest); and 
d) Lack of social or emotional reciprocity. 
 
2.4.3 High-functioning autism 
When Kanner (1943) first described autism, he recognised that individuals 
with this condition could be high-functioning in terms of their language and 
intellectual skills.  In fact, because the 11 children in Kanner’s original sample 
were above average intelligence, he believed that all children with autism 
were within the normal range of intelligence.  Since Kanner’s original account, 
researchers and clinicians have discovered that individuals with HFA have 
different needs and behaviours compared with most children with autism 
(Everard, 1976; Levy, 1986) and have called for clearer diagnostic criteria 
(Tsai, 1992). 
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At the present time, however, there is no explicit definition for HFA.  The ICD-
10 (World Health Organization, 1992a) and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) classifications have not yet established diagnostic criteria.  
Despite this, there is a general consensus in the field of autism as to the 
features of HFA. The term HFA is commonly applied to those individuals who 
meet diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder (as per DSM-IV-TR) and whose 
cognitive level (generally full scale intelligence quotient (IQ)) is 70 or above 
as determined by a valid and individually administered IQ test (Tsai, 1992). 
 
The study of HFA is important because it allows comparison with non-autistic 
age-matched controls which offers an opportunity for testing the hypothesis 
that autism occurs without cognitive deficits.  Research systematically 
comparing high-functioning and low-functioning children with autism, offers an 
opportunity to test the validity of sub-typing autism, based on cognitive levels 
and establishes cognitive and behavioural profiles.  More recent debates 
centre on the distinction of HFA from AD.  The next section of this chapter will 
concentrate on describing AD before concluding with a review of the 
similarities and differences between HFA and AD. 
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2.5 A brief historical account of Asperger’s disorder  
2.5.1 Asperger’s original description  
Hans Asperger (1906-1980) was an Austrian paediatrician who had a special 
interest in the integration of psychiatry and remedial education (Klin & 
Volkmar, 1997).  In the year after Kanner’s (1943) first description of autism, 
Hans Asperger (1944/1991) published his findings on a condition he called 
“autistischen Psychopathen in Kindesalter” or autistic psychopathologies in 
children.  Asperger chose the label Autistic Psychopathy to signify extreme 
egocentrism or shutting off from others.  Asperger and Kanner were unaware 
of each other’s work, but their description of their patients shared many 
commonalities.  These included marked impairments in social interaction and 
restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and 
activities.  
 
In his original paper, Asperger (1944/1991) described the case histories of 
four children, aged six to 11 years, who presented with marked difficulties in 
social integration despite seemingly adequate cognitive and verbal skills 
(Frith, 1991).  Asperger (1944/1991) described many facets of the behaviour 
of children with his syndrome, but did not give a list of essential criteria.  
However, he emphasised the children were:   
1) Socially odd, naïve, inappropriate and emotionally detached from others; 
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2) Markedly egocentric and highly sensitive to any perceived criticism, 
while being oblivious of other people’s feelings; 
3) Possessed of good grammar and extensive vocabularies; 
4) Fluent in speech, but long-winded, literal and pedantic, using 
monologues and not engaging in reciprocal conversations; 
5) Demonstrating poor non-verbal communication and monotonous or 
peculiar vocal intonation; and 
6) Showing circumscribed interests in specific subjects, including collecting 
objects or facts connected with these interests (Asperger, 1944/1991). 
 
Asperger (1944/1991) indicated that although most of the affected children 
had intelligence in the borderline, normal to superior range, they had difficulty 
in learning conventional schoolwork, and he believed these children 
conspicuously lacked commonsense.  However he noted, that these children 
were capable of producing remarkably original ideas and had skills connected 
with their special interests.  While he described their motor coordination and 
organisation of movement as generally poor, some performed well in their 
areas of special interest, such as playing a musical instrument.  Asperger 
also noted that the condition could not be recognised in infancy or usually 
before the third year of life (Asperger, 1944/1991). 
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Asperger’s original work was written in German and was not widely known in 
English psychiatric literature until a review and series of case reports by 
Lorna Wing in 1981 (Wing, 1981).  Wing reported 34 cases (aged five to 34 
years) of whom 19 had a clinical presentation similar to Asperger’s original 
account.  The other 15 presented consistent with current diagnostic criteria, 
but did not have the characteristic onset patterns and early history.  
Concerned that the term autistic psychopathy might be associated with 
sociopathic behaviour, Wing (1981) proposed the label Asperger’s syndrome 
and based on her own case histories, made some modifications to Asperger’s 
original account. 
 
Wing’s account generated interest and many case reports and research 
studies followed.  There was considerable variability, however, in the use of 
the label among clinicians and researchers (Gillberg, 1989; Szatmari, 
Bremmer, & Nagy, 1989; Tantam, 1988) which made comparisons among 
studies difficult.  This led to a need for a consensus in diagnostic criteria. 
 
2.5.2 Current diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s disorder 
In 1994, AD was included in the DSM-IV for the first time (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) the criteria for the qualitative impairments in 
social interaction, and restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviours and 
activities being identical to those for autistic disorder.  In the most recent 
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edition of the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), AD is 
defined by qualitative impairment in social interaction and restricted repetitive 
and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities.   
 
In contrast to the criteria for autistic disorder which includes deficits in verbal 
and nonverbal communication and play, the criteria for AD states that there is 
no evidence of clinically significant language delay, such that the child used 
single words by age two years, and communicative phrases by age three 
years (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Current criteria also state 
that there is no delay in cognitive development (that is, normal or near normal 
IQ), the development of age-appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behaviour 
(other than social interaction), curiosity about the environment in childhood 
and criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder or Schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
 
As there is no clinically significant language delay in AD, this contributes to 
the late clinical recognition compared with other ASD, which may be related 
to normal or near-normal adaptive behaviour in the early years of life 
(Volkmar & Cohen, 1991).  However, language in AD is clearly not typical or 
normal.  Individuals with AD usually have pedantic and poorly modulated 
speech and poor nonverbal pragmatic communication skills (Filipek et al., 
1999) 
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2.6 Similarities and differences between high-functioning autism 
and Asperger’s disorder 
2.6.1 Introduction  
The validity of AD as a distinct diagnostic entity from HFA has generated 
considerable debate and remains controversial (Gillberg & Ehlers, 1998; 
Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004; Rutter & Schopler, 1992).  The ICD-10 
(World Health Organization, 1992a) specifically noted this issue in the 
description of Asperger’s syndrome.  There is little disagreement that AD is 
on a phenomenological continuum with autism (Wing, 1991); however, it is 
unclear whether AD will remain a valid syndrome separate from autism 
(Gillberg & Ehlers, 1998; Rutter & Schopler, 1992). 
 
Macintosh and Dissanayake (2004) outlined several reasons why it is 
important to determine whether AD is distinct from HFA.  Firstly, if individuals 
with AD have qualitatively different impairments from those with HFA, then 
they are likely to have different intervention needs.  Alternatively, if symptoms 
are similar, then individuals with AD may benefit from the wealth of 
knowledge acquired about management of HFA.  Secondly, if the two 
conditions are distinct, they may vary in terms of aetiology.  This knowledge 
may enable early intervention of children at increased risk of either disorder.  
Finally, if distinct, it may be possible to distinguish between HFA and AD in 
terms of prognosis (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004). 
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Numerous studies have been conducted in which direct comparisons have 
been made between individuals with a diagnosis of HFA and AD.  Most of this 
research, however, has suffered from a lack of consistent diagnostic criteria 
and it has therefore been difficult to interpret and compare results (Macintosh 
& Dissanayake, 2004).   
 
2.6.2 Age of onset, identification and outcome 
Based on the few population studies available, Gillberg and Ehlers (1998) 
propose that AD may be considerably more prevalent than HFA.  Howlin 
(2003) found the mean age at which parents of children with HFA became 
concerned (15 months) was earlier than that for children with AD (21 months).  
However, Eisenmajer et al., (1996) found that although AD was diagnosed 
later (M = 8.9 years) than HFA (M = 6 years), no difference was found in the 
age at which parents became concerned about their child’s development. 
 
The outcome for individuals diagnosed with HFA and AD is variable, some 
research indicating that individuals with AD have a better prognosis than 
people with HFA (Howlin, 2003; Szatmari, Archer, Fisman, Streiner, & Wilson, 
1995). 
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2.6.3 Biological markers 
Limited comparative research has been undertaken on aetiological and 
biological markers.  Of the research available, no significant differences have 
been found between individuals with HFA and AD (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 
2004).  Thus, to date, there is little evidence to differentiate these conditions 
on aetiological or biological factors. 
 
2.6.4 Language and communication 
A clinically significant delay in language development is a distinguishing 
feature of HFA, whereas language development in people with AD is not 
significantly delayed.   
 
Most of the comparative studies, on language and communication have 
focused on pragmatic difficulties and have been conducted prior to the 
establishment of formal criteria for AD.  Based on the findings of studies using 
either DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) or ICD-10 criteria 
(World Health Organization, 1992a) (which are conceptually equivalent), it 
appears that the extent to which language and communication impairments 
differentiate the two groups may vary as a function of age (Macintosh & 
Dissanayake, 2004).  
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2.6.5 Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, 
interests and activities 
Little comparative research has been conducted on circumscribed interests, 
ritualistic behaviours or impaired imagination, even though these are 
accepted as core deficits for both AD and autism (Kugler, 1998).  One finding 
suggested an absence of group differences regardless of developmental 
stage (Howlin, 2003), while another found children with HFA showed more 
severe symptoms in repetitive behaviours; however, this group difference was 
more verifiable in the preschool years as opposed to subsequent 
developmental stages (Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000). 
 
2.6.6 Motor skills 
Parental reports of developmental history regarding milestones and current 
motor skills have been examined.  The research on motor skills was 
inconclusive, with some research finding significant differences between HFA 
and AD (Gillberg, 1989; Iwanaga, Kawasaki, & Tsuchida, 2000; Klin, Volkmar, 
Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Rourke, 1995; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton, & Tonge, 
2001; Szatmari et al., 1995; Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson, & Bartolucci, 1990), 
while other research has found no significant differences (Eisenmajer et al., 
1996; Howlin, 2003; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; Szatmari, Bartolucci, & 
Bremner, 1989) and some even found similarities (Ghaziuddin, Butler, Tsai, & 
Ghaziuddin, 1994; Szatmari et al., 1995).  Many of these studies suffered 
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from a lack of consistent diagnostic criteria making it difficult to interpret and 
compare results across studies.  In addition, some studies relied heavily on 
parental report instead of standardised measures of motor abilities 
(Eisenmajer et al., 1996; Howlin, 2003; Szatmari et al., 1995; Szatmari, 
Bartolucci et al., 1989). It is still not clear whether motor skills differentiate 
HFA and AD. 
 
2.6.7 Cognitive profiles 
Some researchers found strengths and weaknesses in the cognitive profiles 
of individuals with HFA and AD (Ehlers et al., 1997; Iwanaga et al., 2000; Klin 
et al., 1995).  However, the criterion specifying an absence of significant 
language delay in AD may determine whether or not group differences are 
found (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004).  When this criterion has been 
adopted, it seems that individuals with HFA and AD are more likely to be 
differentiated on their patterns of cognitive abilities (Iwanaga et al., 2000; Klin 
et al., 1995).  When the language delay criterion has been abandoned, 
thereby limiting diagnostic differentiation between the groups, few differences 
were found (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Szatmari et al., 1995). 
There has been a lack of consistent support for the claim that individuals with 
HFA and AD can be differentiated on the basis of their cognitive profiles 
(Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004).  For example, Miller and Ozonoff (2000) 
used strict DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria and 
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found HFA and AD were not clearly distinguishable on the basis of cognitive 
profiles and both groups showed mixed patterns of ability.  These findings 
were consistent with other researchers who used formal diagnostic criteria 
(Ghaziuddin et al., 1994; Manjiviona & Prior, 1999).  This suggested that no 
particular profile of cognitive abilities is characteristic of either disorder and 
thus, a specific intellectual profile cannot reliably differentiate children with 
HFA with AD.  
 
2.6.8 Executive function  
Executive function involves several abilities required for preparing and 
engaging in complex, organised behaviour, including managing impulses, 
planning, problem solving, and mental flexibility.  Impairment of executive 
function has been hypothesised as a core symptom of autism and may play 
an important role in the repetitive behaviours and stereotyped routines 
commonly seen in children with ASD (Turner, 1999).  The hypothesis of 
executive dysfunction proposes that children with autism are impaired on 
tasks that require higher order cognitive processes, such as inhibition 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996).  Comparative studies on executive function 
have revealed no differences between individuals with HFA and AD 
(Manjiviona & Prior, 1999; Ozonoff, Pennington et al., 1991; Szatmari et al., 
1990).  However, the participants in each group showed deficits in at least 
some areas of executive function which was relative to participants without 
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one of the ASD.  These results have been substantiated by recent studies 
using DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria 
(Ghaziuddin et al., 1994; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; Ozonoff et al., 2000).  The 
evidence suggests that executive function does not differentiate HFA and AD. 
 
2.6.9 Central coherence  
Central coherence is the process of perceiving a meaningful whole or gaining 
meaning from what is observed.  It is believed that individuals with ASD have 
a weak central coherence, that is, a tendency to examine separate or 
unconnected stimuli, or parts of the stimulus, rather than perceiving a 
meaningful whole (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; Frith, 1989).   
 
There is limited comparative research on central coherence.  Rinehart, 
Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton and Tonge (2000) examined interference effects 
of global and local stimuli on the responses of young people with HFA and 
AD during a computer-based task.  No differences were found between the 
clinical groups in the number of errors associated with the interference of 
local detail on global processing.  Results were interpreted as supporting the 
notion that autism and AD belong on the same continuum. 
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2.6.10 Psychiatric co-morbidity  
There is evidence of greater psychiatric co-morbidity in AD compared with 
HFA.  For example, Szatmari (1991) and Szatmari et al. (1989) suggested 
that anxiety symptoms and a schizotypal personality are more common in 
AD.  Tonge et al. (1999) found high rates of emotional and behavioural 
disturbance in young people with HFA and AD.  However, according to parent 
reports young people with AD showed more symptoms of anxiety and 
disruptive anti-social behaviour than young people with HFA (Tonge et al., 
1999).  It is important to note that differences have not always been found 
between the groups on co-morbid psychiatric disorders.  For example, on the 
basis of parental report, Kim et al. (2000) found equally high rates of anxiety 
and depression in children and adolescents with HFA and AD.  Similarly, 
Howlin (2003) found comparable rates of co-morbid psychiatric conditions in 
individuals with the two disorders. 
 
2.6.11 Social interaction skills 
Research shows that individuals with HFA and AD have significant 
impairments in social functioning (Szatmari et al., 1995; Szatmari, Bartolucci 
et al., 1989; Szatmari et al., 1990).  That is, they often use language 
inappropriately in their social interactions and lack non-verbal communication 
skills when interacting with others.  Despite the fact that impairments in 
socialisation are a core feature of both disorders, comparative research on 
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social behaviour is very limited.  The research to date has relied almost 
exclusively on parent and teacher reports and suffers from a lack of 
consistent diagnostic criteria (Szatmari, Bartolucci et al., 1989; Szatmari et 
al., 1990). 
 
On the basis of parent reports, Szatmari et al. (1995) found that children with 
both HFA and AD showed deficits in social and communicative competence, 
and where differences existed, these were in the direction of children with AD 
demonstrating superior social interaction skills.  It has been shown that 
children with AD have a stronger desire for friendship and a greater ability to 
engage in pro-social behaviours than children with HFA.  But they do not 
necessarily have a superior ability to form and maintain these friendships 
(Eisenmajer et al., 1996; Gillberg, 1989).  If children with AD have a stronger 
desire for friendship and a greater ability to engage in pro-social behaviours, 
then they should have a superior ability to form and maintain friendships, 
even though their skills might not be very advanced. The results reflect a lack 
of consistent diagnostic criteria used in the previous research making it 
difficult to interpret and compare the results.  Furthermore, the findings have 
been influenced by the way in which social skills and friendship seeking 
behaviours were measured.  These studies relied on parental report rather 
than professional observation which may have produced different findings 
about the social functioning of children with AD.  While there are some 
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differences in social competence in young children with HFA and AD, it 
seems with age, these differences disappear.  For example, on the basis of 
retrospective parental reports Ozonoff et al. (2000) found that at four to five 
years of age, children with AD showed fewer deficits in reciprocal social 
interaction than the HFA group.  However, when the participants were aged 
between six and 21 year old, these differences no longer remained.  
Furthermore, Gilchrist et al. (2001) found that in early development, children 
with AD showed fewer deficits than those with HFA in imitative social play, 
physically preparing themselves to be lifted, attention and help-seeking, and 
greeting behaviour.  However, on the basis of parent report, there were no 
differences between the groups once the children reached adolescence 
(Gilchrist et al., 2001). 
 
In summary, most of the studies comparing individuals with HFA and AD 
suggest there are few qualitative differences between the two conditions.  
Most of the research, however, suffers from a lack of consistent diagnostic 
criteria and therefore it is very difficult to interpret and compare results across 
studies. 
 
The present study, investigating self-understanding in high-functioning males 
with ASD, and the relationship to social functioning and theory of mind (ToM) 
will add to the growing body of research on children and adolescents with 
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HFA and AD.  Strict operational definitions of HFA and AD were applied to 
avoid confusion caused by the inadequate and inconsistent criteria evident in 
previous research.  Further information about differential diagnostic process 
is set out in chapter five (Methodology).  A review of the literature on self-
understanding and ToM follows.   
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Chapter 3 
Self-understanding  
 
3.1 Self-understanding 
Self-understanding is a multifaceted construct comprising several dimensions 
that define a person’s view of his or her “personhood” or individuality.  These 
dimensions typically include physical attributes, cognitive and psychological 
features as well as interpersonal and social dimensions that ensure a 
connection to society, integration into a social-cultural world, and most 
importantly, differentiation from others (Plesa-Skwerer, Sullivan, Joffre, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2004). 
 
Self-understanding develops over time and is shaped by particular cognitive 
abilities and limitations from each developmental stage.  Self-understanding 
is influenced by socialisation experiences, including interactions with parents, 
siblings, teachers and peers, and the wider socio-cultural environment 
(Harter, 1999). 
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Self-understanding in infants and toddlers is focused on self-awareness 
which is often measured by perceptual image tasks (Bullock & Lutkenhaus, 
1990) and some of these techniques include mirror self-recognition 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993,1996; Bertenthal & 
Fischer, 1978; Butterworth, 1990; Gullap, 1970; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; 
Mans, Cicchetti, & Sroufe, 1978) and picture self-recognition (Lewis & 
Brooks-Gunn, 1979). 
 
Development in speech and language allows the young child to reveal further 
dimensions of self-understanding.  These dimensions include references to 
the self in everyday speech.  For example, the use of their own name and 
personal pronouns to refer to self (Brown, 1973) and the use of internal states 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). 
 
In older children and adolescents self-understanding is measured using self-
descriptions and self-evaluations.  These techniques include use of emotions 
associated with self-evaluation (Lewis, Sullivan, Stranger, & Weiss, 1989; 
Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990) and self-description of representational 
characteristics (both neutral and evaluative) (Stipek et al., 1990).   
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3.2  The self-as-subject and the self-as-object    
The study of self-understanding can be traced back to ancient Greek 
philosophy, as revealed in the ancient Greek aphorism “know thyself”.  
However, contemporary scholars of the self almost always acknowledge the 
work of William James (1961/1892) as one of the most influential theorists on 
self development (Damon & Hart, 1988).  James argued there are two distinct 
but related aspects of the self, the subjective ‘I’ (the self-as-subject) and the 
objective ‘me’ (the self-as-object). 
 
The subjective ‘I’ (self-as-subject) is the “self-as-knower”, the aspect of self 
that continually organises and interprets experience in a subjective manner 
(James, 1961/1892).  The essence of the ‘I’ aspect of self is its subjectivity.  
The ‘I’ incorporates precisely those experiential features of self that elude all 
other constructs.  The ‘I’ more than any other aspect of the person requires a 
special “self” notion to express (Damon & Hart, 1988).  James (1961/1892) 
states that an individual may become aware of the ‘I’ through four types of 
experiences:  
• the awareness of his/her agency over life events which provides the 
individual with a sense of autonomy; 
• the awareness of his/her continuity which provides an individual with a 
sense of stability over time; 
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• the awareness of his/her distinctness or uniqueness of life experiences 
which provides the individual with a sense of one’s individuality; and  
• the awareness of his/her own awareness or self-reflectivity which 
provides the individual with a sense of self-consciousness.        
The self-as-subject emerges from two functional aspects of the world, the 
ecological self and the interpersonal self (James, 1961/1892).  The self-as-
subject has its origins in the predisposed capacity to sense order, consistency 
and regularity in the information registered by the infant (Hobson, 2002). This 
information may be organised in terms of what is physically available (the 
ecological self) and what is available through other people (the interpersonal 
self). 
 
Compared with the interpersonal self, the ecological self appears to be intact 
in young people with ASD.  For example, clinical descriptions of young people 
with ASD illustrate their relatively good skills in negotiating their environment, 
in contrast to their marked difficulties relating to people (Asperger, 1944/1991; 
Kanner, 1943). Thus, because the ecological self appears to be intact in 
young people with ASD the theory and evidence supporting the ecological 
self will not be taken further in this study.  
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The interpersonal self develops through a series of stages as the infant’s 
other capacities emerge and develop (Hobson, 1990).  The reactions of 
babies to their physical and social environments are based upon a 
predisposed capacity to hold primary representations of their perceived 
reality, whereas secondary representations, however, are detached or 
separated from one’s immediate perceptual reality (Hobson, 2002).  Thus, an 
accurate awareness requires secondary representation.  The self-as-object is 
not a direct perception of the self but rather a constructed mental model.  The 
emergence of the self-as-object is now considered. 
 
The objective ‘me’ aspect of self (self-as-object) is known as “the sum total of 
all a person can call his” (James, 1961/1892).  James states the ‘me’ aspect 
of self comprises three primary constituents:  
• the material characteristics of the self, which include one’s body and 
possessions;  
• the social characteristics of the self, which include one’s relations, 
roles and personality; and  
• the spiritual characteristics of the self, which include one’s conscious, 
thoughts and psychological mechanisms.   
 
 38
James (1961/1892) wrote that each individual organises the constituents of 
the ‘me’ into a hierarchical structure with the bodily me at the bottom, the 
spiritual me at the top, and the extra-corporeal material selves and the 
various social selves in between.  Damon and Hart (1982) proposed a fourth 
constituent, the active self, which includes active qualities of the self or typical 
activities that one performs. In contrast to James (1961/1892) Damon and 
Hart (1988) argue that each constituent of the ‘me’ develops in its own right 
and alongside the others. 
 
The self-as-object emerges from the co-ordinated communications between a 
young child and their carers as evidenced by joint attention, social 
referencing, imitation and social role-taking (Hobson, 2002).  Joint attention 
involves the ability to focus on oneself, an object or event and another person 
with the sole purpose of sharing interest (Kasari, Freeman, & Paparella, 
2001).  The capacity of young children to engage in joint attention has been 
supported by research including a series of studies conducted by Butterworth 
and Cochran (1980). 
  
Social referencing refers to the capacity to register and respond to another 
person’s affective orientation toward objects, other people or events within a 
shared environment (Hobson, 1990).  Research suggests that one-year old 
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children can register and respond to their mothers’ emotional state towards a 
shared situation (Sorce, Emede, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985).   
 
Imitation refers to the capacity of the young child to recognise and identify 
with other people (Meltzoff, 1988b,1990).  Research indicates that there are 
at least three types of imitation displayed by young children (Meltzoff, 1990). 
The simplest form of imitation is social modelling where the young child 
imitates the actions of another person while they are being performed.  A 
more cognitively demanding form of imitation is deferred imitation, where the 
young child holds a mental representation of the event and recalls it later.  
The most cognitively demanding form of imitation is social mirroring, where 
the young child recognises his/her own actions as being imitated by another 
person.  Deferred imitation and social mirroring are particularly important in 
the development of self-understanding because they highlight the young 
child’s capacity to psychologically link in with another person (Hobson, 2002).   
 
Social role-taking involves the ability to emotionally attune to another person 
(Hobson, 2002).  It is an explicit demonstration of one person’s awareness of 
him/herself as similar, but at the same time differentiated from other people’s 
psychological stances that he/she may adopt in relation to the world.  Social 
role-taking is important in the development of self-understanding, theory of 
mind and empathy (Hoffman, 1982). 
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Joint attention, social referencing, imitation and social role-taking are 
examples of secondary inter-subjectivity and are a reflection of awareness of 
the self as similar to but separate from others.  This new level of awareness 
enables children to reflect upon and categorise the attitudes of others towards 
the self.   
 
Section 3.3 will summarise the development of self-understanding in typically 
developing (TD) children and adolescents.  This is important for the present 
study because self-understanding in young people with ASD may be delayed 
or limited to one of the early stages. 
 
3.3  The development of self-understanding 
Self-understanding in children and adolescents typically develops over six 
stages (Harter, 1999).  The differences in these six stages show an 
increasing sophistication of self-understanding with age.  At each stage, 
however, certain aspects are granted more significance.  The critical aspects 
of each stage are described below.  
 
In early childhood the young child tends to refer to him/herself in terms of 
typical activities, physical appearance and material possessions (Harter, 
1999).  In this age group, the social sense of self is not as prominent as the 
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physical, active and psychological self and is restricted to an expression of 
basic emotions and preferences (Harter, 1999). 
 
In middle childhood, self-understanding is still restricted to activities, physical 
attributes and material possessions, but these self-descriptions tend to be 
more detailed than in early childhood (Harter, 1999).  During this period, 
children begin to coordinate concepts and use opposites (e.g. good, bad) to 
describe their abilities and there is a tendency to overestimate skills.  An 
important development during this period is the realisation that other people 
have viewpoints toward the self which is used as a self-guide for behaviour 
(Higgins, 1991).  During middle childhood self-understanding is based on 
comparisons of self now and in the past (Suls & Sanders, 1982). 
 
In late childhood there is a significant shift in self-understanding.  The child 
continues to define the self in terms of activities, but adds personal efforts, 
talents and wishes which are understood to be important aspects of the self 
(Harter, 1999).  The awareness of others seems to be more acute, and the 
self is defined in comparison to others (Secord & Peevers, 1974).  In addition, 
the child considers his/her own abilities in relation to others’ reactions.  This 
forms the basis for the child’s social self (Harter, 1999). 
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The period of adolescence represents a dramatic developmental transition 
and physical and cognitive changes occur.  Self-understanding in early 
adolescence moves from the use of evaluative terms (e.g. smart, good etc.) 
to evaluation of the self as an individual (Harter, 1999).  Furthermore, the 
social self is now defined in terms of personality characteristics that influence 
one’s social appeal. Self-understanding during this period becomes 
increasingly differentiated to become a construction of multiple selves that 
vary across different roles and relationships (Grecas, 1972; Griffin, Chassin, 
& Young, 1981; Hart, 1988; Harter, 1988; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & 
Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Smollar & Youniss, 1985). 
 
In mid-adolescence self-understanding broadens to include personal 
attributes as described by others.  Self-understanding is heightened as young 
people become preoccupied with what others think of them (Broughton, 1978; 
Elkind, 1967; Harter, 1990a, 1990b; Lapsley & Rice, 1988; Rosenberg, 1979).  
Cognitive-developmental advances in this stage see contradictions in self-
descriptions which can lead to concerns over which characteristics reflect 
one’s true self (Harter, 1999). 
 
In late adolescence self-descriptions continue to include social and 
personality characteristics and moral and personal evaluations also influence 
the self (Damon & Hart, 1988; Secord & Peevers, 1974).  The emphasis on 
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self-understanding shifts away from the constituents of James’s self-as-object 
and moves towards aspects of self-as-subject.  There is a focus on the self 
into the future and the young person moves towards an integration of 
disparate aspects of self into an internally consistent construct system 
(Harter, 1999).   
 
The development of self-understanding in typically developing children and 
adolescents has been reviewed.  The following section investigates the 
literature on self-understanding in young people with high-functioning ASD. 
 
3.4  Self-understanding in young people with autism spectrum 
disorders 
The present study aims to systematically examine self-understanding in 
young males with high-functioning ASD compared with a TD comparison 
group.  It will seek to determine whether self-understanding is related to an 
understanding of others’ mental states (theory of mind: ToM).  Furthermore, 
this study aims to examine the characteristics and abilities of young males 
with high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder (AD) to determine 
whether there are any significant differences in self-understanding and theory 
of mind between these two groups.  The section below is focused on the 
literature on self-understanding in ASD.  The ability to understand others’ 
mental states (ToM) will be considered in chapter four. 
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As mentioned, the self-as-object emerges from the co-ordinated 
communications between a young child and their carers as evidenced by joint 
attention, social referencing, imitation and social role-taking (Hobson, 2002).  
These early co-ordinated communications are important because they reflect 
an awareness of the self as similar but separate from others and have been 
shown to be impaired (to varying degrees) in individuals with ASD.  For 
example, children with ASD have difficulties with the following:  
• joint attention (Attwood, Frith, & Hermelin, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 
1989d,1995; Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 
1994); 
• social referencing (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1986) 
• imitation (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1994; Dawson & Adams, 1984; 
Dawson & Galpert, 1990; Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & 
Brown, 1998; Hobson & Lee, 1999; Nielsen, Suddendorf, & 
Dissanayake, 2006), and  
• social role-taking (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986; Dawson & 
Fernald, 1987; Oswald & Ollendick, 1989; Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari, & 
Mundy, 1992). 
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Hobson (1990) claims that children with autism lack the prerequisites for self-
understanding and thus fail to develop an “interpersonal self”.  He suggests 
that children with autism fail to see themselves as subjects of experience and 
lack the capacity to think of themselves as thinkers.  He reasoned that self-
understanding (or self-knowledge) is critical to understanding the mental 
states of others and suggests that because children with autism lack a sense 
of “themselves” as potential objects of other people’s evaluations they fail to 
develop a ‘concept of persons’.   
  
Three studies on the self-understanding of persons with ASD were 
discovered, two of these studies were focused on individuals with ASD who 
had an intellectual disability (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 
2003).  Consistent with Hobson’s argument, the findings from these two 
studies suggest that verbally able children with ASD express a more 
restricted range of emotions and tend not to view themselves in terms of 
social activities and relations.  
 
Mavropoulou (1995) reported an examination of self-understanding in seven 
children with “autistic tendencies” compared with nine children with moderate 
learning difficulties and six adults “thought to have” Asperger’s syndrome. 
Mavropoulou (1995) administered Damon and Hart’s (1988) self-
understanding interview and reported that the children with autistic 
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tendencies persisted in describing physical and active aspects of themselves 
and made no references to their social and psychological characteristics.  In 
contrast, social and psychological aspects were frequently elicited in the 
responses from the moderate learning difficulties group.  The autistic 
tendencies group tended to maintain physicalistic views for the formation of 
self, its continuity and distinctness.  For example, in describing themselves 
verbally able children with autism distinguished themselves from others on 
the basis of their name, age, possessions and typical behaviour; whereas the 
moderate learning difficulties group made comparisons based on their talents, 
abilities and efforts. 
 
Mavropoulou’s (1995) study revealed an interesting pattern of responses by 
young people with ASD.  Lee and Hobson (1998) however, identified several 
methodological weaknesses: inadequacy of diagnoses, lack of quantification 
and reliability of ratings.  These methodological issues have been addressed 
by Lee and Hobson (1998) in another study on self-understanding in young 
people with autism which will be reviewed below.  
 
Lee and Hobson (1998) investigated self-understanding in twelve adolescents 
with autism (as per criteria for autistic disorder in the DSM-IV) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) who had an intellectual disability, compared 
with ten young people without autism who had an intellectually disability.  The 
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participants ranged from nine to 19 years.  Lee and Hobson (1998) 
administered Damon and Hart’s (1988) self-understanding interview and 
found no difference in the overall quality (level of description) and quantity of 
statements that fell within the physical, active or psychological categories. 
There was, however, a difference in terms of the quality of responses given in 
the psychological category; children with autism gave more emphasis to their 
preferences rather than their emotions or intellectual capacities.  Moreover, 
the statements by the children with autism that referred to emotions made 
references to being happy, excited and upset.  The emotional responses from 
the non-autistic group were far more varied, for example, including references 
to being uptight, ashamed and feeling worried.  The main group difference 
was that very few of the statements made by the children with autism referred 
to social relations.  This study revealed that in talking about themselves, 
verbally able individuals with autism seemed to think about their physical 
features and activities in the same way as non-autistic people of the same 
age and intellectual ability, but they expressed a more restricted range of 
emotions than non-autistic individuals and tend not to view themselves in 
terms of social activities and relations. 
 
A study by Yoshii and Yoshimatsu (2003) compared adolescents (aged 14 to 
18 years old) with autism (as per criteria for autistic disorder in the DSM-IV-
TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) who also had an intellectual 
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disability with non-autistic intellectually disabled subjects. Yoshii and 
Yoshimatsu (2003) administered Damon and Hart’s (1988) self-understanding 
interview and found significant differences in the self-understanding of 
adolescents with autism (and intellectual disability) compared with the 
intellectually disabled comparisons.  The adolescents with autism had 
significantly less developed self-understanding compared with adolescents 
who had an intellectual disability. 
 
Smukler (2005) argues there is no better source of evidence about a person’s 
knowledge of self than what they say, because this gives you a view into 
someone’s state of mind and depth of self knowledge.  In spite of this there 
has been little in the way of systematic research into self-understanding of 
young people with high-functioning ASD.  Evidence, however, from 
autobiographical writings of high-functioning individuals with ASD suggest 
that they have insight into their own mental states (Frith & Happe, 1999).  
These autobiographical writings typically include memories of early childhood, 
and accounts of adult life experiences.  For example, Donna Williams (1994) 
wrote “I was sick to death of my attention wandering onto the reflection of 
every element of light and colour . . .” (Williams, 1994) and Temple Grandin 
(1992) wrote: 
“As a child I was hyperactive, but I did not feel nervous until I reached 
puberty . . . the feeling was like a constant feeling of stage fright all the 
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time . . . I had a pounding heart, sweaty palms and restless 
movements. . . I had an odd lack of awareness of my oddities of 
speech and mannerisms. . .” (p. 111). 
 
These autobiographical accounts show that adults with ASD are able to 
describe themselves and show insight into their own mental states.  However, 
these narratives are difficult to interpret and assess, they do not show that 
these individuals must have been aware of their own mental states at the time 
in question and unlike other biographers they are not wondering about how 
the reader might see them and their families (Frith & Happe, 1999). 
 
Research on individuals with AD using an experience sampling interview 
technique found that out of the three AD subjects interviewed, two were able 
to think and talk about their inner experiences (Hurlburt, Happe, & Frith, 
1994).  Another important finding was, compared to TD subjects, individuals 
with AD showed no interest in, or curiosity about, how their own inner 
experiences might differ from those of others. 
 
Self-competence and emotion understanding have been investigated in 
young people with high-functioning ASD.  For example, research by Capps, 
Sigman & Yirmiya (1995) found perceived self-competence was lower for 
high-functioning children with ASD compared to a typically developing (TD) 
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comparison group and was lowest among the most highly intelligent autistic 
children.  These highly intelligent children showed they had greater access to 
their own and others’ emotional experiences; they were able to talk about 
their own emotional experiences with ease (Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992) 
and were more accurate in labelling the emotions of others (Yirmiya et al., 
1992).  This, and other research (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Humphrey & 
Lewis, 2008; Meyer, Mundy, Vaughan Van Hecke, & Durocher, 2006) 
suggests that individuals with high-functioning ASD had enough insight to 
report their own mental states and have a sense of distinctness from others. 
 
3.5  Damon and Hart’s model of self-understanding  
Damon and Hart (1982; 1988) constructed a comprehensive framework  for 
studying both the structural organisation and developmental changes of self-
understanding from early childhood to late adolescence.  The model is 
represented in Figure 1; the horizontal dimension corresponds to the self-as-
subject and self-as-object schemes.   The vertical dimension in the figure 
represents the progression through which the components themselves 
develop. 
 
Damon and Hart (1982; 1988) utilised this model as a theoretical starting 
point for developing their semi-structured self-understanding interview.  
Responses to interview questions are classified according to a coding 
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scheme consisting of four self-as-object categories: physical, active, social 
and psychological aspects of the self and three self-as-subject categories: 
continuity, distinctness and agency.   
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Figure 1: The developmental model of self-understanding (adapted from Damon and Hart, 1988)  
Level and 
Period for 
functioning in 
each category 
General 
Organising 
Principle 
Agency Continuity Distinctness  Physical 
Self 
Active  
Self 
Social  
Self 
Psychological 
Self 
 1 Early 
Childhood 
Categorical 
Identifications 
External 
uncontrollable 
factors 
determine self 
Categorical 
identifications 
Categorical 
identifications 
 Bodily 
properties or 
material 
possessions 
Typical 
behaviour 
Fact of 
membership in 
particular social 
relations or 
groups 
Momentary 
moods, feelings, 
preferences and 
aversions 
2 Middle to 
late Childhood 
Comparative 
Assessments 
Efforts, wishes 
and talents 
influence self 
Permanent 
cognitive and 
active capabilities 
and immutable 
self-
characteristics 
Comparisons 
between self 
and other along 
isolated 
dimensions  
 Capability– 
related 
physical 
attributes  
Abilities 
relative to 
others, self or 
normative 
standards  
Abilities or acts 
considered in 
the light of 
others’ 
reactions 
Knowledge, 
cognitive abilities, 
or ability related 
emotions 
3 Early 
Adolescence 
Inter-personal 
Implications 
Communication 
and reciprocal 
interaction 
influence self 
Ongoing 
recognition of self 
by others 
Unique 
combinations of 
psychological 
and physical 
attributes  
 Physical 
attributes that 
influence 
social appeal 
and social 
interactions 
Active 
attributes that 
influence 
social appeal 
and social 
interactions 
Social 
personality 
characteristics 
Social sensitivity, 
communicative 
competence, & 
other 
psychologically 
related social 
skills 
4 Late 
Adolescence 
Systematic 
Beliefs and 
Plans 
Moral or 
personal 
evaluations 
influence self 
Relations 
between past, 
present, and 
future selves 
Unique 
subjective 
experience and 
interpretations 
of events 
 Physical 
attributes 
reflecting 
volitional 
choices, or 
personal and 
moral 
standards 
Active 
attributes that 
reflect 
choices, 
personal or 
moral 
standards 
Moral or 
personal 
choices 
concerning 
social relations 
or social 
personality 
characteristics  
Belief systems, 
personal 
philosophy, self’s 
own thought 
processes 
   SELF-AS-
SUBJECT 
   SELF-AS- 
OBJECT 
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The four self-as-object categories are defined as physical aspects which 
relate to the self’s physical body and material possessions; active aspects 
that include one’s active activities and abilities; social aspects of the self, 
which denote an awareness of one’s social personality characteristics, social 
interactions, or social relations and psychological aspects, which describe an 
awareness of one’s emotions, thoughts, or cognitive processes. 
 
The three self-as-subject categories are defined as continuity, the awareness 
of the self’s personal changes over time; distinctness, the awareness of being 
different or distinct from others and agency, the awareness of one’s 
intentional actions and self-monitoring of these actions.   
 
Damon and Hart (1988) argue that all aspects of the self are present from 
early childhood; however within each component there are levels which 
reflect a developmental progression.  Thus, categories are further classified 
into four levels, reflecting an increase in the complexity of self description, 
from defining the self in concrete terms of surface, observable characteristics, 
to a concept of the self as perceived in reference to the reactions of others 
and to one’s life philosophy  (Plesa-Skwerer et al., 2004).  Further information 
about the self-understanding interview is set out in chapter five 
(Methodology). 
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3.6  Summary 
Self-understanding is a multifaceted construct comprising several dimensions 
that define a person’s view of his or her “personhood” or individuality.  William 
James (1961/1892) argued there are two distinct but related aspects of the 
self, the subjective ‘I’ (the self-as-subject) and the objective ‘me’ (the self-as-
object).  The subjective ‘I’ (self-as-subject) is the “self-as-knower”, the aspect 
of self that continually organises and interprets experience in a subjective 
manner.  In contrast, the objective ‘me’ aspect of self (self-as-object) is known 
as “the sum total of all a person can call his”. 
 
Three studies on self-understanding of persons with ASD were discovered 
and two of these studies were focused on individuals with ASD who also had 
an intellectual disability (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003) 
and another study was on high-functioning children with autistic tendencies 
and adults thought to have Asperger’s disorder.  The findings from these 
three studies suggested that verbally able individuals with ASD express a 
more restricted range of emotions than TD individuals and tend to be less 
likely to view themselves in terms of social activities and relations. 
 
There has been little systematic research into the self-understanding of young 
people with high-functioning ASD.  Evidence, however, from related studies 
(e.g. self-concept and autobiographical writings of high-functioning individuals 
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with ASD) has suggested that they have insight into their own mental states  
and have a sense of distinctness from others (Frith & Happe, 1999). 
 
Various aspects of the self are integrated in the model proposed by Damon 
and Hart (1988) which forms the theoretical basis of the interview used in the 
present study.  The following chapter (Chapter 4) will investigate the ability to 
understand others’ mental states (theory of mind). 
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Chapter 4 
Theory of mind 
 
4.1  Theory of mind 
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to infer the psychological states of other 
people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  Specifically, ToM is a person’s 
understanding that they and other people act on the basis of mental states 
such as desires, intentions, emotions and beliefs.  These mental states are 
used to both predict and explain behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This 
ability appears to be a prerequisite for normal social interaction (Frith & 
Happe, 1999), communication and possibly the acquisition of language 
(Bloom, 1998; Frith & Happe, 1994).  In addition, a well developed ToM is 
associated with educational success (Astington, 1988).  Thus, ToM has 
ramifications that extend across the domains of social functioning, 
communication and academic achievement.   
 
Cognitive processes are inherent to ToM.  According to Leslie (1987; 1988; 
1991) the cognitive system produces primary and secondary representations 
(or metarepresentations).  The former are beliefs about concepts of the 
physical world.  The latter are beliefs about one’s own or other’s primary 
representations.  Leslie (1991) claims that metarepresentation is necessary 
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for attribution of any mental state, including beliefs.  An individual with a fully 
developed representational ToM understands that he/she and other people 
act on the basis of their beliefs. 
 
The neurological basis of ToM has been explored through neuropsychological 
and brain imaging studies (Frith & Frith, 1999; 2005).  A number of studies 
have found that deficits in ToM are associated with damaged or reduced 
activation in specific parts of the brain (e.g. orbito-and medial-frontal cortex, 
amygdala, temporal poles and superior temporal sulcus) (Baron-Cohen, Ring 
et al., 1999; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford, 1999; Castelli, 
Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Happe, Brownell, & Winner, 1999; Happe & Frith, 
1996; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; Stuss, Gallop, & Alexander, 
2001). 
 
4.1.1  Theories on the development of theory of mind 
Several types of theories have been offered as explanations for the 
development of ToM (Flavell, 2004).  The theory-theory is a leading account 
that explains the development of ToM (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) and describes ToM 
as a detached theoretical process.  According to theory-theory, an individual’s 
everyday conception of the mind is an implicit theory, originating in childhood.  
New theories develop through the combination of conceptual structures of old 
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theories (e.g. recalling facts about an individual’s past behaviour) and new 
evidence (e.g. recent social interactions).  Proponents of theory-theory argue 
that how individuals read others’ minds can be extended to provide an 
account of how the person reads their own mind, that is, detecting one’s own 
attitudes engages the same inferential mechanism as detecting someone 
else’s (Frith & Happe, 1999; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994). Thus, theory-theory is 
particularly relevant to the present study which investigates the relationship 
between self-understanding and the understanding of others’ minds in young 
males with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (ASD). 
 
Other accounts that attempt to explain the development of ToM include:  
• modular accounts (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994; Scholl & Leslie, 
1999) that emphasise that ToM develops from dedicated neurological 
mechanisms;  
• simulation accounts (Gordon, 1996; Harris, 1992) that emphasise that 
ToM develops from knowledge that allows one to mimic the mental 
state of another person;  
• executive functioning accounts (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Hughes, 
1998; Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, Pennington et al., 1991; 
Sodian, Hulsken, & Thoermer, 2003) which emphasise that 
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improvement in children's executive functioning with age helps make 
possible the acquisition of key ToM competencies; and  
• sociolinguistic accounts (Astington & Baird, 2005; Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Garfield, Peterson, & Perry, 
2001; Harris, 2005; Siegal, 1991; Tager-Flusberg, 1993) that 
emphasise the connection between social experience, language 
acquisition and the development of ToM.  
 
4.1.2  The development of theory of mind 
According to Piaget’s (1929) formulation of early childhood egocentrism, a 
child does not understand that others’ views and thoughts differ from his or 
her own.  Piaget’s ideas are similar to ToM, but there is general agreement 
among researchers that children pass ToM tasks earlier than they leave 
Piaget’s egocentric stage (Wellman, 1990). 
 
There are a number of early social behaviours that are considered precursors 
to the development of ToM.  Joint attention is particularly important for the 
development of ToM (Charman et al., 2000).  A longitudinal study conducted 
by Charman et al. (2000) demonstrated that children who displayed the 
highest rates of joint attention at 20 months scored highest on ToM tasks at 
44 months.   
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There is a vast amount of research literature (see below) on the acquisition of 
ToM in typically developing children, occurring after the infancy period.  In 
general, children develop the capacity to identify and infer mental states in 
the particular developmental order of feelings, perceptions, desires, 
intentions, and finally, beliefs (Flavell, 2004).  Following is a brief summary of 
some of the major findings: 
1) Feelings:  Preschoolers attribute inner feelings to people who display 
emotions (Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995).  In later 
years, children learn more advanced concepts about emotions, for 
example, people do not always really feel what they appear to feel 
(Flavell & Miller, 1998). 
2) Perception:  Preschoolers recognise that a common object may 
present different visual appearances to two people if viewed from 
different positions (Flavell, 1992).  They can appreciate that attention 
is selective and limited and different people may mentally represent 
the same object differently (Fabricius & Schwanenflugel, 1994; 
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Pillow, 1995). 
3) Desires:  By the age of three, children are not only using some desire 
terms correctly, they also seem to grasp simple causal relations 
among desires, outcomes, emotions, and actions which suggests 
they are developing an implicit theory (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
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4) Beliefs:  There have been many studies of children’s understanding of 
non-pretence mental states such as beliefs that are meant to 
represent reality (Flavell & Miller, 1998).  The majority of these 
studies have dealt with children’s understanding of representations 
that differ from person to person or differ from reality (e.g. false- 
belief).   
 
Children’s knowledge about mental representations continues to develop past 
the preschool years.  In particular, it is not until middle childhood and later 
that children appear to gain any substantial understanding of the mind as an 
active, interpretive, constructive processor (Barquero, Robinson, & Thomas, 
2003; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). 
 
4.2  Theory of mind in young people with autism spectrum disorders 
It has been shown that children with ASD have difficulties with those social 
behaviours that represent early manifestations for ToM.  Children with ASD 
have difficulties with the following:  
• joint attention (Attwood et al., 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989d,1995; 
Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mundy et al., 1994); 
• social referencing (Mundy et al., 1986) 
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• imitation (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1994; Dawson & Adams, 1984; 
Dawson & Galpert, 1990; Dawson et al., 1998; Nielsen et al., 2006); 
and  
• social role-taking (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Dawson & Fernald, 1987; 
Oswald & Ollendick, 1989; Yirmiya et al., 1992). 
 
Imaginative or pretend play has also been marked as a function of early 
developing ToM ability (Baron-Cohen, 2001).  Studies have reported a lower 
frequency of pretend play for children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Craig, 
1997; Lewis & Boucher, 1988; Ungerer & Sigman, 1981; Wing, Gould, 
Yeates, & Brierley, 1977). 
 
It has been hypothesised that impairments in ToM underlie the core social 
and communicative symptoms in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 2000).  The severity of the ToM impairment is significantly greater in 
children with ASD than in other child populations, such as those with 
intellectual disabilities, schizophrenia or language impairment (Bishop, 2000; 
Happe, 1995; Pilowsky, Yirmiya, Arbelle, & Mozes, 2000; Serra, Loth, Van 
Geert, Hurkens, & Minderaa, 2002; Tager-Flusberg, 2001, 2003b; Ziatas, 
Durkin, & Pratt, 1998). 
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The extent of the impairment has been demonstrated in a number of studies 
employing a variety of tests (including both social-cognitive and social-
perceptual measures) with children with ASD.  Individuals with ASD appear to 
have difficulties with the following:  
• mental-physical distinctions (Baron-Cohen, 1989a);  
• understanding functions of the brain (e.g. dreaming, thinking etc.) 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989a);  
• appearance-reality distinctions (Baron-Cohen, 1989a);  
• seeing leads to knowing test (or difficulties understanding who knows 
what) (Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994; Leslie & Frith, 1988); 
• recognising mental state words (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 1992); 
• understanding complex causes of emotions (such as beliefs) (Baron-
Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993); 
• inferring mental states from eye-gaze direction (Baron-Cohen, 1989c; 
Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Campbell, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995; Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992; 
Brent, Rios, Happe, & Charman, 2004; Hobson, 1984; Leekam, Baron-
Cohen, Brown, Perrett, & Milders, 1997); 
• identifying the underlying intention behind a character’s utterance that 
was not true in strange stories (Brent et al., 2004); 
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• monitoring one’s own intentions (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 
1998); 
• production of deception, but also understanding when someone else is 
deceiving them (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992; Yirmiya, 
Solomonica-Levi, & Shulman, 1996; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, 
Shulman, & Pilowsky, 1996) 
• understanding metaphors, sarcasm, jokes and irony (Baron-Cohen, 
1997; Happe, 1994); and  
• the use of language appropriate to the social context (pragmatics) 
(Baron-Cohen, 1988; Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Jones, Stone, & 
Plaisted, 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 1993). 
 
4.2.1  False-belief understanding  
A common approach to assessing ToM in children with ASD has focused on 
the attainment of false-belief understanding, which is the understanding that 
others hold a belief whose content contradicts reality (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001).  False-belief understanding is considered a conceptual 
perspective-taking skill and is typically measured by social-cognitive tasks 
which relate to the understanding that different people have different thoughts 
about the same situation.  The ability to attribute false-beliefs to oneself and 
others, which is normally acquired at around four years of age (Wimmer & 
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Perner, 1983), is considered a particularly important milestone in the 
development of ToM.  False-belief attribution marks the emergence of a 
representational concept of mind, whereby children implicitly understand that 
mental states are subjective representations of the world which are 
independent of, and not necessarily congruent with, reality (Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990).   
 
A large number of research studies have demonstrated that children with 
ASD have difficulties with attributing false-beliefs to someone else, and 
instead children with ASD tend to report what they themselves know (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Leekam & Perner, 
1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Reed & Peterson, 1990; 
Swettenham, 1996; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996). 
 
First-order belief tests are a standard approach to assessing false-belief 
understanding.  These tests involve inferring one person’s mental state 
(Wellman, 1990).  Typically developing (TD) children achieve competence in 
first-order false-belief tests by four years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
 
In comparison, individuals with ASD are typically much older than four years 
when they pass first-order false-belief tests.  Happe (1995) found that on 
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average a verbal mental age of nine years old for children with ASD was 
required before succeeding on such tests, and the lowest mental age in the 
sample was 5 ½ years (Happe, 1995). 
 
Results consistently show that first-order beliefs are understood before 
second-order beliefs (Silliman et al., 2003).  Second-order false-belief tests 
involve coordinating multiple perspectives about what two characters are 
thinking in a situation where the conflicting beliefs of the two characters are 
known to the participant but not to the characters (e.g. what John thinks Mary 
thinks).  The understanding of second-order false-beliefs (especially implicit 
false-beliefs) is often considered a “litmus test” (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999) of 
a ToM because of the complexity of making inferences. 
 
TD children achieve competence in second-order false-belief tests by 
approximately 6 years of age.  In comparison, young people with ASD often 
fail second-order false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986).   
 
Some individuals with high-functioning ASD have shown that they can pass 
second-order false-belief tests (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1993; Ozonoff, Rogers, 
& Pennington, 1991; Ziatas et al., 1998).  The pass rate is typically correlated 
with higher verbal ability as measured by standardised vocabulary tests 
(Happe, 1995; Kazak, Collis, & Lewis, 1997; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995; 
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Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994; Ziatas et al., 1998) and cognitive ability as 
measured by standardised IQ tests (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999).  These 
findings indicate that language ability and cognitive functioning are associated 
with successful performance on ToM tasks.  However, deficits in ToM can be 
revealed in individuals with high-functioning ASD (usually adults) for whom 
comprehension problems can be ruled out.  For example, individuals with 
high-functioning ASD showed deficits in performance on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). 
 
Current research efforts tend to focus on the similarities and differences in 
false-belief understanding among individuals with HFA and those with AD 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Sigman, Arbelle, & 
Dissanayake, 1995).  Results from these studies suggest that deficiencies in 
first and second-order abilities are common to both individuals with HFA and 
those with AD.  Other available evidence indicates that these deficits are less 
characteristic of AD, and suggest that this may be a basis on which the two 
conditions can be distinguished (Ozonoff, Rogers et al., 1991; Ziatas et al., 
1998). 
 
Studies indicating differences in ToM abilities have often been criticised on 
the grounds that these findings could be attributable to poor subject matching 
on verbal IQ (VIQ).  There has been strong evidence for a positive correlation 
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between verbal skills and ToM abilities (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Ozonoff, 
Rogers et al., 1991; Prior et al., 1998).  The pass rate has also been 
correlated with cognitive ability as measured by standardised IQ tests 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 1999).  Thus, apparently better ToM capacity in people 
with AD may reflect their higher verbal and cognitive abilities (Bauminger & 
Kasari, 1999; Ozonoff & McMahon Griffith, 2000; Volkmar & Klin, 2000; Wing, 
1998).  However, passing the second-order false-belief question does not 
mean that participants are able to justify their answer (explain the reason for 
their response) appropriately (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999). 
 
The present study will examine false-belief understanding in young males 
with high-functioning ASD with a particular focus on verbal and other 
cognitive abilities and the justification of responses on the second-order test.  
The study will examine ToM ability among young males with HFA compared 
with those with AD to determine if there are qualitative differences between 
the two conditions. 
 
4.2.2  Theory of mind and social functioning  
A number of studies have shown that ToM development in children has 
consequences on their social behaviour (Jenkins, 2000; Rapacholi, 
Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2003).  Most studies suggest that children with 
more advanced ToM (especially false-belief) tend to have more successful 
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social relationships than their less advanced peers (Watson, Nixson, Wilson, 
& Capage, 1999).  The causal relationship between ToM and social 
behaviour is complex and bidirectional, with social behaviour providing a 
context for ToM acquisitions as well as the converse (Astington, 2003). 
 
When it comes to children with ASD the relationship between the ability to 
reason about others’ mental states (ToM) and real life social skills is unclear.  
Some studies show a significant correlation between ToM skills and social 
functioning (Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 2003a), while a 
number of studies have failed to find an association (Bowler, 1992; Dawson & 
Fernald, 1987; Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, Frith, & Happe, 1994; Klin, 
2000; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 2007; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 
1990; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995).   
 
A number of explanations have been provided for the lack of observed 
significant associations between ToM and social functioning.  Some of the 
reasons include the following:  
1) The “hacking” hypothesis which postulates that children with high-
functioning ASD who pass ToM tasks, do so via alternative 
compensatory strategies (Dissanayake & Macintosh, 2003). 
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2) ToM ability may influence only a relatively narrow range of social 
behaviours rather than social competence in the broader sense 
(Astington, 2003; Frith et al., 1994). 
3) The relationship may be influenced by the tests used to measure ToM 
and social functioning (e.g. parent report or teacher report of social 
functioning versus observational measures) (Dissanayake & 
Macintosh, 2003; Frith et al., 1994). 
4) The differences in verbal ability between study groups (Fombonne et 
al., 1994). 
5) Motivation may be required before children apply false-belief 
understanding to real-life interactions (Astington, 2003). 
6) Social functioning may be less dependent on ToM ability and more 
reliant on other skills such as visual processing (Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Osterling & Dawson, 1994). 
 
4.2.3  Theory of mind and self-understanding  
Few studies have explored the relationship between self-understanding and 
the understanding of others’ mental states (ToM).  A study with TD pre-
adolescents (Bosacki, 2000) found a robust positive relationship between 
self-understanding and ToM.  This finding was consistent with other studies 
and found positive connections between self-understanding and the 
understanding of others’ mental states (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999; Gopnik & 
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Meltzoff, 1994; Hatcher, Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, & Richards, 1990; Homer & 
Astington, 1995; Lang & Perner, 2002; Wimmer & Hartl, 1991) and with the 
theory-theory explanation of social understanding. 
 
Proponents of theory-theory argue that the way in which an individual reads 
another’s mind, can be extended to provide an account of how that person 
reads their own mind.  That is, detecting one’s own attitudes engages the 
same inferential mechanism as detecting someone else’s (Frith & Happe, 
1999). 
 
There has been one published study located on the relationship between self-
understanding and ToM in autism (Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003).  This study 
was focused on self-understanding and ToM in adolescents with autism who 
had an intellectual disability.  The researchers found significant differences in 
both self-understanding and ToM, with adolescents with autism (and 
intellectual disability) performing at a lower level than adolescents with an 
intellectual disability.  The researchers found that adolescents who performed 
better on the self-understanding interview also performed better on ToM 
tasks.  The results suggest there is a significant positive relationship between 
self-understanding and understanding others in low-functioning adolescents 
with autism (Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003) and thus support theory-theory as a 
useful theoretical framework. 
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There has been no research located on the relationship between self-
understanding and ToM in young people with high-functioning ASD.  This 
study aims to systematically investigate self-understanding in young males 
with high-functioning ASD and to discover whether self-understanding is 
related to ToM.  Proponents of theory-theory suggest that detecting one’s 
own mental states engages the same inferential mechanism as detecting 
someone else’s.  If self-understanding and ToM are linked, then the fact that 
these individuals have difficulties with ToM tasks may imply they also have 
difficulties with the ability to reflect on their own mental states.  Moreover, the 
degree of the two abilities should be related.  If the two abilities are related in 
ASD then it is possible that the same inferential mechanism is involved for 
young males with high-functioning ASD. 
 
4.2.4 Clinical implications of research on theory of mind 
Despite a vast amount of research on self-understanding in TD children and 
adolescents, there has been little research located on young people with 
ASD.  There have only been three studies located on self-understanding in 
ASD; two studies focused on individuals with ASD who had an intellectual 
disability (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003) and one study 
focused on high-functioning ASD (Mavropoulou, 1995).  The results from the  
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Mavropoulou study (1995) suggested verbally able children with ASD express 
a more restricted range of emotions and tend not to view themselves in terms 
of social activities and relations.  However, methodological issues make the 
results from this study difficult to interpret. 
 
There has been no systematic research located on self-understanding in 
young people with high-functioning ASD.  The present study aims to 
investigate self-understanding in young males with high-functioning ASD and 
to discover whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and 
ToM.   
 
While the possibility of impaired self-understanding in ASD has been raised 
previously (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Mavropoulou, 1995), it is not yet clear 
whether young people with high-functioning ASD have difficulties with self-
understanding and how this translates to their social functioning.  Individuals 
with high-functioning ASD generally have difficulties attributing mental state 
terms to others to predict behaviour but it is not known if this ability is related 
to self-understanding and whether the same cognitive mechanism is 
underlying the two abilities.   
 
The present study will also examine similarities and differences in self-
understanding between young people with HFA and those with AD and 
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determine whether self-understanding is related to social functioning and 
ToM.  The results will add to the growing body of research which assists in 
the development of diagnostic classification systems and social skills 
interventions for young people with HFA and AD. 
 
4.2.5 Summary  
People with ASD clearly have difficulties with ToM, since the deficits can be 
found in the highest of functioning individuals in whom comprehension 
problems can be ruled out.  Although the deficit in ToM is not a diagnostic 
criterion for ASD, the difficulties appear to occur early and to be universal. 
 
Several theories have been provided as explanations for the development of 
ToM.  Proponents of theory-theory have made a theoretical link between self-
understanding and the understanding of others’ mental states (ToM).  If 
theory-theory is correct then it is likely that the same cognitive mechanism 
underlies the self-understanding and ToM.  
 
4.3  Study overview 
This will be the first known study to systematically examine self-
understanding in young males with high-functioning ASD.  This study aims to 
examine self-understanding and the relationship between social functioning 
and ToM among young males with high-functioning ASD compared with TD 
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comparisons.  The results may indicate a positive relationship exists between 
self-understanding and social functioning which will support the teaching of 
self-understanding in social skills training programs.  Similarly, self-
understanding may relate to ToM for young males with ASD, suggesting that 
the same cognitive mechanism is involved.  The results may also suggest 
that interventions aimed at improving self-understanding may also improve 
ToM.  If self-understanding is related to ToM, the present study will support 
theory-theory as a useful theoretical framework for understanding young 
males with high-functioning ASD.   
 
In addition, this study will examine the similarities and differences between 
young males with HFA and those with AD, to determine whether there are 
any differences between the groups on self-understanding.  Furthermore, this 
study will determine whether relationships exist between self-understanding, 
social functioning and ToM.  If the two groups are similar on the measures, 
then the findings from this research will support a growing body of research 
that demonstrates few qualitative differences between HFA and AD. 
  
The goals of this study are to 
1) compare the quality and quantity of self-understanding among young 
males with high-functioning ASD compared with a TD group; 
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2) compare the quality and quantity of self-understanding among young 
males with HFA compared with a AD group; 
3) examine the relationship between self-understanding and social 
functioning among young males with high-functioning ASD compared 
with a TD group; 
4) examine the relationship between self-understanding and social 
functioning among young males with HFA compared with a AD group; 
5) compare ToM ability among young males with high-functioning ASD 
compared with a TD group; 
6) compare ToM ability among young males with HFA compared with a 
AD group; 
7) examine the relationship between self-understanding and ToM among 
young males with high-functioning ASD compared with a TD group;  
8) examine the relationship between self-understanding and ToM among 
young males with HFA compared with a AD group;  
 
4.4  Hypotheses  
The hypotheses were consistently written from the null hypothesis 
perspective (i.e. no differences were expected). This study will specifically 
test the following null hypotheses: 
 
 
 74
4.4.1  Hypothesis 1:  Self-understanding  
Young males with high-functioning ASD are not significantly different from the 
TD comparison group on a measure of self-understanding. 
 
4.4.2 Hypothesis 2:  Self-understanding in HFA and AD 
Young males with HFA are not significantly different from young males with 
AD on a measure of self-understanding.  
 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Self-understanding and social functioning  
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as measured 
by scores on the self-understanding interview) and social functioning (as 
measured by scores from Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Socialization 
Domain) for young males with high-functioning ASD. 
 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Self-understanding and social functioning in HFA 
and AD 
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as measured 
by scores on the self-understanding interview) and social functioning (as 
measured by scores from Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Socialization 
Domain) for young males with HFA and AD. 
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4.4.5 Hypothesis 5: Theory of mind  
Young males with high-functioning ASD are not significantly different from the 
TD comparison group on false-belief ToM tasks. 
 
4.4.6 Hypothesis 6: Theory of mind in HFA and AD  
Young males with HFA are not significantly different from young males with 
AD on false-belief ToM tasks. 
 
4.4.7  Hypothesis 7: Self-understanding and theory of mind   
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as measured 
by scores on the self-understanding interview) and ToM ability (as measured 
by scores from the false-belief ToM tasks) for young males with high-
functioning ASD. 
 
4.4.8 Hypothesis 8: Self-understanding and theory of mind in HFA and 
AD 
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as measured 
by scores on the self-understanding interview) and ToM ability (as measured 
by scores from the false-belief ToM tasks) for young males with HFA and AD.   
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
 
5.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of 43 young males diagnosed with one of the autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD) (25 diagnosed with high-functioning autism (HFA) 
and 18 diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder (AD) and 38 typically developing 
(TD) males.  Only males with a chronological age between 9 and 18 years 
and a minimum full scale IQ of 70 based on the Kaufman Brief Intelligence 
Test (KBIT) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990) were selected for the study. The 
chronological ages of 9-18 years were selected to allow for comparison with 
previous research on self-understanding in young people with ASD who also 
had an intellectual disability. The University of Sydney’s Human Research 
Ethics Committee and Autism Spectrum Australia’s (Aspect) Ethics 
Committee approved the study.   
 
The clinical groups were recruited through Aspect and through local, 
metropolitan and national newspapers.  All participants in the ASD group had 
been previously diagnosed by a paediatrician, psychiatrist or psychologist.  
Participants were not accepted into the study without accompanying 
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documentation of their diagnosis.  In addition, all participants with ASD were 
assessed by a psychologist (experienced in the assessment and diagnosis of 
ASD) to confirm the diagnoses.  The clinical diagnoses were based on the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition Text 
Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria using 
a combination of structured diagnostic interview, clinical observation and 
previous reports from medical, cognitive and communication assessments.    
 
No individual with autism having a verbal mental age (VMA) of less than six 
years or chronological age of eight years has been recorded as passing any 
theory of mind task (Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001).  Therefore, only 
those with a VMA above six years were included in the current study.  One 
participant was excluded from the ASD group in the current study because of 
a VMA of five years eight months.   
 
In terms of differential diagnosis, children were allocated to the HFA group 
when they met the diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder but their full-scale IQ 
was 70 or above (as determined by a standardised IQ test).  Children were 
allocated to the AD group when they did not meet criteria for autistic disorder 
(e.g. there was no evidence of a clinically significant language delay, such 
that the child used single words by age three years) but still presented with 
qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction and restricted, 
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repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities.  In 
addition, they did not have delays in cognitive development or the 
development of age appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behaviour (other 
than social interaction) and curiosity about the environment in childhood. 
 
The TD group was recruited through local, metropolitan and national 
newspapers.  Young people with a history of a psychiatric disorders or 
specified developmental or behavioural disorders were excluded from the TD 
group.  Psychiatric diagnoses were excluded using the Child Behavior 
Checklist (CBCL) (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). Two participants were 
excluded from the TD group because they had a history of behavioural and 
emotional problems.   
 
5.2 Procedure 
Participants were interviewed and assessed over two sessions by two 
psychologists at the Centre for Behavioural Sciences in Medicine, University 
of Sydney.  At the beginning of the first session, participants were assured of 
the anonymous and confidential nature of the study and written informed 
consent was obtained from each parent and child (see Appendices A and B).  
 
Sessions were structured in a way that allowed for one psychologist to 
interview the parent whilst the other psychologist assessed and interviewed 
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the child.  The duration of the first session was approximately three hours.  
The parent interview involved administration of the CBCL (Achenbach & 
Rescorla, 2001), Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Rutter, Le 
Couteur, & Lord, 2003) and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Interview 
Edition Survey Form (VABS) (Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti, 1984).  The child 
session involved administration of the KBIT (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990) and 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Third Edition (PPVT-III) (Dunn & Dunn, 
1997). 
 
The second session with the parent involved administration of a general 
questionnaire (approximately 20 mins) and at this time they were also given a 
verbal interpretation of the results from the IQ, adaptive behaviour and 
receptive vocabulary tests.  The second session with the child involved 
administration of the Damon and Hart Self-Understanding Interview (Damon 
& Hart, 1988) and two false-belief theory of mind tasks (first and second-order 
theory of mind tasks).   
 
5.3 Measurement instruments 
The instruments completed by participants are listed in Table 5.1 and are 
described in detail from section 5.3.1. 
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Table 5.1 Instruments completed 
Variable Instrument 
Behavioural and 
emotional problems 
 
Child Behavior Checklist  
ASD symptoms Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised 
IQ Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 
Adaptive behaviour 
(Social functioning) 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales 
Receptive language Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Third Edition 
Self-understanding Damon & Hart Self-Understanding Interview 
Theory of mind First-order “Sally Anne” task  Second-order “Ice Cream” task 
Demographics General Questionnaire 
 
5.3.1 Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) 
The CBCL (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001), is a standardised instrument of 
118 items, that assesses competencies, adaptive functioning, and behaviour 
problems in children.  The CBCL consisted of a form for children aged 18 
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months to five years, and a version for children aged six to 18 years. The 
CBCL/6-18 was completed by parents/ carers who saw the child in family-like 
contexts.  The CBCL was employed to help screen out psychiatric conditions 
in the TD group.  The first two pages requested demographic information, 
while the last two pages requested ratings of behavioural, emotional and 
social problems.  The respondent rated each problem item as 0 = not true, 1 
= somewhat or sometimes true, and 3 = very often or often true, based on the 
preceding six months.  
 
The CBCL consisted of two broadband factors of behaviour problems: 
internalising and externalising, with mean scale scores for national normative 
samples and clinically referred and nonreferred samples of children.  
Internalising behaviours included anxiety/depression, withdrawal, and somatic 
complaints.  Externalising behaviours included attention problems, aggressive 
behaviour, and rule-breaking actions.  Behavioural scales yielded a score of 
total behavioural problems.  Scores were summed and then converted to 
normalised T scores.  For internal, external, and total behaviour problems, T 
scores >60 were within the borderline to clinical referral range.  Higher scores 
represented more deviant behaviour.  
 
The CBCL has been shown to have very high inter-interviewer reliability (.93 
for the 20 competence items and .96 for the 118 specific problem items) 
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(Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  This test had very high test-retest reliability 
(Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  The overall intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) was 1.00 for the 20 competence items and .95 for the 118 specific 
problem items (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  Internal consistency refers to 
the correlation between half of a scale’s items and the other half of its items.  
The alphas for the competence scales were moderately high, ranging from 
.63 to .79.  These alphas were about as high as can be expected for scales 
that have only a few items, and that were designed to tap a variety of 
competencies with items that differ in format (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  
For the empirically based problem scales, the alphas ranged from .78 to .97, 
and for the DSM-oriented scales, the alphas ranged from .72 to .91 
(Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).   
 
In relation to the stability of scale scores, over 12 and 24 months respectively, 
the mean correlations were .70 and .61 on the competence scales, .74 and 
.70 on the empirically based problem scales, and .65 and .68 on the DSM-
oriented scales (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). The content validity of the 
competence, adaptive, and problem item scores has been supported by four 
decades of research, consultation, feedback, and revision, as well as by 
findings that all items discriminated significantly (p <.01) between 
demographically matched referred and nonreferred children (Achenbach & 
Rescorla, 2001).  The criterion-related validity of the CBCL was supported by 
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multiple regressions, odds ratios, and discriminant analyses, all of which 
showed significant (p <.01) discrimination between referred and nonreferred 
children (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  The construct validity of the scales 
has been supported in many ways, such as evidence for significant 
associations with analogous scales of other instruments and with DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria, by cross-cultural 
replications of ASEBA syndromes, by genetic and biochemical findings, and 
by predictions of long-term outcomes (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). 
 
5.3.2 Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R)  
The ADI-R (Rutter et al., 2003) was administered to the parent/s of the 
participants in the ASD group.  The ADI-R is a standardised, semi-structured 
diagnostic interview designed to elicit a full range of information needed to 
produce a diagnosis of autism and to assist in the assessment of related 
disorders, such as AD. The ADI-R is one of the “gold standard” diagnostic 
instruments in all appropriate autism research protocols (Filipek et al., 1999). 
Use of the ADI-R involves an experienced clinical interviewer. In the current 
study the interviewer was a registered psychologist who completed specific 
training, having achieved competence in the use of the ADI-R for research 
purposes.  In addition, the interviewer had previous experience in the 
assessment of, and intervention for, children with ASD.  Use of the ADI-R 
also requires an informant (a parent or caregiver) who is familiar with both the 
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developmental history and the current day-to-day behaviour of the individual 
being assessed.  In the current study the informant was in most instances the 
biological parent/s.  The ADI-R is designed to be applicable across a wide 
age range (in terms of both mental age and chronological age) providing the 
participant’s mental abilities are at a developmental level of at least two 
years. 
 
The ADI-R takes approximately two hours to administer and score.  It focuses 
on three main areas: (i) quality of reciprocal social interaction; 
(ii) communication and language; and (iii) repetitive, restricted and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour.  The ADI-R produces an algorithm 
consisting of 37 items organised according to the International Classification 
of Disease Tenth Edition (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 1992a) and 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagnostic criteria for 
autism.  There are no standard cut-offs on the ADI-R for AD, but the 
diagnostic algorithm has also been found to be almost as effective for AD as 
for autism when applied to school age children (Rutter et al., 2003) and 
several possible cut-offs have been proposed by different investigators 
(International Molecular Genetic Study of Autism Consortium, 2001; Sung et 
al., 2005). 
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The psychometric data for the ADI-R was carefully collected with attention to 
matching across samples and maintaining rater “blindness” (Lord, 1997).  
Reliability of the ADI-R has been assessed using measures of inter-rater 
reliability and test-retest reliability.  Inter-rater reliability has been good to 
excellent for individual items and excellent for overall scores, including those 
for each of the three domains.  In the study by Lord, Rutter et al. (1994) 26 of 
the 35 weighted kappa values for the behavioural items in the three domains 
were 0.70 or greater, and none was below 0.60.  In the study by Poustka, 
Lisch et al. (1996), 27 out of 36 kappa values were 0.70 or greater, but six 
were below 0.60.  Inter-rater reliabilities were substantially higher for 
summated ratings in the three domains and the multiple sub-domains.  The 
intra-class correlations in the Lord et al. (1994) study ranged from 0.93 to 
0.97.  In the Poustka, Lisch et al. (1996) study the intra-class correlations 
ranged from 0.73 to 0.86, except for one at 0.69, another at 0.66, and a third 
at 0.52.  Inter-rater reliability has been assessed by Chakrabarti and 
Fombonne (2001) and the intra-class correlation coefficients ranged from 
0.59 to 0.87.  Internal consistency was excellent within the three domains.  
Differentiation between children and adults with autism and those with 
intellectual disability is excellent (Lord, Storoschuk, Rutter, & Pickles, 1993).    
 
Data on test-retest reliability were obtained in the Lord, Storoschuk et al. 
(1993) study.  Retest reliability was very high, all coefficients being in the 
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range of 0.93 to 0.97.  Hill, Bolte et al. (2001) showed inter-rater reliabilities 
slightly below those reported by Lord, Storoschuk et al. (1993).  Lord, Rutter 
et al. (1994) reported kappa values ranging from 0.74 to 0.82.  The re-test 
reliabilities were high ranging from 0.82 to 0.91. 
 
Validity of the ADI-R was assessed using measures of discriminative validity 
and convergent validity.  Data on the discriminative validity were obtained in 
the Lord, Rutter et al. study (1994).  The validation findings indicated good 
diagnostic differentiation of the overall algorithm (the social domain showing 
the most clear-cut diagnostic differentiation), but they confirmed the 
difficulties associated with diagnosis in young non-verbal children with low 
mental ages.   The findings from all the studies to date indicated that the ADI-
R diagnostic algorithm worked well for the differentiation of ASD from non-
autistic developmental disorders in clinically referred groups provided the 
mental age is above 2 years.  
 
In terms of convergent validity, when the ADI-R has been compared with the 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) (Schopler, Reichler, De Vellis, & 
Daly, 1980) it has been found to have excellent convergent validity after age 
3 years (Lord, 1997); convergent validity with the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS) has also been good (Le Couteur et al., 1989).  
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5.3.3 Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Interview Edition Survey Form 
(VABS) 
The VABS (Sparrow et al., 1984) were used to assess adaptive behaviour.  
The VABS includes 297 items and evaluates personal and social sufficiency 
in individuals aged between 0 through to 18 years 11 months, or a low-
functioning adult. The scales consist of semi-structured interviews conducted 
with a carer who is familiar with the day-to-day activities of the participant, 
and takes 20 to 60 minutes to administer. The instrument assesses four 
areas of adaptive behaviour: Communication, Daily Living Skills, Socialization 
and Motor Skills.  Communication refers to those skills required for receptive, 
expressive, and written language; Daily Living Skills includes the practical 
skills needed to take care of oneself and contribute to a household and 
community; Socialization pertains to those skills needed to get along with 
others, regulate emotions and behaviour, as well as skills involved in leisure 
activities such as play; Motor Skills comprise both fine and gross motor skills, 
and are typically assessed in individuals below the age of 6 years. Therefore, 
in the current study they were not assessed. 
 
The VABS is a preferred measure of adaptive behaviour for individuals with 
ASD because there are published supplementary norms specifically for 
individuals diagnosed with ASD (Carter, Volkmar, Sparrow, Wang, & Lord, 
1998).  In this study, the Socialization domain from the Interview Edition was 
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used to assess social skills.  The Socialization domain can be used 
separately to assess social skills specifically (Njardvik, Matson, & Cherry, 
1999) and has been shown to effectively document delays in social 
development in people diagnosed with ASD (Volkmar, Carter, Sparrow, & 
Cicchetti, 1993).  The Socialization domain of the VABS has been shown to 
have good reliability (0.80) (Sparrow et al., 1984). 
 
As with other standardised psychometric tests, a composite score is 
achieved.  The composite score and each of the domain scores can be 
expressed as a standard score, which has an average standard score of 100, 
and standard deviations of 15.  
 
Reliability of the VABS has been assessed using measures of internal 
consistency reliability, test-retest reliability and inter-rater reliability.  For the 
Survey Form, the split-half reliability coefficients for the Communication 
domain range from 0.73 to 0.94, the Daily Living Skills domain coefficients 
range from 0.83 to 0.92, and the Socialization domain coefficients range from 
0.78 to 0.94 (Sparrow et al., 1984).  Generally, domain internal consistency 
reliability coefficients are satisfactory for the interpretation of individual 
performance.  The split-half reliability coefficients for the Adaptive Behavior 
Composite are excellent, ranging from 0.89 to 0.98 (Sparrow et al., 1984).  
The test-retest reliability coefficients for the domains and Adaptive Behavior 
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Composite are very good, with the majority of the coefficients 0.80 and above 
(Sparrow et al., 1984).  The interrater reliability coefficients for the Survey 
Form are quite good with majority above 0.70 (Sparrow et al., 1984). 
 
Validity of the VABS was assessed using measures of construct validity, 
content validity, and criterion-related validity.  Construct validity data are 
presented in terms of developmental progressions of Vineland scores, and 
factor analyses of the domains and sub-domains.  The progression of mean 
raw scores from one age to the next provides adequate support for the 
assumption that adaptive behaviour as measured by the Vineland is age-
related (Sparrow et al., 1984).  In addition, results of the factor analyses 
indicate that the Adaptive Behavior Composite is an adequate index.  The 
content validity of the Vineland is supported by the thorough procedures 
including field testing and national standardisation used in the original 
development of items (Sparrow et al., 1984).  The validity of the VABS is also 
supported by correlations between Vineland scores and scores from other 
adaptive behaviour scales and intelligence tests (Sparrow et al., 1984). 
 
5.3.4 Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT) 
The KBIT (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990) is a brief, individually administered 
measure of the verbal and non-verbal intelligence of a wide range of children, 
adolescents and adults.  It may be used for individuals aged between four 
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and 90 years.  As with all other instruments in this study, the KBIT was 
administered by a trained psychologist.  
 
The full test takes approximately 15 to 30 minutes to administer, and is 
composed of two sub-tests: Vocabulary (including expressive vocabulary and 
definitions) and Matrices.  Vocabulary measures verbal crystallised thinking, 
based on school-related skills.  The Matrices sub-test measures non-verbal 
skills and the ability to solve new problems (fluid thinking) by assessing an 
individual's ability to perceive relationships and complete analogies. All 
Matrices items involve pictures or abstract designs rather than words. 
 
Age-based standard scores (SS) having a mean of 100 and a standard 
deviation of 15 are provided for the Vocabulary and Matrices sections, as well 
as an overall score, the KBIT IQ Composite.  Reliability of the KBIT has been 
assessed using measures of internal consistency reliability, spilt-half reliability 
and test-retest reliability (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990).  Internal consistency 
reliabilities average 0.94 for the overall KBIT IQ Composite, 0.93 for the 
Vocabulary sub-test, and 0.88 for the Matrices sub-test (Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1990).  Split-half reliability figures for the Composite IQ score range from .88 
to .98 (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990).  Test-retest reliability figures for 
Vocabulary coefficients range from .86 to .97, Matrices scores range from .80 
to .92 and Composite scores all exceed .90 (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990).  
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Validity of the KBIT was assessed using measures of concurrent validity, 
content validity and construct validity (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990).  
Concurrent validity analyses with the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children–Third Edition (WISC-III) (Wechsler, 1991), Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale- Revised (WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981) and Kaufman 
Assessment Battery for Children (KABC) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983) 
provide evidence that the KBIT subscales measure the same constructs as 
the KABC and Wechsler scales (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990). In a study 
comparing the KBIT and WAIS-R correlations between the Verbal, Nonverbal 
and Composite scales of the two measures were .83, .77, and .88, 
respectively (Naugle, Chelune and Tucker, 1993). In another study, the 
WISC-III was compared to the KBIT to determine if the KBIT can reliably 
predict results for school aged children on the WISC-III (Boyd and Dumont, 
1996).   The results indicated strong correlations, the KBIT Vocabulary score 
correlated well with the WISC-III Verbal IQ score (.82) and there was strong 
correlation (.83) between the KBIT Composite score and the WISC-III Full 
Scale IQ score (Boyd and Dumont, 1996).   Similarly, results from a study 
comparing the KBIT to the KABC indicated that the measures provide similar 
scores (Lassiter and Bardos, 2006). 
 
A brief measure of intelligence was preferred for the current study because it 
allowed for other important variables to be assessed, and in addition 
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accommodated the large sample size and short attention spans, as well as 
minimising lethargy in the young participants.  
 
The KBIT had the advantage of allowing information to be processed visually.  
For example, all the Matrices items contain pictures and abstract designs 
rather than words; therefore, non-verbal ability can be assessed even when 
comprehension and language skills are limited. In addition, most of the 
participants had previously been assessed using the Wechsler Scales of 
intelligence and therefore the KBIT prevented practice effects and served as 
a confirmation of the intellectual status of each participant.   
 
5.3.5 Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III) 
Clinical observations and research suggest that children with ASD have 
difficulties with comprehension (Beisler, Tsai, & Vonk, 1987). These 
difficulties need to be taken into account when interviewing people with ASD. 
 
In the present study the participants with an ASD were compared with young 
TD males and were all screened for a minimum verbal mental age of six 
years using the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  The PPVT-III does not 
provide a comprehensive measure of all aspects of linguistic understanding, 
but it has proved useful in a number of studies for establishing comparison 
groups of individuals with ASD and TD groups who display similar levels of 
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performance (although sometimes contrasting profiles) on language related 
tasks (Silliman et al., 2003; Peterson et al., 2007).  It therefore was deemed 
to be an appropriate measure of verbal ability. 
 
The PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) is designed for persons aged two years, 
six months through to 90+ years and serves two purposes: (1) as an 
achievement test of receptive vocabulary attainment; and (2) as a screening 
test of verbal ability.  The PPVT-III is individually administered and is 
available in two parallel forms, each containing four training items and 204 
test items grouped into 17 sets of 12 items each.  The item sets are arranged 
in order of increasing difficulty.  Each item consists of four black and white 
illustrations arranged on a page.  The PPVT-III testing time averages 12 
minutes because most individuals complete five sets or 60 items of 
appropriate difficulty.  Item sets that are too easy or too hard are not 
administered.  Most of the scoring, which is rapid and objective, is 
accomplished while the test is being administered.   
 
Performance on the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) has been compared with 
performance on other measures of verbal ability.  The studies of Rutter and 
his colleagues (Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975; Lockyer & Rutter, 1970) indicate 
how performance on Picture Vocabulary tests compares with the verbal sub-
tests of the Wechsler Scales of Intelligence in revealing troughs in the abilities 
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of people with autism.  Further, the PPVT-III and the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III) (Wechsler, 1991) correlate highly 
with verbal IQ scores and provide strong evidence that the PPVT-III is an 
effective screening device for verbal ability.  
 
The PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) was standardised in the United States on 
a national stratified sample of 2,725 persons, 2,000 children and adolescents, 
and 725 persons over age 19.  Raw scores can be converted to the following 
age-referenced normative scores: standard scores, percentiles, stanines, 
normal curve equivalents and age equivalents.  Optional bands of confidence 
for these derived scores are also provided. 
 
The psychometric properties of the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) include 
four types of reliability:  alpha reliability, split half reliability, alternate forms 
reliability and test-retest reliability.  Alpha reliability coefficients ranged from 
0.92 to 0.98 with a median value of 0.95 for both form IIA and IIB.  Split-half 
reliability coefficients ranged from 0.86 to 0.97 with a median reliability of 0.94 
for both form IIA and form IIB.  Alternate forms reliability coefficients ranged 
from 0.88 to 0.96 with a median value of 0.94. Test-retest reliability 
coefficients were in the 0.90s (Dunn & Dunn, 1997). 
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Four types of validity have been computed for the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 
1997) including construct validity, content validity, internal validity and 
criterion validity.  With regards to content validity, there is strong evidence 
that the PPVT-III measures what it claims to measure when that is defined as 
hearing vocabulary for single standard English words.  When an inference is 
made that the test can be used as a screening test of intellectual functioning, 
arguments to support the claim must be based on construct validity.  There is 
substantial evidence to conclude that a test of vocabulary such as the PPVT-
III predicts school success and taps verbal ability quite well.  There is also 
necessary evidence to support internal validity and criterion validity of the 
PPVT-III.  Four criterion validity studies were conducted during 
standardisation of the PPVT-III, and all results provided evidence that PPVT-
III is an effective screening device for verbal ability (Dunn & Dunn, 1997). 
In the present study the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) served the purpose of 
a measure of verbal mental age.  As previously mentioned, no individual with 
autism having a verbal mental age (VMA) of less than six years or 
chronological age of eight years has been recorded as passing any theory of 
mind task (Kleinman et al., 2001).  Therefore, only those with a VMA above 
six years were included in the present study.  The PPVT-III can be used 
successfully with persons who have been diagnosed with ASD because there 
is no need for them to speak or interact verbally with the examiner (Dunn & 
Dunn, 1997). 
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5.3.6 Damon and Hart’s Self-Understanding Interview 
Damon and Hart’s Self-Understanding Interview (Damon & Hart, 1988) is a 
structured interview method that gathers in-depth information about a 
person’s knowledge of self.  The interview questions specifically target self-
descriptions (“What are you like?”) rather than self-evaluations which require 
participants to react to statements in the form of judgements (“I am good at 
sport”).  The Damon and Hart Self-Understanding Interview (Damon & Hart, 
1988) attempts to incorporate the voices of individuals, their self-descriptions, 
perspectives and concerns and was selected not only because it was 
designed for children, but also because it is the most sensitive approach to 
evaluating those aspects of self-understanding that were predicted to be 
relatively improvised in individuals with high-functioning ASD, namely the 
social and psychological, as well as those aspects anticipated to be relatively 
robust, namely the physical and active aspects.  Therefore, it held promise for 
demonstrating specificity in any group differences observed in spontaneously 
generated and verbally expressed self-statements.  There has been no 
research located on the psychometric properties of the Damon and Hart Self-
Understanding Interview (Damon & Hart, 1988), however, the researcher 
followed the standardised procedure for administration and scoring and the 
interview has been successfully used in previous research on young people 
with intellectual disabilities and ASD (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Mavropoulou, 
1995; Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003). 
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The Damon and Hart’s Self-Understanding Interview (Damon & Hart, 1988) 
contains seven principal items.  The first four items were designed to explore 
the self-as-object and the last three the self-as-subject.  These were 
presented in a fixed order with occasional variation to maintain the flow of the 
interview.  
 
The wording of the questions was varied as required, to suit each 
participant’s comprehension needs.  The interview also allows, where 
necessary, new probe questions to be added in order to fully explicate each 
participant’s line of reasoning.  The general principle in probing a self-
statement is to continue with follow up questions until the participant repeats 
himself, gives an “I don’t know” response, or shows marked signs of 
tiredness.  Each interview took between 30 and 60 minutes to administer.    
 
Scoring the Self-Understanding Interview 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim.  Each transcript was divided into 
units of scoring called “chunks”.  A chunk were defined as a self-characteristic 
mentioned by the participant, together with responses to the related probe 
questions, as well as any further discussion of the specific characteristic that 
immediately followed the probed responses.  Chunks were derived from self-
statements elicited in the course of the self-understanding interview and 
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coded into those that demonstrated an awareness of the self-as-subject and 
those that demonstrated an awareness of the self-as-object.  These two 
classes of self-awareness were considered separately. Within the self-as-
subject, chunks were coded into one of three categories (Continuity, Agency 
and Distinctness) and then at one of four levels (Levels of description).  
Within, the self-as-object chunks were coded into one of the four categories 
of self-understanding (Physical, Active, Social and Psychological) then rated 
at one of four levels (Levels of description), based on Damon and Hart’s 
(1988) coding scheme and scoring criteria.  
 
Damon and Hart (1988) included the following additional rules for scoring 
identified chunks: (a) a chunk that can be coded at more than one level within 
a single category should be scored at the highest applicable level in that 
category; (b) a chunk that can be coded in two or more categories at different 
levels should be scored for the highest level in the various categories.  All 
categories can be defined in conjunction with all of the levels.  For example, a 
physical statement would have a level three assignment if a physical feature 
was discussed in regard to how it impacted one’s social appeal; or a 
psychological rating would have a level one assignment if the statement 
focussed only on “moods, thoughts, feelings unrelated to permanent 
dispositions, abilities or beliefs” (Damon & Hart, 1988). 
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For reliability purposes, a third person was trained to identify self-statements 
according to the criteria outlined above.  The rater, blind to the diagnosis, 
identified all chunks from two transcripts (one from the ASD sample and one 
from the non-ASD sample).  Of the 40 chunks identified by the investigator 
from these two transcripts, 38 (95%) were identified by the blind rater.  
Furthermore, the blind rater did not identify a single chunk within the two 
transcripts which was not already identified by the investigator.  Following this 
the same rater was trained to code chunks using the Damon and Hart scoring 
manual.  The same rater then coded all of the chunks identified by the 
investigator for 16 (20%) randomly selected participants (eight with ASD and 
eight TD participants).  Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was 
calculated.  The two raters achieved high proportions of agreement for 
category (ICC = 0.84), and level (ICC = 0.81). 
 
In addition to the coding method presented above, the investigator carried out 
supplementary analysis and coded the presence or absence of recurring 
themes in participants’ responses to three questions: What are you most 
proud of?; If you could have three wishes what would they by?; and How did 
you get to be the way you are? These questions were chosen because they 
provided opportunities to capture aspects of the self that reflect specific 
choices, self-evaluations and reflection on their own agency and 
development.  In addition, the researcher examined responses to identify all 
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references by the ASD participants to their own disorder.  These references 
were coded according to whether they discussed their disorder in a positive, 
neutral or negative way. 
 
5.3.7  Theory of mind measures 
A common approach to assessing theory of mind is the ability to attain false- 
belief understanding, the understanding that others hold a belief whose 
content contradicts reality (Wellman et al., 2001).  False-belief understanding 
is typically measured by social-cognitive tasks that relate to the 
understanding that different people have different thoughts or beliefs about 
the same situation.  In everyday life, there are many examples that involve 
understanding that another person may have a belief that is different from 
reality.  For example, interactions that involve teasing, reflecting an 
awareness of another person’s mistaken expectation, negotiating friendships 
by reading and responding to intentions, in conversations reading the 
listener’s level of interest in one’s speech and being able to anticipate what 
other’s might think of ones actions  (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, & Hadwin, 1999; 
Reddy, 1991).   
 
False-belief tests were chosen for this study because the ability to attribute 
false-beliefs is considered an important milestone in the development of ToM 
and they are commonly used in research on children with ASD (Astington & 
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Gopnik, 1991).  The standard approach to the assessment of false-beliefs 
involves first and second-order tasks.  Performance on first and second-order 
false-belief tasks correlate with other measures of person perception.  For 
example, Happe (1993) found first and second-order false-belief performance 
correlated with the understanding of metaphor and irony.  Similarly, Hillier et 
al (2002) found a significant relationship between scores from first and 
second-order false-belief tasks and understanding complex emotions (such 
as embarrassment) in others. 
 
Participant’s understanding of first-order false-beliefs was assessed using the 
traditional “Sally Anne task”, a task based on one developed by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983) and was similar to that used by Baron-Cohen et al., (1985).  
Participant understanding of higher order mental state reasoning was 
assessed using Baron-Cohen’s (1989b) “Ice Cream task”, a task originally 
developed by Perner and Wimmer (1985).  The “Sally Anne task” and “Ice 
Cream task” were selected because they could be presented visually (i.e. 
participants were asked to watch a scene acted out using dolls) which 
facilitated participant understanding. In addition, the two tasks were 
straightforward and efficient to administer, important features given the large 
battery of tests and the limited time available with each participant.  
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Before administration began, the examiner read a brief set of instructions, 
including a simplified purpose of the task.  Participants were told that they 
were to help the examiner decide whether or not little children would like the 
stories and why.  This purpose was included because research indicates that 
more complex narratives result when children are provided with a shared 
purpose for the activity (Bamberg & Reilly, 1996). After describing the 
purpose to the participants, the examiner began administration of the first- 
order task. 
 
5.3.7.1 First-order false-belief task: “Sally Anne task” 
The task employed two dolls, a basket, a box and a marble. The 
experimenter and the participant were sitting at a table, facing each other.  To 
facilitate comprehension, participants were also presented with a written 
version of the story and a written version of all questions.  
 
Each participant was presented with two doll protagonists (Sally and Anne).  
Explanations were given: “This is Sally. This is Anne. Sally has a basket. 
Anne has a box”.  Participants were tested to ensure they knew which doll 
was which: “Which is Anne? Which is Sally?” (Naming Question).  Next, the 
experimenter moved the doll Sally in a way that she placed the marble in her 
basket.  The experimenter explained, “Sally is going outside for a walk” and 
the doll Sally left the scene.  Next, the experimenter moved the doll Anne in a 
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way that she took the marble out of Sally’s basket and hid it in her box.  At 
this point, two prompt questions were asked, “Where did Anne hide the 
marble?” and “Did Sally see that?”  Then, when Sally returned, the 
experimenter asked the critical belief question: “Where will Sally look for her 
marble?”  The participant could either say or point to the location where he 
thought that Sally would look for the marble.  If the young person pointed or 
verbally indicated to the previous location of the marble, then they passed the 
Belief Question by appreciating the doll’s now false-belief.  If, however, they 
pointed to the marble’s current location, then they failed the question by not 
taking into account the doll’s belief.  The participant was asked to justify his 
response (Justification Question).  Lastly, two control questions were asked: 
“Where is the marble really?” (Reality Question) and “Where was the marble 
in the beginning?” (Memory Question).  The control questions were crucial to 
ensure that the participant had both knowledge of the real current location of 
the object and an accurate memory of the previous location. 
 
Response Coding  
Participants received a pass (correct) only if they answered the test question 
correctly.  Participants received a fail (incorrect) if they answered the false-
belief test question incorrectly. 
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5.3.7.2 Second-order false-belief task: “Ice Cream task” 
The task employed four dolls, a model village (including two houses, a school 
and a park) and an ice cream van constructed from cardboard.  The 
experimenter and the participant were sitting at a table facing each other.  To 
facilitate comprehension, participants were presented with a written version of 
the story and a written version of all questions.  Before reading/hearing the 
story, each participant was shown the display, the key locations were named 
and the characters (John, Mary, the ice cream man and Mary’s mother) were 
introduced. Participants were tested to ensure they knew which actor doll was 
which, by being asked: “Which is John and which is Mary?” (Naming 
Question).  The experimenter presented the story verbatim and enacted the 
events.  The story line was based around two actors, John and Mary, who 
see an ice cream van at the park where they were playing.  Later, each actor 
was independently informed that the ice cream van had moved from the park 
to the school, but neither knew that the other actor was informed.  The 
purpose of the probe questions was to ensure that the participants were 
following the story and had correctly encoded and remembered the key 
events.  The purpose of the control questions was to assess the participants’ 
understanding of first-order knowledge or ignorance (e.g., “Does Mary know 
where the ice cream van is?”).  Across the probe and control questions the 
number of “yes” and “no” responses was balanced to ensure that participants 
did not receive a bias in favour of one response over another.  After each 
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probe and control question was answered, feedback or correction was 
provided to the participant.  Finally, there were two test questions for which 
no feedback was provided: the second-order ignorance question and the 
second-order false-belief question.  These were asked as open-ended 
questions.  To respond correctly, participants had to take into account John’s 
ignorance of Mary’s knowledge of the true whereabouts of the ice-cream van 
(i.e. “John thinks that Mary thinks that . . .”).  However, if the participant gave 
no response, then a forced-choice format was used (e.g. “Does John know 
that Mary knows where the ice cream man is?” or “Does John not know that 
Mary knows where the ice cream man is?”).  The presentation order of the 
forced choice response was reversed across participants.  Before the 
second-order false-belief test question, participants were provided with a 
memory question to ensure that the participants were following the story and 
had correctly encoded and remembered the key events. 
 
Response Coding 
Participants received a pass (correct) only if they answered the test question 
correctly.  Participants received a fail (incorrect) if they answered the false- 
belief test question incorrectly.  Justifications were coded as either pass or 
fail.  A pass is where two mental states are mentioned (e.g. “John thinks that 
Mary thinks . . .”).  A fail was given when one or less mental states were 
mentioned (e.g. John thinks she is at the park, or she is at the park). 
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5.3.8 General Questionnaire  
A general questionnaire (see Appendix C) was administered to parents.  The 
questionnaire included questions about demographic information about the 
participant (for example, place of residence, family structure and socio-
economic status).  Socio-economic status was measured using the 
Hollingshead Index of Social Position (Hollingshead, 1957).  The 
Hollingshead Index of Social Position is designed to measure social class, 
conceptualised as a weighted combination of residential address, 
occupational position and educational attainment.  The index ranks people on 
a 5-point social class scale, using self-report data on occupational category 
and years of education.  In addition, information was gathered about the 
participant’s medical history (including other medical problems and 
medication usage) and interventions (for example, education and participation 
in social skills groups). 
 
5.4 Participant motivation  
The motivation of participants was a methodological issue for completion of 
the Self-Understanding Interview.  Koegel and Mentis (1985) have addressed 
the issue of motivation in children with autism and in their work reported a 
study that compared the impact of two reinforcement contingencies on the 
verbal responding of four children with autism.  They found that when any 
observable attempt to verbalise was reinforced rather than reinforcement of 
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specific verbalisations all children achieved higher rates of correct verbal 
responding and progressed more rapidly.   
 
Vismara (2006) addressed the role of motivation in children with autism,  by 
examining whether using motivational procedures (such as integrating 
participants’ interests into intervention sessions) improved joint attention in 
children with autism.  Vismara (2006) found improvements in participants’ 
joint attention, communicative behaviours, and the quality of interactions with 
caregivers as a result of motivational procedures.    
 
Before commencing the self-understanding interviews the investigator made 
attempts to get to know the participants and therefore built up a rapport with 
them.  The self-understanding interviews were paced according to the 
participants’ needs and routine, and accommodations were made for fatigue. 
Therefore, steps were taken to ensure that the responses provided by the 
participants reflected their understanding of self.   
 
5.5 Statistics  
Data were analysed using SPSS 14 for Windows (2005).  A p value of < 0.05 
was considered to be statistically significant for all analyses.   The strength of 
a bivariate correlation was recorded as small when the r value was 0.20-0.29, 
moderate when the r value was 0.30-0.49, and large when the r value was 
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0.50-1.00. This partitioning of the strength of correlation coefficients followed 
Cohen (1988), except that correlations of 0.10-0.19 were not included in the 
small category for clarity of presentation.  The p values for the bivariate 
correlations are recorded in the tables, but they are not referred to in the text 
because the statistical significance of r is strongly influenced by sample size 
(Cohen, 1988).  
 
To compare groups, parametric and non-parametric statistics were used.  
Parametric techniques (for example, t-test and Pearson Correlation) were 
used when the underlying distribution of scores in the groups were normal.  
Non-parametric techniques (for example, Chi-square, Spearman Rank Order 
Correlation and Mann-Whitney) were used when parametric assumptions 
were not met.  A Fisher’s Exact Test was selected when one or more cells in 
a 2 x 2 contingency table had an expected count less than 5. Adjustments for 
multiple comparisons were made using multiple regression analysis.   
 
Normal distribution was assessed by various measures.  The first was 
assessing the proximity of the mean to the median.  Second, skewness and 
kurtosis values were examined.  Finally, statistical tests of normality were 
obtained.  The Shapiro-Wilk test statistic was used to determine normality.   
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5.6  Study design  
The design of the research is schematically presented in Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: Nomothetic research design  
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1. Damon and Hart’s Self-Understanding Interview 
2. Socialization Domain (Vineland Adaptive Behavior 
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3. Two False-Belief Theory of Mind tasks: 
First-Order Sally-Anne Task 
Second-Order Ice Cream Task 
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Chapter 6 
Results 
Part I:  Participant Characteristics 
 
The sample consisted of 43 young males diagnosed with one of the autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD) and 38 typically developing (TD) young males.  
The ASD group consisted of 25 participants diagnosed with high-functioning 
autism (HFA) whilst 18 were diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder (AD). 
 
Age:  The age of the participants ranged from 9-18 years old, with a mean 
age of 12.43 (ASD: mean = 11.93, SD = 2.60; TD: mean = 13.00, SD = 2.14).  
An independent samples t-test showed a borderline significant difference 
between the two groups for age (t (78.6) = -2.03, p = 0.05); the mean age for 
the ASD group was one year lower than the TD group.  
 
Education level:  In the total sample, 37% (30) of participants were in 
primary school, and 63% (51) were in secondary school or no longer at 
school.  In the ASD group, 48.8% (21) were in primary school, and 51.2% 
(22) were in secondary school or no longer at school.  In the TD group, 23.7% 
(9) were in primary school and 76.3% (29) were in secondary school or no 
longer at school.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed 
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that participants in the ASD group were significantly more likely to be in 
primary school than those in the TD group: χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 4.45, 
p = 0.04.  
 
Education support:  In the total sample, 43.2% (35) received special 
education support (for example, access to a teacher’s aide) and 56.8% (46) 
received no special education support.  In the ASD group, 76.7% (33) 
received special education support, and 23.3% (10) received no special 
education support.  In the TD group, 5.3% (2) received special education 
support and 94.7% received no special education support.  Yates’ Correction 
for Continuity chi-square analysis showed that participants in the ASD group 
were significantly more likely to receive special education support than those 
in the TD group: χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 39.14, p = < 0.0001.   
 
Indigenous background:  Of the ASD group, 2.3% (1) was indigenous and 
97.7% (42) were non-indigenous.  Of the TD group, 2.6% (1) were indigenous 
Australians and 97.4% (37) were non-indigenous.  Fisher’s Exact Test chi-
square analysis showed no significant difference on this variable between the 
ASD and TD groups (p = 1.00). 
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Socio-economic status:  In the total sample, 23.5% (19) of the participants 
were from upper or upper-middle class socio-economic backgrounds, 61.7% 
(50) were from middle class backgrounds, and 14.8% (12) were from lower-
middle or lower socio-economic backgrounds as determined by the 
Hollingshead Index of Social Position (Hollingshead, 1957).  Of the ASD 
group, 16.3% (7) were from upper or upper-middle class, 65.1% (28) were 
from middle class, and 18.6% (8) were from lower-middle or lower class 
backgrounds.  Of the TD group, 31.6% (12) were from upper or upper-middle 
class, 57.9% (22) were from middle class, and 10.5% (4) were from lower-
middle or lower class backgrounds.  Pearson’s chi-square analysis showed 
no significant difference between the ASD and TD groups; χ2 (df = 2, N = 81) 
= 3.07, p = 0.22. 
 
Residence:  Participants were from New South Wales (NSW) and Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT).  In the total sample, 80.2% (65) participants lived in 
urban areas and 19.8% (16) lived in rural areas.  Of the ASD group, 69.8% 
(30) of the participants lived in urban areas and 30.2% (13) lived in rural 
areas.  Of the TD group, 92.1% (35) of the participants lived in urban areas 
and 7.9% (3) lived in rural areas.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square 
analysis showed that the residence of the ASD group differed from the TD 
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group.  Significantly fewer participants from the TD group lived in rural areas; 
χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 5.02, p = 0.03.  
 
Parents:  The majority of participants in the total sample (95.1%) were the 
natural (or biological) children of their parents and 4.9% (4) were adopted or 
fostered.   In the ASD group 93.0% (40) were natural children of their parents 
and 7% (3) were adopted or fostered.  In the TD group 97.4% (37) were 
natural children and 2.6% (1) were adopted or fostered.  Fisher’s Exact Test 
chi-square analysis showed no significant difference between the ASD and 
TD groups (p = 0.62). 
 
Family:  In the ASD group 69.8% (30) lived with both parents and 30.2% (13) 
lived with one parent.  In the TD group 76.3% (29) lived with both parents and 
23.7% (9) lived with one parent.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square 
analysis showed no significant difference in the number of participants living 
with both parents in the ASD and the TD groups; χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 0.17, p 
= 0.68. 
 
Siblings:  In the ASD group 86.0% (37) lived with one or more siblings and 
14.0% (6) lived with no siblings.  In the TD group 94.7% (36) lived with one or 
more siblings and 5.3% (2) lived with no siblings.  Fisher’s Exact Test chi-
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square analysis showed no significant difference in the number of participants 
living with siblings in the ASD and TD groups (p = 0.27). 
 
Intelligence quotient (IQ):  The IQ of participants ranged from 73 to 134, 
with a mean IQ of 105.77 (see Table 6.1).  An independent samples t-test 
was conducted to determine whether the two groups differed on IQ as 
assessed on the KBIT (see Table 6.2). No significant difference was reported 
with respect to IQ standard score (t (76.37) = -0.75, p = 0.46).  Furthermore, 
there was no significant difference between the two groups in regard to verbal 
IQ (t (79) = 0.24, p = 0.81) and performance IQ (t (79) = -1.64, p = 0.11).  
 
Adaptive behaviour:  The adaptive behaviour score for participants ranged 
from 39 to 126, with a mean of 84.96 (see Table 6.1).  An independent 
samples t-test was used to determine whether the two groups differed on 
adaptive behaviour (see Table 6.2).  There was a significance difference 
between the two groups on the composite adaptive behaviour standard score.  
The ASD group (mean = 72.16, SD = 19.87) scored significantly lower than 
the TD group (mean = 99.45, SD = 12.10); (t (70.53) = -7.56, p = < 0.0001).  
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine whether the two 
groups differed on each of the sub-domains of Communication (ASD: mean = 
82.44, SD = 25.98; TD: mean = 100.37, SD = 11.84); (t (60.28) = -4.07, p = 
<0.0001), Daily living skills (ASD: mean = 72.35, SD = 22.95; TD = 93.00, SD 
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= 10.88; (t (61.54) = -5.27, p = <0.0001), and Socialization (ASD: mean = 
73.37, SD = 16.45; TD: mean = 105.13, SD = 13.01); (t (78.09) = -9.69, 
p = <0.0001).   
 
Receptive language:  The receptive language ability results on the PPVT-III 
of participants ranged from 72 to 138, with a mean value of 107.89 (see 
Table 6.1).  An independent samples t-test showed no significant difference 
between the ASD (mean = 105.07, SD = 17.45) and TD groups 
(mean = 111.08, SD = 9.47) with respect to the PPVT-III standard score 
(t (66.31) = -1.96, p = 0.06), although the difference between the groups 
approached significance.   
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Table 6.1 IQ, Adaptive Behaviour and Receptive Language:  Means and 
Standard Deviations for the total sample.  
Standard Score 
(SS) N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
KBIT      
Vocabulary  81 70 128 103.79 13.08 
Matrices 81 75 134 106.63 13.20 
KBIT Composite 
Standard Score 81 73 134 105.77 12.97 
VABS  
Communication 81 36 123 90.85 22.37 
Daily living skills 81 20 129 82.04 20.95 
Socialization 81 49 127 88.27 21.79 
Adaptive 
Behavior 
Composite 
Standard Score 
81 39 126 84.96 21.51 
PPVT-III      
PPVT-III 
Standard Score 81 72 138 107.89 14.51 
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Table 6.2 IQ, Adaptive Behaviour and Receptive Language: Means and 
Standard Deviations of the ASD and TD groups. 
Variable ASD Mean (SD) 
TD 
Mean (SD) 
T or 
x Df P 
Age  11.93  (2.60)  13.00 (2.14) -2.03 78.6 0.05 
KBIT      
Vocabulary   104.12 (14.18)  103.42 (11.90) 0.24 79.0 0.81 
Matrices  104.40 (14.32)  109.16 (11.47) -1.64 79.0 0.11 
KBIT Composite 
Standard Score  104.77 (14.72)  106.89 (10.74) -0.75 76.4 0.46 
VABS 
Communication  82.44 (25.98)  100.37 (11.84) -4.07 60.3 < 0.0001** 
Daily living skills  72.35 (22.95)  93.00 (10.88) -5.27 61.5 < 0.0001** 
Socialization   73.37 (16.45)  105.13 (13.01) -9.69 78.1 < 0.0001** 
Adaptive 
Behavior 
Composite 
Standard Score 
 72.16 (19.87)  99.45 (12.10) -7.56 70.5 < 0.0001** 
PPVT-III      
PPVT-III 
Standard Score   105.07 (17.45)  111.08 (9.47) -1.96 66.3 0.06 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level 
 
Social skills training:  None of the participants in the TD group had 
participated in a social skills training program.  In the ASD group 27.9% (12) 
had participated in one or more social skills training programs but 72.1% (31) 
had not.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed that the 
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proportion of participants in the ASD group who had participated in at least 
one social skills training program was significantly higher than in the TD 
group: χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 10.34, p = < 0.0001. 
 
Medication:  One of the participants in the TD group was taking medication.  
In the ASD group 34.9% (15) were taking medication and 65.1% (28) were 
not taking medication.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis 
showed that the number of participants in the ASD group who were taking 
medication significantly differed from the number of participants in the TD 
group: χ2 (df = 1, N = 81) = 11.28, p = < 0.0001.  Of the ASD group, 20.9% 
(9) were taking stimulants, 18.6% (8) were taking anti-depressant medication, 
14.0% (6) were taking anti-psychotics, 7.0% (3) were taking anti-convulsants 
and 2.3% (1) were taking anxiolytic medication.  The one medicated 
participant in the TD group was taking an anti-depressant. 
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Part II:  Participant Characteristics of the ASD Groups 
 
As noted in Part I, the ASD group consisted of 43 young males diagnosed 
with one of the ASD.  Of these participants 25 were diagnosed with high-
functioning autism (HFA) and 18 were diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder 
(AD).  
 
Age:  The age of the participants in both groups ranged from 9 to 17 years. 
The mean age for the HFA group was 11.48 (SD = 2.57) and the mean age 
for the AD group was 12.56 (SD = 2.60).  An independent samples t-test 
showed no significant difference between the mean age of the two groups 
(see table 6.3) (t (41) = -1.35, p = 0.19).   
 
Education support:  Of the HFA group 88.0% (22) had received special 
education support compared to 61.1% (11) from the AD group.  Yates’ 
Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed no significant difference 
between the HFA and AD groups for special education support: χ2 (df = 1, 
N = 41) = 2.87, p = 0.09).   
 
Intelligence quotient:  The IQ of participants in the HFA group ranged from 
73 to 134 (mean = 102.68; SD = 15.90) and the AD group ranged from 87 to 
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130 (mean = 107.67; SD = 12.77).  An independent samples t-test showed no 
significant between the groups for mean IQ (t (41) = -1.10, p = 0.28).  
Furthermore, there was no significant difference between the two groups in 
regard to mean verbal IQ (t (41) = -1.30, p = 0.20) and mean performance IQ 
(t (41) = -0.62, p = 0.54) (see Table 6.3).    
 
The cognitive profiles of the HFA and AD groups were examined.  Paired-
samples t-tests showed no significant difference between mean verbal IQ 
(mean = 101.76, SD = 14.67) and mean performance IQ (mean = 103.24, in 
the HFA group (t (24) = -0.61, p = 0.55).  For the AD group, there was no 
significant difference between mean verbal IQ (mean = 107.39, SD =13.16) 
and mean performance IQ (mean = 106.00, SD = 12.29), (t (17) = 0.50, 
p = 0.62).  
 
Adaptive behaviour:  The adaptive behaviour composite score for the HFA 
group ranged from 39 to 126 (mean = 70.76, SD = 21.17) and for the AD 
group ranged from 47 to 114 (mean = 74.11, SD = 18.33).  An independent 
samples t-test showed no significant differences between the groups for the 
composite adaptive behaviour standard score (see Table 6.3) (t (41) = -0.54, 
p = 0.59) or for the Communication (t (41) = -0.87, p = 0.39), Daily living skills 
subscale (t (41) = -0.60, p = 0.55), and Socialization (t (41) = 0.07, p = 0.95) 
subscales of the VABS.      
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Receptive language:  The receptive language on the PPVT-III of the HFA 
group ranged from 72 to 131 (mean = 101.56, SD = 16.46) and for the AD 
group ranged from 79 to 138 (mean = 109.94, SD = 18.06).   An independent 
samples t-test showed no significant difference between the groups with 
respect to the PPVT-III mean standard score (see Table 6.3) (t (41) = -1.58, p 
= 0.12).  
 
Autistic symptoms:  A significant difference was found between the HFA 
(mean = 21.16, SD = 5.15) and AD groups (mean = 17.56, SD = 5.52) on the 
ADI-R social domain (t (41) = 2.20, p = 0.03).   There was no significant 
difference between the groups on the ADI-R communication (t (41) = 1.02, 
p = 0.31) and behaviour domains (t (41) = 0.63, p = 0.54) (see Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3 IQ, Adaptive Behaviour and Receptive Language: Means and 
Standard Deviations of the HFA and AD groups.  
Variable HFA Mean (SD) 
AD 
Mean (SD) T or x Df P 
Age  11.48 (2.57)  12.56 (2.60) -1.35 41 0.19 
KBIT      
Vocabulary  101.76 (14.67) 107.39 (13.16) -1.30 41 0.20 
Matrices 103.24 (15.76) 106.00 (12.29) -0.62 41 0.55 
KBIT Composite 
Standard Score 102.68 (15.90) 107.67 (12.77) -1.10 41 0.28 
VABS 
Communication  79.52 (28.57)  86.50 (22.04) -0.87 41 0.39 
Daily living skills  70.56 (23.75)  74.83 (22.22) -0.50 41 0.55 
Socialization   73.52 (17.34)  73.17 (15.62) 0.07 41 0.95 
Adaptive 
Behavior 
Composite 
Standard Score 
 70.76 (21.17)  74.11 (18.33) -0.54 41 0.59 
PPVT-III      
PPVT-III 
Standard Score  101.56 (16.46) 109.94 (18.06) -1.58 41 0.12 
ADI-R      
Social  21.16 (5.15)  17.56 (5.52) 2.20 41 0.03*
Communication  16.44 (4.58)  15.06 (4.11) 1.02 41 0.31 
Behaviour   6.40 (2.69)  5.89 (2.56) 0.63 41 0.54 
      
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level 
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Social skills training:  Of the HFA group 20.0% (5) had participated in one 
or more social skills training programs compared with 38.9% (7) from the AD 
group.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed no 
significant difference in the number of participants who had participated in 
social skills training; χ2 (df = 1, N = 43) = 1.04, p = 0.31. 
 
Medication:  Of the HFA group 36.0% (9) were taking medication (including 
stimulants, anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, anti-convulsants and anxiolytic 
medication) compared to 33.3% (6) from the AD group.  Yates’ Correction for 
Continuity chi-square analysis showed no significant difference between the 
HFA and AD groups for medication; χ2 (df = 1, N = 41) = 0.00, p = 1.00).   
 
6.1 Summary  
The major findings from chapter six were: 
1) There was a borderline significant difference between the ASD and 
TD groups with regard to age.  The mean age of participants in the 
ASD group was one year lower than the mean age of participants in 
the TD group. 
2) Participants in the ASD group were significantly more likely to be in 
primary school and receiving education support than those in the TD 
group.   
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3) There were significantly more participants in the ASD group living in 
rural areas than the TD group.   
4) Participants in the ASD group had significantly lower mean scores 
than the TD group on adaptive behaviour, including communication, 
daily living skills and socialization.        
5) There were significantly more participants in the ASD group who had 
participated in social skills training than in the TD group.   
6) There were significantly more participants in the ASD group taking 
medication than those in the TD group.   
7) There were no significant differences between the ASD and TD 
groups for variables of socio-economic status, family structure, IQ 
and receptive language ability.  
8) There were no significant differences between the HFA and AD 
groups for age, education support, IQ, adaptive behaviour, receptive 
language ability, participation in social skills training programs and 
use of medication. 
9) Participants from the HFA group had significantly higher mean scores 
compared to the AD group for the ADI-R social domain score. 
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Chapter 7 
Results 
Part III - Testing Hypotheses 
 
As noted in chapter six, the mean age of participants in the ASD group was 
one year lower than the mean age of participants in the TD group.  Post hoc 
examinations were conducted to explore the relationship between 
chronological age and responses from the self-understanding interview.  In 
addition, post hoc examinations were conducted to explore the relationships 
between receptive language ability (as measured by PPVT-III standard 
score), verbal IQ, performance IQ, full scale IQ and responses from the self-
understanding interview and theory of mind (ToM) tasks.  
 
7.1 Hypothesis 1:  Self-understanding  
Young males with high-functioning ASD are not significantly different 
from the TD comparison group on a measure of self-understanding. 
 
The results from the Damon and Hart Self-Understanding Interview are 
presented below.   
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7.1.1 Verbal productivity 
There was no significant difference between the ASD group (mean = 26.42, 
SD = 11.87) and TD group (mean = 28.50, SD = 7.09) in regard to the total 
number of statements produced from the Damon and Hart Self-
Understanding Interview (t (69.85) = -0.97, p = 0.34).   
 
7.1.2 Self-as-subject 
The self-as-subject component includes the total self-as-subject score, total 
scores for each of the three categories that make up the self-as-subject 
(continuity, agency and distinctness) and scores for four levels across each 
category.   
 
The total number of statements relating to the self-as-subject was normally 
distributed and analysed as continuous data.   An independent samples t-test 
showed no significant difference between the ASD group (mean = 6.16, SD = 
3.96) and the TD group (mean = 5.92, SD = 2.36) for the total number of self-
as-subject statements produced (t (69.84) = 0.34, p = 0.74).   The participants 
in the ASD group had a wide range of scores as evidenced by the larger SD 
suggesting a large range of variability in terms of the number of self-as-
subject statements produced.   
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7.1.3 Self-as-subject:  Categories and level analyses  
The distribution of scores within the four levels of each category was severely 
skewed; for this reason the data were combined across levels and the total 
sum score for each of the three categories was analysed.  The data from the 
three categories were analysed using non-parametric tests because the data 
were not normally distributed.   
 
Table 7.1 Self-as-subject: Medians and Interquartile ranges (IQR) for 
ASD and TD groups. 
Variable ASD Median (IQR) 
TD  
Median (IQR) Z P 
Continuity  2.0 (2.0)  2.0  (1.0) -0.16 0.88 
Agency  1.0 (1.0)  1.0 (1.0) -2.09* 0.04 
Distinctness  3.0 (3.0)  3.0 (1.3) -0.35 0.73 
 *Significant at the < 0.05 level  
 
Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant difference between the ASD and 
TD groups on continuity (the awareness of self over time) (z = -0.16, p = 0.88) 
and distinctness (the awareness of being distinct or different from others) (z = 
-0.35, p = 0.73).  However, the ASD and TD groups differed on agency 
(awareness of the formation, existence or control of self).  Although the 
median was the same, the ASD group (median = 1.0, IQR = 1.0 (1.0, 0.0)) 
produced significantly fewer agency statements than the TD group (median = 
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1.0, IQR = 1.0 (2.0, 1.0)) (z = -2.09, p = 0.04).  A significant difference was 
found because most of the ASD group scored below 1.0 and most of the TD 
group scored above 1.0 (refer to Figure 3).  The outliers made the groups 
more alike rather than different and therefore are unlikely to bias the p-value 
towards significance.    
 
Figure 3: Median number of agency statements for ASD and TD groups  
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7.1.4 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological age (in 
years), receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ, full scale IQ and the 
sum total of statements produced for each self-as-subject category 
(continuity, agency and distinctness) was conducted by calculating Spearman 
Rank Correlation Coefficients.  The coefficients are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Correlations between self-as-subject and chronological age, 
receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ among 
the ASD and TD groups. 
 Continuity Agency Distinctness 
ASD    
Age -0.08 0.36* 0.19 
Receptive 
language  0.23 0.26 0.32* 
Verbal IQ 0.17 0.21 0.33* 
Performance IQ 0.13 0.16 0.40** 
Full scale IQ 0.15 0.23 0.38* 
TD    
Age 0.13 0.17 0.29 
Receptive 
language 0.27 0.35* 0.12 
Verbal IQ 0.01 0.09 0.11 
Performance IQ 0.01 0.22 0.01 
Full scale IQ 0.01 0.22 0.12 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
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A significant positive relationship was found between chronological age and 
agency statements for the ASD group (r = 0.36, N = 43, p = 0.02) and 
distinctness statements correlated with receptive language ability (r = 0.32, N 
=43, p = 0.04); verbal IQ (r = 0.33, N = 43, p = 0.03); performance IQ (r = 
0.40, N = 43, p = < 0.0001) and full scale IQ (r = 0.38, N = 43, p = 0.01).  For 
the TD group, a significant positive relationship was found between receptive 
language ability and agency statements (r = 0.35, N = 38, p = 0.03).   
 
Since the mean age of participants in the ASD group was one year lower than 
the mean age of participants in the TD group, multiple regression analysis 
was conducted to determine whether age is a significant predictor of self-
understanding. Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine 
whether age is a significant predictor of self-understanding.  Regression 
analysis showed that age was not an independent predictor of self-as-subject 
(t = 0.44, p = 0.78).   
 
7.1.5 Self-as-object 
The total number of statements relating to the self-as-object was normally 
distributed and analysed as continuous data.  An independent samples t-test 
showed no significant difference between the ASD group (mean = 20.26, SD 
= 9.36) and the TD group (mean = 22.58, SD = 5.77) in regard to the total 
number of self-as-object statements produced (t (70.97) = -0.36, p = 0.18).  
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The participants in the ASD group had a wide range of scores as evidenced 
by the larger SD suggesting that some participants with ASD produced few 
statements while others produced many self-as-object statements.   
 
7.1.6 Self-as-object:  Category and level analyses  
The distribution of scores across categories (Physical, Active, Social and 
Psychological) and levels (Levels 1 to 4) were analysed as continuous data.  
The data were not normally distributed and therefore non-parametric tests 
were used. The median number of statements across the four categories 
(physical, active, social and psychological) for the ASD and TD groups is 
presented below in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4:  Self-as-object scheme:  Median number of statements across 
categories   
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Self-as-object: Category analyses  
Mann-Whitney U tests showed a significant difference between the ASD 
group (median = 6.0, IQR = 5.0) and the TD group (median = 3.0, IQR = 4.3) 
on physical statements produced, with the ASD group producing significantly 
more statements concerned with physical-body characteristics than the TD 
group (z = -3.09, p = < 0.0001).  In contrast, Mann-Whitney U tests showed 
no significant difference between the ASD group (median = 7.0, IQR = 6.0) 
and the TD group (median = 8.0, IQR = 5.0) on the total number of 
statements produced concerned with activities or abilities (z = -1.48, p = 
0.14).   
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Mann-Whitney U tests showed a significant difference between the ASD 
(median = 2.0, IQR = 3.0) and TD groups (median = 5.0, IQR = 4.3) on 
statements concerned with social personality characteristics, social 
interactions or social relations, with the ASD group produced significantly 
fewer social statements than the TD group (z = -4.76, p = < 0.0001).  
Similarly, Mann-Whitney U tests showed a significant difference between the 
ASD (median = 3.0, IQR = 3.0) and TD groups (median = 4.0, IQR = 4.3) on 
statements concerned with emotions, thoughts, or cognitive processes, with 
the ASD group producing significantly fewer psychological statements than 
the TD group (z = -2.61, p = 0.01).   
 
Self-as-object: Level analyses 
Physical   
A level one physical statement is defined as physical and material attributes 
that have significance in and of themselves.  There was a significant 
difference between the ASD group (median = 4.0, IQR = 3.0) and the TD 
group (median = 1.5, IQR = 4.0), with the ASD group producing significantly 
more physical statements at level one than the TD group (z = -2.87, p = < 
0.0001).   
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Figure 5: Median number of physical statements at level one for ASD 
and TD groups  
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A level two physical statement is defined as physical and material attributes 
that reflect the nature of self’s activities or capabilities.  There was a 
significant difference between the ASD group (median = 1.0, IQR = 2.0) and 
the TD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0), with the ASD group producing 
significantly more physical statements at level two than the TD group 
(z = -2.86, p = < 0.0001).   
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Figure 6: Median number of physical statements at level two for ASD 
and TD groups  
Group
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A level three physical statement is defined as physical and material attributes 
that influence or reflect the self’s social appeal, social interactions, social 
relations, or group membership.  There was no significant difference between 
the ASD group (median = 0.00, IQR = 1.00) and the TD group (median = 
0.00, IQR = 0.25) on the number of physical statements produced at level 
three (z = -1.52, p = 0.13).   
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A level four physical statement is defined as physical and material attributes 
that influence or reflect the self’s personal philosophy, moral standards or 
lifestyle.  There was no significant difference between the ASD group (median 
= 0.0, IQR = 1.0) and the TD group (median = 1.0, IQR = 1.3) on the number 
of physical statements produced at level four (z = -1.49, p = 0.14).   
 
Active 
A level one active statement is concerned with active attributes that reflect 
activities that the self performs, or activities that are allowed, forbidden, or 
demanded of the self.   There was no significant difference between the ASD 
(median = 2.0, IQR = 3.0) and TD groups (median = 2.0, IQR = 2.0) on the 
number of active statements produced at level one (z = -0.60, p = 0.55).   
 
A level two active statement is defined as active attributes that are considered 
relative to other abilities of the self or to the abilities of others. There was no 
significant difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 2.0) and 
TD groups (median = 1.0, IQR = 1.0) on the number of active statements 
produced at level two (z = -1.62, p = 0.11).   
 
A level three active statement is defined as active attributes that influence the 
self’s social appeal, social interactions, or group membership.  There was no 
significant difference between the ASD group (median = 2.0, IQR = 4.0) and 
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TD group (median = 2.0, IQR = 3.0) on the number of active statements 
produced at level three (z = -0.65, p = 0.52).   
 
A level four active statement is defined as active attributes that influence or 
reflect the self’s personal philosophy, moral standards, or lifestyle.  As can be 
seen from Figure 7, there was a significant difference between the ASD 
(median = 1.0, IQR = 2.0) and TD groups (median = 3.0, IQR = 3.3), with the 
ASD group producing significantly fewer active statements at level four than 
the TD group (z = -3.62, p = <0.0001).  
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Figure 7: Median number of active statements at level four for ASD and 
TD groups  
Group
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Social 
A level one social statement is defined as social attributes of the self that 
define the self as a member of a social group.  There was no significant 
difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) and the TD 
group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) on the number of social statements 
produced at level one (z = -0.44, p = 0.66).  
 
A level two social statement is defined as social activities or abilities that are 
understood with reference to the reactions of others.  There was a significant 
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difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) and the TD 
group (median = 2.0, IQR = 3.0), with the ASD group produced significantly 
fewer social statements at level two than the TD group (z = -3.09, p = < 
0.0001).  Refer to Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Median number of social statements at level two for ASD and 
TD groups  
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A level three social statement is defined as social attributes of the self that 
reflect the self’s personality characteristics or group membership and that 
influence the nature of the self’s social interactions.  There was a significant 
difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) and the TD 
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group (median = 1.5, IQR = 4.0), with the ASD group producing significantly 
fewer social statements at level three than the TD group (z = -3.82, p = < 
0.0001). Refer to Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Median number of social statements at level three for ASD and 
TD groups  
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A level four social statement is defined as social attributes of the self that 
reflect or influence the self’s personal philosophy, moral standards, or 
lifestyle.  There was a significant difference between the ASD group (median 
= 0.0, IQR = 0.0) and the TD group (median = 1.0, IQR = 1.0), with the ASD 
group producing significantly fewer social statements at level four than the TD 
group (z = -5.00, p = < 0.0001).  Refer to Figure 10.   
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Figure 10: Median number of social statements at level four for ASD and 
TD groups  
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Psychological  
A level one psychological statement is defined as attributes that define 
moods, and feelings that have significance in and of themselves.   There was 
no significant difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0) 
and the TD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0) on the number of psychological 
statements produced at level one (z = -1.14, p = 0.26).   
 
A level two psychological statement is defined as those attributes that reflect 
the self’s cognitive capabilities, acquired knowledge, or activity – related 
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emotional states.  There was a significant difference between the ASD group 
(median = 2.0, IQR = 3.0) and the TD group (median = 3.0, IQR = 4.0), with 
the ASD group producing significantly fewer psychological statements at level 
two than the TD group (z = -2.45, p = <0.0001).  Refer to Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Median number of psychological statements at level two for 
ASD and TD groups  
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A level three psychological statement is defined by psychological attributes 
that reflect or influence social skills or social interactions.  There was no 
significant difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0) and 
the TD group (median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) on the number of psychological 
statements produced at level three (z = -0.78, p = 0.43).  
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A level four psychological statement is defined by psychological attributes 
that reflect the self’s personal philosophy, moral standards, or lifestyle.  There 
was a significant difference between the ASD group (median = 0.0, 
IQR = 1.0) and the TD group (median = 1.0, IQR = 2.0), with the ASD group 
producing significantly fewer psychological statements at level four than the 
TD group (z = -2.73, p = 0.01).  Refer to Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Median number of psychological statements at level four for 
ASD and TD groups  
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7.1.7 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological age (in 
years) receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ and 
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the sum total of statements produced for each self-as-object category 
(physical, active, social and psychological) was conducted by calculating 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (see Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3 Correlations between self-as-object categories and 
chronological age, receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and 
full scale IQ amongst the ASD and TD groups.  
 Physical Active Social Psychological
ASD     
Age -0.40** 0.23 0.30 0.46** 
Receptive language -0.14 0.07 -0.06 0.44** 
Verbal IQ -0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.32* 
Performance IQ 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.28 
Full scale IQ 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.36* 
TD     
Age -0.23 -0.19 0.42** 0.42** 
Receptive language 0.23 -0.10 0.15 0.32 
Verbal IQ 0.05 -0.14 -0.14 0.21 
Performance IQ 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.14 
Full scale IQ 0.24 -0.00 -0.10 0.25 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level 
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
 
For the ASD group, there was a significant negative relationship between 
physical statements and chronological age (r = -0.40, N = 43, p = < 0.0001).  
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There were significant positive relationships between psychological 
statements and chronological age (r = 0.46, N= 43, p = < 0.0001), receptive 
language ability (r = 0.44, N= 43, p = < 0.0001), verbal IQ (r = 0.32, N= 43, 
p = 0.03) and full scale IQ (r = 0.36, N =43, p = 0.02).   
 
For the TD group, there were significant positive relationships between 
chronological age and psychological statements (r = 0.42, N= 38, 
p = <0.0001) and social statements (r = 0.42, N= 38, p = < 0.0001).  There 
was a borderline significant positive relationship between receptive language 
ability and psychological statements (r = 0.32, N = 38, p = 0.05).    
 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine whether age is a 
significant predictor of self-understanding.  Regression analysis showed that 
age was not an independent predictor of self-as-object (t = 0.82, p = 0.26).  
Thus, adjusting for age did not alter the association between ASD and self-
understanding.     
 
7.1.8 Content analysis 
In order to capture those aspects of self understanding which may reveal 
personal concerns and features of the self unique to participants with ASD, 
responses to three specific questions were analysed using a content coding 
scheme.  A theme was counted if it was mentioned once during the interview.  
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References to the identified themes were tallied from each interview.  
Tables 7.4 present the percentage of participants in the ASD and TD groups 
mentioning each of the major themes identified.  The content analyses 
revealed common concerns and features of this age group, but also themes 
that differentiated the groups.     
 
Table 7.4 Common themes mentioned from the self-understanding 
interview amongst the ASD and TD groups. 
 ASD 
% 
(frequency)
TD 
% 
(frequency)
χ2 Df P 
Possessions/money/ 
Material goods  69.80 (30)  47.4  (18) 3.32 1 0.07 
Personal 
achievements  34.9 (15)  68.4 (26) 7.79* 1 0.01 
Altruistic/humanitari
an concerns  18.6  (8)  36.8 (14) 2.53 1 0.11 
Role of family and 
friends  41.9 (18)  65.8 (25) 3.73 1 0.05 
Acceptance by 
others  23.3 (10)  7.9 (3) 2.49 1  0.12 
Behaviour  20.9 (9)  5.3 (2) 3.00 1  0.08 
Plans for the future  16.3 (7)  28.9 (11) 1.21 1  0.27 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
 
A theme which clearly differentiated the two groups was the issue of obtaining 
good marks at school and mentioning their accomplishments in other 
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activities (e.g. musical ability and sport). Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-
square analysis showed a significant difference between the ASD and TD 
group, with the ASD group mentioning significantly fewer personal 
achievements than the TD group χ2 (df= 1, N= 81) = 7.79, p = 0.01.   
 
Another theme which differentiated the groups was the role of family and 
friends in the formation of self.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square 
analysis showed a borderline significant difference between the ASD and TD 
groups.  Compared to the TD group, the ASD group made significantly fewer 
references that relate to the role of family and friends; χ2 (df = 1, N= 81) = 
3.73, p = 0.05.   
  
Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed no significant 
difference between the ASD and TD groups; however, there was a trend for a 
greater number of references about personal possessions, money and 
wishes for material goods from the ASD group; χ2 (df= 1, N= 81) = 3.32, 
p = 0.07.  Similarly, although the Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square 
analysis showed no significant difference between the ASD and TD groups in 
terms of references about personal conduct or behaviour the result 
approached significance; χ2 (df= 1, N= 81) = 3.00, p = 0.08.   
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References to disorder 
For the ASD group, 32.2% (13) of participants highlighted their disorder as a 
salient aspect of their self.  In fact, a proportion of ASD participants 
responded to the question “what are you like?” by referring to their disorder.   
Given the relevance of this theme to the current study, references to “autism” 
or “Asperger’s” were tallied throughout the interview.  The participants with 
ASD who mentioned their disorder tended to do so in a negative way.  Table 
7.5 presents the percentage of participants with ASD who referred to their 
disorder and whether they mentioned it in a positive, neutral or negative 
manner.   
 
Table 7.5 Percentage and frequency of ASD group who mention their 
disorder 
 ASD 
% (frequency) 
HFA 
% (frequency) 
AD 
% (frequency) 
Specific references to 
disorder  30.2 (13)  28.0 (7)  33.3 (6) 
Positive references  9.3 (4)  8.0 (2)  11.1 (2) 
Neutral references  4.7 (2)  8.0 (2)  0.0 (0) 
Negative references  16.3 (7)  12.0 (3)  22.2 (4) 
 
Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed no significant 
difference between the HFA and AD groups on specific references to their 
disorder; χ2 (df = 1, N= 43) = 0.00, p = 0.97.   
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7.2 Hypothesis 2:  Self-understanding in HFA and AD 
Young males with high-functioning autism (HFA) are not significantly 
different from young males with Asperger’s disorder (AD) on a measure 
of self-understanding. 
 
7.2.1 Verbal productivity 
There was no significant difference between the HFA (mean = 25.44, SD = 
11.27) and AD groups (mean = 27.78, SD = 12.85) in regard to the total 
number of statements produced from the Damon and Hart Self-
Understanding Interview (t (41) = -0.63, p = 0.53).   
 
7.2.2 Self-as-subject 
There was no significant difference between the HFA (mean = 5.76, SD = 
3.52) and AD groups (mean = 6.72, SD = 4.55) in regard to the total number 
of self-as-subject statements produced (t (41) = -0.78, p = 0.44).  Similarly, 
there was no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on the 
self-as-subject categories of continuity (z = -0.67, p = 0.51), agency 
(z = -0.46, p = 0.65) and distinctness (z = -0.91, p = 0.36). See Table 7.6 
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Table 7.6 Self-as-subject: Medians and Interquartile ranges (IQR) for 
HFA and AD groups. 
Variable HFA  Median (IQR) 
AD 
Median (IQR) Z P 
Continuity  2.0 (2.0)  1.0 (3.0) -0.67 0.51 
Agency  1.0 (1.0)  1.0 (2.0) -0.46 0.65 
Distinctness  3.0 (2.5)  3.5 (4.5) -0.91 0.36 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant difference between the HFA and 
the AD groups on continuity (z = -0.67, p= 0.51), agency (z = -0.46, p = 0.65) 
and distinctness (z = -0.91, z = 0.36). 
 
7.2.3 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological age (in 
years), receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ, full scale IQ and the 
sum total of statements produced for each self-as-subject category 
(continuity, agency and distinctness) was conducted by calculating Spearman 
Rank Correlation Coefficients.  The coefficients are shown in Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7 Correlations between self-as-subject and chronological age, 
receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ among 
the HFA and AD groups. 
 Continuity Agency Distinctness 
HFA    
Age 0.02 0.31 0.20 
Receptive 
language 0.16 0.46 0.30 
Verbal IQ 0.16 0.38 0.41* 
Performance IQ -0.01 0.47* 0.34 
Full scale IQ 0.05 0.51* 0.40 
AD    
Age -0.21 0.41 0.14 
Receptive 
language 0.36 0.14 0.32 
Verbal IQ 0.28 -0.06 0.25 
Performance IQ 0.38 -0.27 0.50* 
Full scale IQ 0.27 -0.11 0.30 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
 
In the HFA group, significant positive relationships were found between 
agency statements and performance IQ (r =0.47, N = 25, p = 0.02) and full 
scale IQ (r = 0.51, N = 25, p = 0.01).  Significant positive relationship was 
found for distinctness statements and verbal IQ (r = 0.41, N = 25, p = 0.04).    
A borderline significant positive relationship was found between distinctness 
statements and full scale IQ (r = 0.40, N = 25, p = 0.05).  In the AD group, a 
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significant positive relationship was found between distinctness statements 
and performance IQ (r = 0.50, N = 18, p = 0.04). 
 
7.2.4 Self-as-object 
The total number of statements relating to the self-as-object was normally 
distributed and analysed as continuous data.  An independent samples t-test 
showed no significant difference between the HFA (mean = 19.68, SD = 8.69) 
and AD groups (mean = 21.06, SD = 10.44) in regard to the total number of 
self-as-object statements produced (t (41) = -0.47, p = 0.64).   
 
The distribution of scores across the categories (physical, active, social and 
psychological) and levels (Levels 1 to 4) were analysed as continuous data.  
The data were not normally distributed and therefore non-parametric tests 
were used. 
 
7.2.5 Self-as-object: Categories and level analyses  
The median number of statements across the four categories (physical, 
active, social and psychological) for the HFA and AD groups is presented in 
Figure 7.8. 
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Table 7.8 Medians and Interquartile ranges (IQR) of HFA and AD groups 
on categories. 
Category  
HFA 
Median 
(IQR) 
AD 
Median 
(IQR) 
Z P 
Physical  7.0 (4.5) 4.5 (4.3) -1.84      0.07 
Active 5.0 (7.0) 7.5 (5.5) -0.84 0.40 
Social  2.0 (1.5) 1.5 (4.3) -0.05 0.96 
Psychological  3.0 (3.0) 2.5 (7.3) -0.44 0.66 
 
Self-as-object: Category analyses 
There was no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on the 
total number of physical (z = -1.84, p = 0.07), active (z = -0.84, p = 0.40), 
social (z = -0.05, p = 0.96) and psychological statements produced (z = -0.44, 
p = 0.66).   
 
Self-as-object: Level analyses 
Physical  
There was a significant difference between the HFA (median = 4.0, IQR = 
4.0) and AD groups (median = 2.5, IQR = 4.0) on the number of level one 
physical statements produced, with the HFA group producing significantly 
more physical statements at level one than the AD group (z = -2.19, p = 0.03) 
(see Figure 13). There were no significant differences between the HFA and 
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AD groups on the number of physical statements produced at level two (HFA: 
median = 1.0, IQR = 1.0; AD: median = 1.0, IQR = 3.0) (z = -1.10, p = 0.27), 
level three (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR = 0.3; AD: median = 0.5, IQR = 1.0) 
(z = -1.16, p = 0.25) and level four (HFA: median = 1.0, IQR = 2.0; AD: 
median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) (z = -1.40, p = 0.16). 
 
Figure 13:  Median number of physical statements at level one for HFA 
and AD groups 
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Active 
There was no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on the 
number of active statements produced at level one (HFA: median = 1.0, IQR 
= 3.0; AD: median = 2.0, IQR = 2.3) (z = -0.44, p = 0.66), level two (HFA: 
median = 0.0, IQR = 2.0; AD: median = 1.0, IQR = 2.5) (z = -1.10, p = 0.27) 
and three (HFA: median = 2.0, IQR = 4.0; AD: median = 2.0, IQR = 2.5) 
(z = -0.34, p = 0.74). There was however, a borderline significant difference 
between the HFA (median = 0.0, IQR = 2.0) and AD groups (median = 1.0, 
IQR = 2.3) on the number of active statements produced at level four, with the 
HFA group producing fewer active statements at level four than the AD group 
(z = -1.98, p = 0.05).  Refer to Figure 14. 
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Figure 14:  Median number of active statements at level four for HFA 
and AD groups 
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Social  
There was no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on the 
number of social statements produced at level one (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR 
= 1.0; AD: median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0) (z = -0.97, p = 0.33), level two (HFA: 
median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0; AD: median = 0.5, IQR = 2.0) (z = -1.00, p = 0.32), 
level three (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0; AD: median = 0.0, IQR = 1.3) (z = 
-0.33, p = 0.74) and level four (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0; AD: median = 
0.0, IQR = 0.0) (z = -0.85, p = 0.40).   
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Psychological  
There was no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on the 
number of psychological statements produced at level one (HFA: median = 
0.0, IQR = 0.0; AD: median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0) (z = -0.29, p = 0.77), level two 
(HFA: median = 1.0, IQR = 3.0; AD: median = 2.0, IQR = 6.0) (z = -0.43, p = 
0.67), level three (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR = 0.0; AD: median = 0.0, IQR = 
0.3) (z = -0.49, p = 0.62) and level four (HFA: median = 0.0, IQR = 1.0; AD: 
median = 0.0, IQR = 1.3) (z = -0.05, p = 0.96).     
 
7.2.6 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological age (in 
years) receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ and 
the sum total of statements produced for each self-as-object category 
(physical, active, social and psychological) was conducted by calculating 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients.  The coefficients are shown in 
Table 7.9 
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Table 7.9 Correlations between self-as-object categories and 
chronological age, receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and 
full scale IQ amongst the HFA and AD groups. 
 Physical Active Social Psychological
HFA     
Age -0.48* 0.35 0.32 0.60** 
Receptive language -0.29 0.11 -0.09 0.52** 
Verbal IQ -0.34 0.26 -0.15 0.39 
Performance IQ -0.00 0.19 0.22 0.45* 
Full scale IQ -0.19 0.21 0.06 0.50* 
AD     
Age -0.25 -0.06 0.24 0.39 
Receptive language 0.13 -0.11 0.04 0.28 
Verbal IQ 0.27 -0.12 0.07 0.20 
Performance IQ 0.18 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 
Full scale IQ 0.22 -0.12 -0.00 0.13 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
 
For the HFA group, there were significant positive correlations between 
chronological age and physical statements (r = 0.48, N = 25, p = 0.02) and 
psychological statements (r = 0.60, N = 25 p = < 0.0001).   For the HFA 
group, age may be a factor in explaining the number of physical and 
psychological statements produced.  There were also significant positive 
correlations between psychological statements and receptive language ability 
 159
(r = 0.52, N = 25, p = < 0.0001), performance IQ (r = 0.45, N = 25, p = 0.02) 
and full scale IQ (r = 0.50, N = 25, p = 0.01).   There were no significant 
correlations between these same variables for the AD group.    
 
7.2.7 Content analysis 
In order to capture those aspects of self understanding which may reveal 
personal concerns and features of the self unique to participants with HFA 
and AD, responses to three specific questions were analysed using a content 
coding scheme.  A theme was counted if it was mentioned once during the 
interview.  References to the identified themes were tallied from each 
interview.  Table 7.10 presents the percentage of participants with HFA and 
AD mentioning each of the major themes identified.   
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Table 7.10 Common themes mentioned from the self-understanding 
interview amongst the HFA and AD groups. 
*p-values were computed using Fisher’s Exact Test  
 
The content analyses revealed common concerns and features of the groups 
but there were no themes that differentiated the HFA and AD groups.     
 
 
 
 
 
 HFA 
% 
(frequency) 
AD 
% 
(frequency) 
χ2 Df P 
Possessions/ 
Material goods  76.0 (19)  61.1 (11) 0.51 1 0.48 
Personal 
achievements  28.0 (7)  44.4 (8) 0.63 1 0.43 
Altruistic/humanita
rian concerns*  20.0 (5)  16.7 (3)   1.00 
Role of family and 
friends  40.0 (10)  44.4 (8) 0.00 1 1.00 
Acceptance by 
others*  24.0 (6)  22.2 (4)   1.00 
Behaviour*  24.00 (6)  16.7 (3)   0.71 
Plans for the 
future*  16.0 (4)  16.7 (3)   1.00 
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7.3 Hypothesis 3:  Self-understanding and social functioning  
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as 
measured by scores on the self-understanding interview) and social 
functioning (as measured by scores from Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scales Socialization Domain) for young males with high-functioning 
ASD. 
 
To investigate the relationship between self-understanding and social 
functioning, the groups’ responses from the seven categories of the self-
understanding interview (agency, continuity, distinctness, physical, active, 
social and psychological) and the total self-as-subject and self-as-object 
scores were correlated with the score from the VABS socialization domain 
using a non-parametric test (see table 7.11). 
 
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient showed for the ASD group, a 
significant positive relationship between social functioning (as measured by 
the VABS socialization domain) and distinctness statements (r = 0.32, N = 43, 
p = 0.03) and total self-as-subject statements and social functioning (as 
measured by the socialization domain from the VABS) (r = 0.36, N = 43, 
p = 0.02).  For the ASD group, self-understanding is a factor that explains 
social functioning.  In the TD group, there were no significant relationships 
found between self-understanding and social functioning.   
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Table 7.11 Correlations between scores from the self-understanding 
interview and VABS socialization domain amongst the ASD and TD 
groups.  
 VABS Socialization Domain 
ASD 
Self-as subject  
Continuity  0.19 
Agency  0.20 
Distinctness  0.32* 
Total self-as-subject 0.36* 
Self-as-object  
Physical  0.12 
Active  0.06 
Social  0.13 
Psychological  0.23 
Total self-as-object 0.12 
TD  
Self-as-subject  
Continuity  0.19 
Agency  0.09 
Distinctness  0.17 
Total self-as-subject  0.27 
Self-as-object  
Physical  -0.03 
Active  -0.09 
Social  0.00 
Psychological  0.28 
Total self-as-object 0.05 
 * Significant at the < 0.05 level  
 
 163
7.4 Hypothesis 4:  Self-understanding and social functioning in HFA 
and AD 
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as 
measured by scores on the self-understanding interview) and social 
functioning (as measured by scores from Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scales Socialization Domain) for young males with HFA and AD.  
 
Table 7.12 presents the correlation between scores from socialization domain 
from the VABS and the self-understanding interview for the two ASD groups.   
Within the HFA group, a significant positive relationship was found between 
agency self-statements and social functioning (as measured by the VABS 
socialization domain) (r = 0.45, N = 25, p = 0.02).  For the HFA group, self-
understanding may be a factor in explaining social functioning scores.  For 
the AD group, there were no significant relationships found between self-
understanding and social functioning.  
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Table 7.12 Correlations between scores from the self-understanding 
interview and VABS socialization domain amongst the HFA and AD 
groups.  
 VABS Socialization Domain  
HFA 
Self-as subject  
Continuity  0.06 
Agency  0.45* 
Distinctness  0.34 
Total self-as-subject 0.35 
Self-as-object  
Physical  0.13 
Active  0.06 
Social  0.09 
Psychological  0.21 
Total self-as-object 0.15 
AD  
Self-as-subject  
Continuity  0.34 
Agency  -0.09 
Distinctness   0.34 
Total self-as-subject  0.43 
Self-as-object  
Physical  0.03 
Active  0.09 
Social  0.21 
Psychological 0.19 
Total self-as-object 0.03 
 * Significant at the < 0.05 level 
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7.5 Hypothesis 5: Theory of mind 
Young males with high-functioning ASD are not significantly different 
from the TD comparison group on false-belief ToM tasks.   
The distribution of scores for ToM (first-order false-belief task, second-order 
false-belief task and second-order false-belief justification question) were 
analysed as categorical data.  The results for the ASD and TD groups are 
presented in Table 7.13. 
 
Table 7.13 Percentage and frequency of ASD and TD groups who 
passed ToM tasks.  
Variable ASD% (frequency) 
TD% 
(frequency) χ2 df P 
First-order  79.1 (34)  92.1 (35) 1.78 1 0.18 
Second-order  44.2 (19)  76.3 (29) 7.35* 1 0.01 
Second-order 
Justification   18.6 (8)  34.2 (13) 1.81 1 0.18 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
 
7.5.1 First-order theory of mind task 
The majority of the ASD group, 79.1% (34) passed the first-order ToM task.  
The TD group approached ceiling, 92.1% (35) passed the first-order ToM 
task. Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis showed no 
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significant difference between the ASD and TD group on the first-order ToM 
task χ2 (df = 1, N= 81) = 1.78, p = 0.18.   
 
7.5.2 Second-order theory of mind task 
Of the ASD group, 44.2% (19) passed and 55.8% (24) failed the second-
order ToM task.  Of the TD group, 76.3% (29) passed whilst the remainder 
failed the second-order ToM task.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square 
analysis showed a significant difference between the ASD and TD groups, 
with significantly more participants in the TD group passing the second-order 
belief question; χ2 (df= 1, N= 81) = 7.35, p = 0.01.   
 
7.5.3 Second-order task justification question 
Of the ASD group, 18.6% (8) passed and 81.4% (35) gave one or no mental 
states in their response and therefore failed the second-order task justification 
question.   Of the TD group, 34.2% (13) passed and 65.8% (25) failed the 
second-order task justification question.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-
square analysis showed no significant difference between the ASD and TD 
group on the second-order justification question; χ2 (df= 1, N= 81) = 1.81, 
p = 0.18).   
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7.5.4 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological (age in 
years), receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ, full scale IQ and 
performance on ToM tasks was conducted by calculating Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficients.  The coefficients are shown in Table 7.14 
 
Table 7.14 Correlations between ToM and chronological age, receptive 
language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ amongst the ASD 
and TD groups. 
 First-Order  
ToM 
Second-  
Order  
ToM 
Second-Order 
ToM Justification 
Question 
ASD    
Age 0.06 0.29 0.24 
Receptive 
language 0.21 0.45** 0.32* 
Verbal IQ 0.32* 0.28 0.22 
Performance IQ 0.11 0.30 0.35* 
Full scale IQ  0.24 0.33* 0.32* 
TD    
Age 0.21 0.06 0.29 
Receptive 
language -0.18 -0.02 -0.17 
Verbal IQ -0.03 0.27 -0.21 
Performance IQ -0.13 0.13 -0.14 
Full scale IQ -1.0 0.19 -0.25 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
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For the ASD group, there was a significant positive relationship between first- 
order ToM and verbal IQ (r = 0.32, N = 43, p = 0.04).  There were significant 
positive relationships between second-order ToM and receptive language (r = 
0.33, N = 43, p = < 0.0001) and full scale IQ (r = 0.33, N = 43, p = 0.03).  
There was a borderline significant positive relationship between second-order 
ToM and performance IQ (r = 0.30, N = 43, p = 0.05).  There were significant 
positive relationships between second-order ToM justification question and 
receptive language (r = 0.32, N = 43, p = 0.04); performance IQ (r = 0.35, N = 
43, p = 0.02) and full scale IQ (r = 0.32, N = 43, p = 0.04). There were no 
significant relationships for the TD group.  
 
Since the mean age of participants in the ASD group was one year lower than 
the mean age of participants in the TD group, multiple regression analysis 
was conducted to determine whether age is a significant predictor of first-
order and second-order ToM. Multiple regression analysis showed that age 
was not an independent predictor of first-order ToM. With ASD in the model, 
age was not a statistically significant factor for first-order ToM (t = 0.71, p = 
0.48).  Similarly, age was not an independent predictor of second-order ToM 
(t = 1.75, p = 0.84).  Thus, adjusting for age did not alter the association 
between ASD and first-order or second-order ToM. 
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7.6 Hypothesis 6: Theory of mind in HFA and AD  
Young males with HFA are not significantly different from young males 
with AD on false-belief ToM tasks. 
The distribution of scores for ToM (first-order false-belief task, second-order 
false-belief task and second-order false-belief justification question) were 
analysed as categorical data.  The results for the HFA and AD groups are 
presented in Table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15 Percentages and frequency of HFA and AD groups who 
passed ToM tasks.  
Variable HFA% (frequency) 
AD % 
(frequency) χ2 Df P 
First-order*  76.0 (19)  83.3 (15)  1 0.71 
Second-order  32.0 (8)  61.1 (11) 2.51 1 0.11 
Second-order 
Justification*   12.0 (3)  27.8 (5)  1 0.25 
*p-values were computed using Fisher’s Exact Test 
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7.6.1 First-order theory of mind task 
Of the HFA group, 76.0% (19) passed whilst the remainder failed the first-
order ToM task.  Of the AD group, 83.3% (15) passed whilst the remainder 
failed the first-order ToM task.  Fisher’s Exact Test chi-square analysis 
showed no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups for the 
first-order task (p= 0.71). 
 
7.6.2 Second-order theory of mind task 
 
Of the HFA group, 32.0% (8) passed and 68.0% (17) failed the second-order 
ToM task.  Of the AD group, 61.1% (11) passed and 38.9% (7) failed the 
second-order ToM task.  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis 
showed no significant difference between the HFA and AD groups on second-
order ToM task; χ2 (df= 1, N= 43) = 2.51, p = 0.11. 
 
7.6.3 Second-order task justification question 
Of the HFA group, only 12.0% (3) passed whilst the majority failed the 
second-order justification question.  Of the AD group, 27.8% (5) passed whilst 
the majority failed the second-order justification question. Fisher’s Exact Test 
chi-square analysis showed no significant difference between the HFA and 
AD groups for the second-order justification question (p = 0.25). 
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7.6.4 Post-hoc examination 
A post hoc examination of the associations among chronological (age in 
years), receptive language, verbal IQ, performance IQ, full scale IQ and 
performance on ToM tasks was conducted by calculating Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficients.  The coefficients are shown in Table 7.16. 
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Table 7.16 Correlations between ToM and chronological age, receptive 
language, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full scale IQ amongst the HFA 
and AD groups. 
 
First-Order  
ToM 
Second  
Order  
ToM 
Second-Order 
ToM 
Justification 
Question  
HFA    
Age 0.03 0.36 0.20 
Receptive 
language 0.25 0.48* 0.24 
Verbal IQ 0.25 0.39 0.26 
Performance IQ 0.15 0.38 0.38 
Full scale IQ 0.16 0.40 0.33 
AD    
Age 0.09 0.06 0.22 
Receptive 
language 0.19 0.26 0.35 
Verbal IQ 0.37 0.01 0.16 
Performance IQ 0.04 0.23 0.32 
Full scale IQ 0.33 0.18 0.28 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
 
For the HFA group, there was a significant positive relationship between 
receptive language and second-order ToM (r = 0.48, N = 25, p = 0.02) and a 
borderline significant positive relationship between full scale IQ and second- 
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order ToM (r= 0.40, N = 25, p = 0.05).  There were no significant correlations 
for these same variables for the AD group. 
 
7.7 Hypothesis 7:  Self-understanding and theory of mind 
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as 
measured by scores from self-understanding interview) and ToM ability 
(as measured by scores from the false-belief theory of mind tasks) for 
young males with high-functioning ASD.  
 
The groups’ responses from the seven categories of the self-understanding 
interview (agency, continuity, distinctness, physical, active, social and 
psychological) and total scores (self-as-subject and self-as-object) were 
correlated with the ToM scores (first-order task, second-order task, and 
second-order justification question) using Spearman Rank non-parametric 
test of correlation.  The results for the ASD and TD groups are presented in 
Table 7.17. 
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Table 7.17 Correlations between scores from the self-understanding 
interview and ToM scores amongst the ASD and TD groups.   
 First-Order  
ToM 
Second-  
Order  
ToM  
Second-Order 
ToM Justification 
Question  
ASD    
Self-as-subject    
Continuity  0.19 0.18 0.17 
Agency  0.04 0.21 -0.14 
Distinctness  0.23 0.28 0.33* 
Total self-as-subject 0.30 0.32* 0.24 
Self-as-object    
Physical  -0.03 -0.05 -0.21 
Active  0.02 0.31* 0.14 
Social  0.10 0.04 0.06 
Psychological  -0.08 0.30 0.31* 
Total self-as-object 0.07 0.31* 0.14 
TD    
Self-as-subject    
Continuity  0.02 -0.08 0.09 
Agency  -0.22 -0.03 0.12 
Distinctness   0.09 0.21 -0.01 
Total self-as-subject  0.03 0.13 0.04 
Self-as-object    
Physical  0.11 0.10 -0.07 
Active  -0.18 -0.18 -0.21 
Social  0.09 -0.04 -0.12 
Psychological  0.07 0.08 0.06 
Total self-as-object -0.06 -0.06 -0.27 
* Significant at the < 0.05 level  
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For the ASD group, significant positive relationships were found between 
second-order ToM and total self-as-subject statements (r= 0.32, N = 43, p = 
0.04) and active statements (r = 0.31, N = 43, p = 0.04).  Significant positive 
relationships were found between second-order ToM justification question 
and distinctness statements (r = 0.33, N = 43, p = 0.03) and psychological 
statements (r = 0.31, N = 43, p = 0.04).  A borderline significant relationship 
was found between second-order ToM and total self-as-object statements (r = 
0.31, N = 43, p = 0.05).  For the ASD group, ToM ability may be a factor in 
explaining scores on the self-understanding interview.  For the TD group, 
there were no significant relationships between self-understanding (as 
measured by the self-understanding interview) and understanding of others’ 
minds (as measured by ToM tasks).   
 
7.8 Hypothesis 8: Self-understanding and theory of mind in HFA and 
AD 
There is no significant relationship between self-understanding (as 
measured by scores on the self-understanding interview) and ToM 
ability (as measured by scores from the false-belief ToM tasks) for 
young males with HFA and AD.   
 
The Spearman Rank test of correlation was used for the HFA and AD groups 
(see Table 7.18).   
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Table 7.18 Correlations between scores from the self-understanding 
interview and ToM scores amongst the HFA and AD groups. 
 First-Order  
ToM 
Second-  
Order  
ToM 
Second-Order 
ToM 
Justification  
HFA    
Self-as-subject    
Continuity  0.28 0.17 0.13 
Agency  -0.18 0.09 -0.06 
Distinctness  0.31 0.13 0.41* 
Total self-as-subject 0.29 0.20 0.25 
Self-as-object    
Physical  -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 
Active  0.03 0.40 0.24 
Social  -0.03 0.10 0.01 
Psychological  -0.06 0.55** 0.37 
Total self-as-object 0.03 0.44* 0.25 
AD    
Self-as-subject    
Continuity 0.09 0.28 0.25 
Agency  0.30 0.30 -0.26 
Distinctness   0.16 0.42 0.19 
Total self-as-subject  0.29 0.43 0.15 
Self-as-object    
Physical  0.22 0.11 -0.28 
Active  0.00 0.11 0.00 
Social  0.30 -0.02 0.11 
Psychological  -0.13 -0.01 0.27 
Total self-as-object 0.09 0.14 0.00 
*Significant at the < 0.05 level  
**Significant at the < 0.01 level  
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Within the HFA group, significant positive relationships were found between 
second-order ToM and psychological statements (r = 0.55, N = 25, p = < 
0.0001), and total self-as-object statements (r = 0.44, N = 25, p = 0.03).  A 
borderline significant positive relationship was found between second-order 
ToM and active statements (r = .040, N = 25, p = 0.05).  There were 
significant positive relationships between second-order justification and 
distinctness statements (r = 0.41, N = 25, p = 0.04).  For the HFA group, ToM 
may be a factor in explaining scores on the self-understanding interview. 
 
For the AD group, there were no significant relationships between 
self-understanding (as measured by the self-understanding interview) and 
understanding of others’ minds (as measured by performance on ToM tasks).   
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Part IV:  Subsidiary Analyses 
  
7.9 Theory of mind and social functioning 
To determine the nature of the relationship between ToM and social 
functioning, the ToM scores were correlated with the score from the VABS 
socialization domain using a non-parametric test (see table 7.19).  
 
Table 7.19 Correlations between ToM scores and social functioning (as 
measured by the VABS socialization domain) amongst the ASD and TD 
groups.  
 VABS Socialization Domain  
ASD 
1st order ToM task 0.28 
2nd order ToM task 0.14 
2nd order ToM 
Justification Question -0.05 
TD  
1st order ToM task 0.21 
2nd order ToM task 0.29 
2nd order ToM 
Justification Question -0.07 
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The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients showed no significant 
relationships between ToM and social functioning for either group. Table 7.20 
presents the results for the HFA and AD groups using a non-parametric test.    
 
Table 7.20 Correlations between ToM scores and social functioning (as 
measured by the VABS socialization domain) amongst the HFA and AD 
groups. 
 VABS Socialization Domain  
HFA 
1st order ToM task 0.25 
2nd order ToM task 0.23 
2nd order ToM 
Justification Question -0.01 
AD  
1st order ToM task 0.37 
2nd order ToM task -0.01 
2nd order ToM 
Justification Question -0.17 
 
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients showed no significant 
relationships between ToM ability and social functioning for either group. 
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7.10 Self-understanding and participation in formal social skills 
training programs 
As noted in Chapter six, 12 of the ASD group participated in formal social 
skills training.  To determine whether formal social skills training had 
implications for self-understanding, the ASD group were divided into those 
who had participated in formal social skills training (SST) and those who had 
not received social skills training (no-SST).  See Table 7.21. 
 
Table 7.21 Medians and Interquartile ranges (IQR) for SST and no-SST 
groups. 
Variable 
SST 
Median (IQR)
N = 12 
No-SST 
Median (IQR) 
N = 31 
Z P 
Self-as-subject     
Continuity   2.00 (2.0)  1.00 (3.0) -1.15 0.25 
Agency   1.00 (1.0)  1.00 (1.0) -1.90 0.58 
Distinctness   3.00 (3.0)  3.00 (3.0) -0.82 0.41 
Self-as-object     
Physical   6.00 (6.5)  6.00 (4.0) -0.10 0.92 
Active   7.00 (3.3)  5.00 (8.0) -0.30 0.77 
Social   1.50 (4.5)  2.00 (3.0) -0.39 0.70 
Psychological   3.50 (7.8)  2.00 (3.0) -0.47 0.64 
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7.10.1  Self-as-subject: categories  
An independent samples t-test showed no significant difference between the 
SST group (mean = 7.92, SD = 4.27) and the no-SST group (mean = 5.48, 
SD = 3.68) on total self-as-subject statements (t = (41) = -1.86, p = 0.07), 
however, there was trend towards participants in the SST group producing 
more self-as-subject statements than the no-SST group.  Mann-Whitney U 
tests showed no significant differences between the SST group and the no-
SST group on the number of statements produced from the three self-as-
subject categories (see Table 7.21). 
 
7.10.2 Self-as-object: categories 
An independent samples t-test showed no significant differences between the 
SST group (mean = 22.42, SD = 8.06) and the no-SST group (mean = 19.42, 
SD = 9.81) on total self-as-object statements produced (t = (41) = -0.94, 
p = 0.35). Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant differences between 
the SST and no-SST group on the number of statements produced from the 
four self-as-object categories (see Table 7.21). 
 
7.11 Theory of mind and participation in social skills training programs 
As noted in 7.2, the distribution of scores for ToM (first-order false-belief task, 
second-order false-belief task and second-order justification question) were 
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analysed as categorical data.  The results for the SST group and no-SST 
group are presented in Table 7.22. 
 
Table 7.22 Percentage and frequency of SST group and no-SST group 
who passed ToM tasks. 
Variable 
SST 
% (frequency) 
N = 12 
No-SST 
% (frequency) 
N = 31 
χ2 Df P 
First-order*  75.0% (9)  80.6% (25)  1 0.69 
Second-order  50.0% (6)  41.9% (13) 0.02 1 0.89 
Second-order 
Justification 
Question* 
   0.00% (0)  25.8% (8)  1 0.08 
*p-values were computed using Fisher’s Exact Test  
 
Within the ASD group, Fisher’s Exact Test chi-square showed no significant 
differences between the SST group and the no-SST group on the first-order 
ToM task (p = 0.69).  Yates’ Correction for Continuity chi-square analysis 
showed no significant difference between the SST group and the no-SST 
group on the second-order ToM task; χ2 (df = 1, N = 43) = 0.02, p = 0.89).  
Although the Fisher’s Exact Test chi-square showed no significant difference 
between the two groups on the second-order justification question the result 
approached significance (p = 0.08).   
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7.12 Social functioning and participation in social skills training 
programs 
As noted in Chapter six, the distribution of scores for social functioning were 
analysed as continuous data which were normally distributed.  An 
independent samples t-test was used to determine whether the two groups 
differed on the VABS socialization subscale.  There was no significant 
difference between the SST group (mean = 76.42, SD = 19.90) and the no-
SST group (mean = 72.19, SD = 15.12) on the VABS socialization subscale (t 
(41) = -0.75, p = 0.46). 
 
7.13 Summary 
The major findings from chapter seven were: 
1) Participants in the ASD group produced significantly fewer agency 
statements (statements that demonstrate awareness or explain the 
formation, existence or control of self) than the TD group.   
2) Participants in the ASD group produced significantly more physical 
statements (physical, body characteristics or material possessions) 
than the TD group.   
3) Participants in the ASD group produced significantly fewer social 
statements (statements concerned with social personality 
characteristics, social interactions or relations) than the TD group 
during the self-understanding interview.   
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4) Participants in the ASD group produced significantly fewer 
psychological statements (statements concerned with emotions, 
thoughts, or cognitive processes) than the TD group.  
5) Content analysis revealed common concerns and features for the 
ASD and TD groups (e.g. possessions, humanitarian issues, 
acceptance by others and plans for the future).  However, one theme 
clearly differentiated the ASD and TD groups; participants in the ASD 
group made significantly fewer references to personal achievements 
compared with the TD group.  In addition, the ASD group made 
significantly fewer references that relate to the role of family and 
friends. 
6) For participants in the ASD group, there were significant positive 
correlations between self-understanding and social functioning.  In 
comparison, there were no significant correlations for the TD group. 
7) In terms of ToM ability, significantly more participants in the TD group 
passed the second-order ToM task.   
8) For participants in the ASD group, there were significant positive 
correlations between self-understanding and ToM.  In comparison, 
there were no significant relationships between self-understanding 
and ToM for the TD group.   
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9) There were significant positive correlations between self-
understanding and ToM for the HFA group, but no significant 
correlations for the AD group. 
10) There was a significant positive correlation between agency 
statements (from the self-understanding interview) and social 
functioning for the HFA group.  In comparison, there were no 
significant correlations between self-understanding and social 
functioning for the AD group. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The deficit in reciprocal social interaction is a core feature of ASD and 
improvements in social functioning have been identified as one of the most 
critical areas needing remediation.  A thorough understanding of the social 
difficulties experienced by young people with ASD is required to enable 
interventions to specifically treat the social deficits.  The present study aimed 
to investigate self-understanding and theory of mind (ToM) because they 
have been hypothesised as underlying the social impairments experienced by 
young people with high-functioning ASD.  Furthermore this study investigated 
whether self-understanding is related to ToM for young males with ASD, as 
social skills interventions aimed at improving self-understanding may 
simultaneously improve ToM, or vice versa.  
 
Hobson (2002) proposed an order in which children come to understand the 
social world.  He suggested that self-understanding (or self-knowledge) is 
critical and underlies the ability to understand the mental states of others 
(ToM).  Hobson claimed that because children with autism lack a sense of 
“themselves” as potential objects of other people’s evaluations they fail to 
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develop ToM.   However, there is little research relating to self-understanding 
and ToM and the question of how children’s developing self provides the 
infrastructure for ToM has not been addressed in young people with high-
functioning ASD.  This chapter will discuss the relationship between self-
understanding and ToM in young males with high-functioning ASD compared 
with typically developing (TD) young males.   
 
A secondary aim of this study was to identify whether young males with high-
functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger’s disorder (AD) could be distinguished 
in terms of their level of self-understanding and ToM ability and the 
relationship between these two capacities.  These results will add to the 
growing body of research on the similarities and differences between HFA 
and AD and will assist in determining whether the two conditions are separate 
diagnostic entities that can be reliably differentiated.    
 
The present study found a number of significant results, but only those that 
related to the hypotheses, or that were unique or not supporting current 
research trends are discussed in this chapter. 
 
8.2  Participant characteristics  
Differences in the participant characteristics between the ASD and TD groups 
and the HFA and AD groups are now discussed.   
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8.2.1 Differences between ASD and the TD groups 
In the present study several differences were found between the ASD and TD 
groups.  There was a borderline significant difference in age, with the mean 
age of the ASD group being one year lower than the TD group.  Regression 
analysis showed that after adjusting for age the values for the main variables 
changed marginally if at all.  Therefore age is not a significant predictor of 
ToM and self-understanding. 
 
Participants with ASD were more likely to be in primary school and to have 
received special education support.  The finding of increased educational 
support for the ASD group was expected since the research has indicated 
that students with ASD, including those who are cognitively high-functioning, 
require special education support and services (American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1999; White, Scahill, Klin, Koeing, & Volkmar, 
2007).  
 
Young males with ASD scored lower than the TD group on all domains of the 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (VABS) (Sparrow et al., 1984), 
Communication, Socialization and Daily Living Skills domain scores and the 
Adaptive Behavior Composite score. The findings from the present study 
were consistent with previous research (Liss et al., 2001) which indicated 
deficits in adaptive behaviour (including socialisation and daily living skills) 
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was strongly correlated with the autistic symptomatology for high-functioning 
children with autism.   
 
In the present study, young males with ASD were more likely to have 
participated in social skills training programs than those in the TD group. This 
was expected since individuals with ASD are characterised by marked 
impairments in reciprocal social interaction, and consequently social skills 
training is a common intervention (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
Barry et al., 2003; Blacher, Kraemer, & Schalow, 2003; Mesibov, 1994; Tse, 
Strulovitch, Tagalakis, Meng, & Fombonne, 2007). 
 
The ASD group were more likely to be taking medication than those in the TD 
group.  This was an expected difference between the groups since medication is 
often prescribed to people with ASD for associated medical conditions (e.g. 
epilepsy) and also co-morbid psychopathologies including anxiety, depression 
and aggressive behaviour (American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, 1999; Bellini, 2004; Blacher et al., 2003; Ghaziuddin, Ghaziuddin, & 
Greden, 2002).  
 
In the present study, more participants with ASD lived in rural areas 
compared with the TD group.  Participants from rural areas may have 
volunteered more readily in the study because there are fewer services 
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available in rural areas for children with ASD (Mandell, Maytali, & Zubritsky, 
2005; O'Sullivan, Wills, Jackson, & Chalmers, 2008) and they benefited by 
receiving a summary report, which would have been helpful for families and 
schools.  
 
8.2.2  Similarities and differences between the HFA and AD groups  
Some researchers have found differences in intellectual functioning between 
individuals with HFA and AD (Ehlers et al., 1997; Fine, Bartolucci, Ginsberg, 
& Szatmari, 1991; Ghaziuddin & Gerstein, 1996; Gillberg, 1989; Klin et al., 
1995; Ozonoff, Rogers et al., 1991; Szatmari et al., 1990; Wurst, 1974).  
According to these studies, IQ was generally higher in individuals with AD 
(including full scale IQ and verbal IQ) compared with HFA even when 
inclusion criteria was an IQ of 70 and above (Gillberg & Ehlers, 1998).  Most 
of this research, however, suffered from a lack of consistent diagnostic 
criteria, and the extent to which these inadequacies in subject selection 
procedures accounted for the group differences was unclear (Macintosh & 
Dissanayake, 2004).  
 
There have been several studies that have adopted strict Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-
TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) or International Classification of 
Diseases-Tenth Edition (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 1992a) 
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diagnostic criteria and have nevertheless found differences in IQ between 
HFA and AD (Ghaziuddin et al., 1994; Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi, 2004; 
Gilchrist et al., 2001; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; 
Ozonoff et al., 2000; Szatmari et al., 1995).  The present study using the 
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria found no 
significant difference in IQ between the groups.  Participants with HFA were 
comparable to participants with AD on verbal IQ, performance IQ and full 
scale IQ.  These findings were consistent with Ghaziuddin, Butler, Tsai and 
Ghaziuddin (1994) who adhered to strict ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 
1992a) diagnostic criteria and found no significant differences between HFA 
and AD on IQ.  The findings from the present study suggest no significant 
differences between the HFA and AD on IQ and thus, intellectual functioning 
may not reliably differentiate groups of children with HFA with AD.  
 
Various areas of strength and weakness in the cognitive profiles of individuals 
with HFA and AD have been found in previous studies (Ehlers et al., 1997; 
Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi, 2004; Gunter, Ghaziuddin, & Ellis, 2002; 
Iwanaga et al., 2000; Klin et al., 1995; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000).  The trend 
from previous research suggested that individuals with AD exhibit a relatively 
higher verbal IQ compared to their performance IQ and individuals with HFA 
tend to exhibit lower verbal IQ in comparison to their performance IQ.  Most of 
this research, however, suffered from a lack of consistent diagnostic criteria 
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and it is unclear to what extent inadequacies in subject selection procedures 
accounted for group differences (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004).  The 
results from the present study (which applied DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria) 
were consistent with Szatmari et al. (1990) and found no discrepancies in the 
mean VIQ and mean PIQ between the groups suggesting no particular profile 
of cognitive abilities is characteristic of either disorder and thus, a specific 
intellectual profile cannot reliably differentiate between children with HFA and 
AD.  
 
There has been limited research located on the differences in adaptive 
behaviour between HFA and AD.  Where differences have been detected, 
they have generally been in the direction of children with AD achieving higher 
scores than those with HFA (Szatmari et al., 1995; Szatmari et al., 2000).  
However, in both these studies the researchers did not ensure the mutual 
exclusivity of diagnoses, and many of the participants with AD met criteria for 
autism (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004).  Consistent with research by Smily 
and Meredith (2003) the present study found no significant differences 
between the HFA and AD groups on the Daily Living Skills and Socialization 
domains.  Neither were there differences found between the groups on the 
Communication domain and Adaptive Behavior Composite scores.   
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Studies that have examined differences in receptive language between HFA 
and AD have produced mixed findings (Ramberg, Ehlers, Nyden, Johansson, 
& Gillberg, 1996; Szatmari et al., 1995).  Szatmari et al (1995) found 
significant differences between the HFA and AD groups on receptive 
language, with the AD group achieving higher scores than the HFA group. By 
contrast, Ramberg, Ehlers et al. (1996) found few differences between school 
aged children with HFA and AD on measures of receptive and expressive 
language.  Consistent with Ramberg et al. (1996) the present study found no 
significant differences between the HFA and AD groups on receptive 
language suggesting that verbal comprehension cannot reliably differentiate 
children with HFA with AD. 
 
In relation to the core symptoms of ASD, differences between the HFA and 
AD groups were found in the current study on the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Lord et al., 1994). Consistent with Star, Szatmari, 
Bryson and Zwaigenbaum (2003) the present study found participants with 
HFA had more symptoms from the social interaction domain and displayed 
more overall symptoms when they were younger compared with the AD 
group.  The results from the present study suggest that individuals with HFA 
can be distinguished from individuals with AD on the severity of the social 
impairment, with the AD group demonstrating fewer and/or less severe 
symptoms than the HFA group.   
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As previously mentioned, children with high-functioning ASD are often 
referred to clinics for social skills training to assist with their social functioning 
(Barry et al., 2003). There has been no previous research located comparing 
HFA and AD in terms of participation in social skills training programs.  In the 
present study, participation in social skills training programs was compared 
between the groups and, as expected, no difference in the participation rate 
was found.   
  
Differences in participant characteristics between the ASD and TD groups, as 
well as the HFA and AD groups, have been discussed.  In summary, while some 
expected differences were found between the ASD and TD groups, there was 
only one difference found between the HFA and AD groups.  The remainder of 
the chapter will address self-understanding, ToM and the relationship between 
these capacities.   
 
8.3 Self-understanding  
An impaired self-understanding has been linked to the social difficulties 
experienced by individuals with ASD.  Hobson (1982) argues that children 
with ASD fail to develop a “concept of persons” and consequently their 
knowledge or understanding of self is impaired.  However, few studies have 
investigated self-understanding in young people with ASD and there is no 
systematic research located on self-understanding in young people with high-
 195
functioning ASD.  The evidence available suggests that individuals with ASD 
express a more restricted range of emotions than TD individuals and they 
tend not to view themselves in terms of social characteristics and relations 
with others (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Mavropoulou, 1995; Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 
2003).  The only study located which included adults with AD (Mavropoulou, 
1995) had a number of methodological issues (Lee & Hobson, 1998).  
Therefore this is the first systematic study on self-understanding in young 
people with high-functioning ASD.     
 
One of the aims of the present study was to examine self-understanding in 
individuals with high-functioning ASD, and explore any possible differences 
between the HFA and AD groups. Self-understanding was assessed using 
the Damon and Hart Self-Understanding Interview (Damon & Hart, 1988), a 
semi-structured interview aimed at eliciting self-descriptions comprising 
several dimensions that define a person’s view of his or her individuality.  The 
results from the self-understanding interviews are discussed below. 
 
8.3.1 Self-understanding in ASD 
Inconsistent with the null hypothesis, significant differences were found 
between the groups on the self-understanding interview. There was a 
significant difference between the ASD and TD groups in the median agency 
scores, with the ASD group producing significantly fewer statements that 
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demonstrate agency.  The ASD group were less aware of the formation, 
existence and control of self compared with the TD group.   
 
A sense of agency (the awareness that one is in control of their actions) has 
been proposed as being a key component of social cognition (De Vignemont 
& Fourneret, 2004) and has been associated with deficits in imitation by 
people with ASD (Hobson & Lee, 1999; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Rogers, 
Bennetto, McEvoy, & Pennington, 1996).  Thus impairments in agency might 
be predicted in ASD; however, research has shown a relatively intact sense 
of agency for this population (David et al., 2007).  In the David et al., study 
(2007) agency was measured using an action monitoring task whereas the 
present study measured agency using direct questions that aimed to elicit an 
understanding of agency. Therefore the differences between the studies may 
owe to the way agency was measured.  
 
In the current study, it is possible that children with ASD achieved lower 
scores for agency because they found it more difficult than TD children to 
access their thoughts and understand how their thoughts relate to their 
behaviour.  Awareness of agency is important for regulating behaviour which 
not only has implications for social functioning but for caregiver stress 
(Lecavalier, Leone, & Wiltz, 2006).    
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Consistent with previous research (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Mavropoulou, 1995; 
Yoshii & Yoshimatsu, 2003), the present study found children with ASD 
produced significantly more physical characteristics than TD children when 
describing themselves.  Analysis of the physical statements provided by the 
ASD group revealed significantly more lower level responses (levels 1 and 2)  
than the TD group and comparable numbers of higher level responses (levels 
3 and 4).  These findings indicate that children with ASD understand and 
describe themselves using concrete visual attributes (e.g. “I’m tall”).  
Furthermore, the results may reflect a delay in the development of 
self-understanding for individuals with ASD since relatively high proportions of 
physical self-statements have been reported for young TD children (Damon & 
Hart, 1988; Guardo & Bohan, 1971; Keller, Ford, & Meacham, 1978). 
 
In the present study, age was negatively correlated with physical statements 
for the ASD group; the mean age for the ASD group was one year lower than 
the TD group.  Hence, age may have contributed to the higher number of 
physical attributes reported by the ASD group, and although causality cannot 
be inferred, it is possible that younger children with ASD produced more 
physical statements than TD comparisons. 
 
In the present study the quantity of active statements was comparable in the 
ASD and TD groups.  There were, however, differences in the quality of 
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active statements, with the ASD group producing fewer active statements that 
reflected the self’s personal philosophy, moral standards, or lifestyle (level 4).  
These findings suggested that individuals with ASD are less aware of the 
reason or rationale for their actions. For example, children with ASD were 
equally able to produce active attributes that reflected the activities that the 
self performs, or the activities that are allowed, forbidden, or demanded of the 
self (e.g. what are you like? I play computer games) but could not produce 
active statements that reflected the self’s personal philosophy, moral 
standards, or lifestyle (e.g. reasons why one attends school or religious 
ceremonies).  These results provided some support for the notion of a 
general delay in the development of self-understanding for young people with 
high-functioning ASD.  Therefore, individuals with ASD may need to be taught 
how to access, describe and explore reasons for their actions in order to 
improve their self-understanding and hence social skills.  
 
Consistent with previous research on self-understanding in individuals with 
autism (Lee & Hobson, 1998; Mavropoulou, 1995), the present study found 
that participants with ASD provided significantly fewer statements reflecting 
social personality characteristics, social interactions or social relations 
compared with the TD group.  Children with ASD appeared to have difficulties 
describing themselves in relation to others.  Furthermore qualitative analysis 
revealed that the ASD group produced significantly fewer social statements 
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that encompassed higher level responses (levels 3 and 4).  The results 
suggested that individuals with high-functioning ASD have difficulties 
understanding how their personality characteristics can be understood with 
reference to the reactions of others, influence the nature of their social 
interactions as well as influence their personal philosophy, moral standards, 
or lifestyle.  Relatively fewer social self-statements have been reported for 
young TD children (Guardo & Bohan, 1971; Keller et al., 1978).  Therefore, 
these results provide some support for the notion of a general delay in the 
development of self-understanding for young people with high-functioning 
ASD and help explain the social difficulties experienced by young people with 
ASD. 
 
In the present study the ASD group provided significantly fewer psychological 
statements than the TD group.  Given the difficulties children with ASD have 
in relation to abstract concepts (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) it was expected that 
children with ASD would have difficulties describing their emotions, thoughts 
and cognitive processes.  Consistent with Lee and Hobson’s (1998) study (on 
low-functioning individuals with autism) the present study found the 
psychological statements made by the ASD group were restricted to 
observable concrete features of the self.  These findings support previous 
research that suggest that individuals with ASD have difficulties recognising, 
conceptualising and explaining psychological states (Baron-Cohen et al., 
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1986; Hill et al., 2004; Hillier & Allinson, 2002; Hurlburt et al., 1994; Tager-
Flusberg, 1992; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994).   
 
The results from the present study suggest that individuals with high-
functioning ASD have difficulties understanding psychological aspects of self 
including cognitive capabilities, emotional states, personal philosophy and 
moral standards.  The results may not only have repercussions for social 
functioning but also for educational success.  For example, the results 
suggest that children with ASD could find it difficult to understand different 
characters perspectives in novels or poetry.  
 
Post-hoc correlational analyses revealed positive relationships between 
psychological self-statements and age, receptive language and full scale IQ 
for the ASD group.  Within the ASD group the correlations held for the HFA 
group only.  There is a possibility that the current findings reflect a logical 
progression in self development, such that children with HFA were found to 
produce more psychological statements with age.  Further investigation may 
need to be conducted to confirm direction of causality.   
 
Intelligence was found to be a possible mediating factor in a child’s ability to 
describe themselves in psychological terms.  Higher IQ scores in the HFA 
group were associated with more psychological self-statements being 
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produced.  There was also a positive correlation between psychological 
statements and receptive language, supporting the literature on the link 
between verbal skills and ToM abilities (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Ozonoff, 
Rogers et al., 1991).  The current finding implies that as children’s verbal 
skills develop their ability to describe themselves in psychological terms 
improves.  Further studies may need to be conducted to confirm the direction 
of causality. 
 
In order to capture those aspects of self-understanding which may reveal 
personal concerns and features of the self unique to participants with ASD, 
responses to three specific questions were analysed using a content coding 
scheme.  The only significant difference between the ASD and TD groups 
was references to personal accomplishments, with the ASD group providing 
significantly fewer references to personal accomplishments than the TD 
group.  Individuals with high-functioning ASD may have negative self 
schemas and may not focus on their achievements.  This finding is consistent 
with Capps, Sigman & Yirmiya (1995) who found children with high-
functioning ASD gave lower estimates of their overall self-worth.  
Interventions for individuals with high-functioning ASD should not only teach 
social skills but increase their awareness of accomplishments and improve 
their self-worth as this may give them the confidence required to use the skills 
they have been taught. 
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8.3.2 Self-understanding in HFA and AD 
The present study found no significant differences between the HFA and AD 
groups on agency, continuity and distinctness.  The HFA and AD groups were 
generally comparable in terms of the quantity and quality of statements 
produced in the physical, active, social and psychological categories.  Thus 
there were few qualitative differences between the HFA and AD groups.   
 
A central issue in any research that examines self-understanding in 
individuals who have some kind of diagnostic label applied to them is their 
understanding of and engagement with, the label itself (Humphrey & Lewis, 
2008).  What the terms Asperger’s disorder or high-functioning autism mean 
to a young person and the extent to which this understanding is part of their 
developing identity, is likely to influence the way in which they make sense of 
their (and others) experiences (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008).  In the present 
study a very similar profile of concerns emerged for both the HFA and AD 
groups.  In addition, the HFA and AD groups could not be distinguished in 
terms of “insight” into their own condition.   
 
Of those participants who mentioned their disorder, most did so in a negative 
way.  For example, they talked of having a “mental problem”, of not being 
“normal” and having “a bad brain”.  This finding that both groups have 
negative schemas and thoughts about their condition is consistent with 
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previous research on students with high-functioning ASD (Humphrey & Lewis, 
2008) which suggested that these individuals constructed their views from the 
feedback they receive from others (e.g. from peers, teachers and parents). 
These findings also related to the issue of pathologising ASD.  In the present 
study, participants with ASD viewed themselves as having a disorder; 
whereas several authors (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Molloy & Vasil, 2002) have 
argued that rather than being viewed as a “disorder”, ASD should be viewed 
and explained as a “difference”.  
 
These findings suggest that HFA and AD are comparable in terms of self-
understanding and are consistent with research trends that have failed to 
differentiate the two groups (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004).  If these 
disorders are not distinct, future research should combine the two disorders 
and clinical definitions.    
 
8.4  Self-understanding and social functioning 
There have been no published studies located investigating the relationship 
between self-understanding and social functioning in young people with 
high-functioning ASD.  To determine whether this relationship exists for 
young males with high-functioning ASD, self-understanding was correlated 
with the socialization domain from the VABS. 
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The present study found a significant positive relationship between self-
understanding and social functioning for participants with ASD.  Specifically, 
social functioning was related to self-statements that demonstrated 
distinctness from others.  Therefore the null hypothesis, that there is no 
significant relationship between self-understanding and social functioning, 
was rejected. 
 
A more developed self-understanding may translate to better social 
functioning in young males with high-functioning ASD.  If the direction of 
causality pertains self-understanding should be part of a social skills 
curriculum. For example, teaching individuals with ASD about the various 
aspects of self (physical, active, social, psychological features) and exploring 
ways to improve awareness of agency, continuity and distinctness.    
 
8.5 Theory of mind 
It has been hypothesised that impairments in ToM underlie the core social 
and communication symptoms in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000).  The 
extent of the impairment has been demonstrated in a number of studies 
(Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1994; Brent et al., 2004; Leslie & Frith, 1988).  Difficulties with ToM 
extend beyond social and communicative functioning and have been 
associated with educational success (Astington, 1988). The present study 
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compared false-belief understanding in individuals with high-functioning ASD 
and a TD group, and explored differences between the HFA and AD groups. 
 
8.5.1  Theory of mind in ASD  
A large number of research studies have demonstrated that children with 
ASD have difficulties attributing false-beliefs to others, children with ASD 
reporting what they know rather than what someone else could be thinking 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Leekam & Perner, 
1991; Perner et al., 1989; Reed & Peterson, 1990; Swettenham, 1996; 
Swettenham et al., 1996). 
 
The results from the present study found the majority of participants passed 
the first-order false-belief ToM task, with the TD group approaching ceiling 
performance.  The results supported the null hypothesis which states there is 
no significant difference between the ASD and TD groups. 
 
A positive correlation was found between first-order ToM ability and verbal IQ 
for the ASD group.  This was expected since previous research found that IQ 
was associated with false-belief performance in young people with ASD 
(Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997; Dissanayake & Macintosh, 2003; Happe & 
Frith, 1996; Ziatas et al., 1998).  A child with better verbal IQ is likely to 
perform better on false-belief ToM tasks. 
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Unlike past research that shows pass rates on ToM tasks are typically 
associated with language ability (Ziatas et al., 1998) the present study found 
no significant associations between receptive language ability and first-order 
ToM for either group.  Therefore, first-order false-belief understanding may 
only be related to expressive language ability.   
 
In the present study, a different pattern of results emerged for the second- 
order ToM task.  Consistent with Ozonoff et al. (1991) there was a significant 
difference between the ASD and TD groups, with more TD participants 
passing the second-order belief question compared with the ASD group. The 
difference between the ASD and TD groups on the second-order task could 
be related to the additional complexity of the task.  Compared with first-order 
tasks, second-order tasks have an increased information-processing load 
(i.e., they are longer, include more characters and episodes, and the narrative 
structure itself is more complicated).  Other possible explanations for the 
lower performance of the ASD group in the second-order task may be related 
to participants having a specific deficit in motivation rather than an absence of 
knowledge in ToM (Boucher, 1989; Dunlap & Koegal, 1980; Koegal & Mentis, 
1985; Koegel & Egel, 1979). 
 
Previous research has found that IQ and language ability is associated with 
false-belief performance in young people with ASD (Buitelaar & van der 
 207
Wees, 1997; Ziatas et al., 1998).  In the present study, there were positive 
correlations found between second-order ToM ability, full scale IQ and 
receptive language ability for the ASD group.  These results suggest that ToM 
ability (as measured by false-belief understanding) is associated with IQ and 
receptive language ability for the ASD group only.  These findings are 
consistent with previous research (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Milligan, 
Astington, & Dack, 2007; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994; Ziatas et al., 
1998) and provide further support for the argument that language and 
intellectual functioning play a vital role in second-order false-belief 
understanding and thus in the development of ToM. 
 
The second-order justification question was difficult for both the ASD and TD 
groups, with fewer than half of the participants from each group passing the 
justification question.  The findings from the present study are consistent with 
Bauminger and Kasari’s research (1999) and found young males with ASD 
did not differ from TD comparisons on the justification question.  The task 
required the children to verbally justify their responses to an unfamiliar person 
it is possible that some children were self-conscious and therefore spoke less 
and scored lower on the task.  Nevertheless, it appears that children with 
ASD are equally able to justify their responses on second-order ToM tasks.   
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8.5.2 Theory of mind in HFA and AD  
The HFA and AD groups were comparable in terms of performance on all 
ToM tasks.  These findings are consistent with previous research (Baron-
Cohen, 1989b; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Sigman et al., 1995) that found 
deficiencies in first and second-order ToM abilities are common to both 
individuals with HFA and AD.  In addition, there was no significant difference 
between the HFA and AD groups on the second-order ToM justification 
question. These findings align with previous research (Baron-Cohen, 1989b; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Sigman et al., 1995) that suggests that HFA and 
AD cannot be distinguished on ToM ability.  Future research and intervention 
targeting ToM should combine the two disorders. 
 
8.6  Self-understanding and theory of mind 
A theoretically important question for philosophers and psychologists is 
whether the same cognitive mechanism required for self-understanding is 
also necessary for ToM.  If self-understanding is related to ToM for young 
males with ASD, social skills interventions aimed at improving self-
understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice versa.  
 
8.6.1 Self-understanding and theory of mind in ASD 
A number of significant positive correlations were found between self-
understanding and second-order ToM ability for the ASD group only. These 
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findings are consistent with Yoshi and Yoshimatsu (2003) who found a robust 
positive relationship between self-understanding and ToM for young people 
with ASD.  However, it should be noted the Yoshii and Yoshimatsu study 
(2003) assessed adolescents (14-18 years) who had autism and an 
intellectual disability whereas the present study focused on high-functioning 
children and adolescents with ASD. 
 
The results from the present study suggested for young males with high-
functioning ASD, self-understanding was strongly linked to ToM.  This 
suggests that if children with ASD have difficulty with one capacity (e.g. ToM) 
then they are likely to have difficulty with the other (self-understanding) or 
vice versa.  Self-understanding and ToM are required for effective social 
functioning and should be incorporated into intervention programs for 
individuals with ASD, however the results suggest that interventions aimed at 
improving self-understanding may also improve ToM.   The findings support 
Hobson’s theory and theory-theory.   For young males with high-functioning 
ASD, self-understanding and ToM are connected and may stem from a 
common underlying cognitive framework.    
 
Hobson (1982) proposed that self-understanding is critical to and underlies 
the ability to understand others’ mental states.  Although direction of causality 
cannot be inferred from a correlational study, if Hobson is correct and the 
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direction of causality pertains then the relationship between self-
understanding and ToM for participants with high-functioning ASD is better 
explained by simulation theory (Gordon, 1996; Harris, 1992).  Simulation 
theorists (Gordon, 1996; Harris, 1992) argue that children’s abilities at using 
their own mental states (self-understanding) are employed to simulate those 
of others (ToM). 
 
An unexpected finding was that there were no significant correlations 
between self-understanding and ToM for the TD group. This finding is 
inconsistent with previous research (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999; Bosacki, 2000; 
Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Hatcher et al., 1990; Homer & Astington, 1995; 
Lang & Perner, 2002; Wimmer & Hartl, 1991).  However, there were a 
number of differences between the present study and past research such as 
the age, ethnicity and gender of participants.  Future research could 
investigate these variables to determine if they mediate the relationship 
between self-understanding and ToM. 
 
8.6.2 Self-understanding and theory of mind in HFA and AD 
There has been no prior research located on the link between self-
understanding and the understanding of others’ mental states for the distinct 
conditions of HFA or AD.  Interestingly, the positive relationship between self-
understanding and ToM found in the ASD group, only held for the HFA group, 
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while in the AD group no significant relationship between the variables was 
found.  There are a number of possible explanations for the relationship 
between self-understanding and ToM for the HFA group.  Variables not 
measured in the study may have influenced the results, for instance, 
expressive language skills (Ziatas et al., 1998) and co-morbid psychiatric 
conditions such as anxiety and depression (Tonge et al., 1999).  Compared to 
the AD and TD groups young people with HFA may have had less developed 
expressive language skills and more symptoms of anxiety and depression 
which may help to explain the differences between the HFA group and the 
other groups.  
 
The lack of association for self-understanding and ToM for the AD group may 
be explained by the presence of a separate cognitive mechanism responsible 
for first person mentalising (self-understanding) and another separate 
mechanism for ToM (Nichols & Stich, 2002).   
 
This finding has significant implications for the treatment of individuals with 
AD, as separate interventions may be required to improve self-understanding 
and understanding of others.  However, for individuals with HFA, treatments 
aimed at improving self-understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or 
vice versa.  It would be useful if future research confirmed the direction of 
causality through the use of a longitudinal study to determine if the focus of 
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intervention should be on expanding self-understanding or teaching ToM 
ability.   
 
8.7  Subsidiary analyses  
8.7.1  Theory of mind and social functioning 
The relationship between ToM and real life social skills in children with ASD is 
not clear.  Some studies have shown a significant correlation between ToM 
skills and social functioning (Frith et al., 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 2003a), while 
other studies have failed to find an association (Bowler, 1992; Dawson & 
Fernald, 1987; Fombonne et al., 1994; Klin, 2000; Peterson et al., 2007; Prior 
et al., 1990; Roeyers et al., 2001; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995). 
 
The present study found no significant relationships between social 
functioning and ToM for the ASD, TD, HFA and AD groups. These findings 
are consistent with Dissanayake and Mackintosh (2003), Dawson and 
Fernald (1987), Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, Frith and Happe (1994), Klin 
(2000); Peterson, Slaughter and Paynter (2007), Prior, Dahlstrom and 
Squires (1990), Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet and Pichal (2001), Sparrevohn and 
Howie (1995) who found no relationship between ToM ability and social 
functioning. 
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A number of explanations have been provided for the lack of significant 
associations between ToM and social functioning.  The “hacking” hypothesis 
postulates that children with high-functioning ASD who pass ToM tasks arrive 
at the correct answer via non-mentalistic compensatory strategies 
(Dissanayake & Macintosh, 2003).  Furthermore, ToM ability (especially as 
assessed by false-belief tasks) may influence only a relatively narrow range 
of social behaviours and not social competence in the broader sense 
(Astington, 2003; Frith et al., 1994), and motivation may be required before 
children apply false-belief understanding to real-life interactions (Astington, 
2003).  
 
8.7.2  Self-understanding and participation in formal social skills 
training programs 
Children with ASD are often referred for social skills training (Barry et al., 
2003; Blacher et al., 2003; Mesibov, 1994; Tse et al., 2007) because 
improvements in social functioning have been identified as one of the most 
critical areas needing remediation and affecting intervention outcomes 
(Kransy & Ozonoff, 2003; Rogers, 2000).  However, empirical support for 
social skills training programs for children with high-functioning ASD appears 
to be limited (Rao, Beidel, & Murray, 2008).   
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While it was outside the scope of this study to investigate the effectiveness of 
social skills training programs for each of the participants, parents were 
questioned about whether their child had previously participated in any formal 
social skills training.  It was expected that children with ASD who had 
participated in social skills training would show a different pattern of results 
from children who had not undergone formal training.  In the present study, 
children who had previously participated in formal social skills training 
programs were not found to have achieved higher scores on the self-
understanding interview than those who had not participated in programs.  
Similarly, participation in social skills training was not associated with higher 
scores on the measure of social functioning.  These findings complement the 
work of Bellini, Benner, Peters and Hopf (2007) who demonstrated the limited 
effectiveness of social skills interventions available for children with ASD. 
 
It is possible that participation in formal social skills training alone does not 
translate to improved social functioning for children with high-functioning 
ASD.  Given that children with ASD find it difficult to generalise skills that they 
have learned (Barry et al., 2003; Rogers, 2000), it is possible that regular 
program attendance is necessary to improve their social skills and gives them 
the confidence to engage in social interactions.  Nonetheless, it has been 
found that children who have participated in social skills training programs 
appeared to find it a positive experience, which provided a context for 
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meaningful peer relationships with other children and a strong feeling of 
acceptance by their peers.  Thus, regular attendance in social skills programs 
may provide the social support that many high-functioning individuals require 
(Barry et al., 2003). 
 
8.7.3 Theory of mind and participation in social skills training 
programs 
There is some evidence that ToM skills can be learned during social skills 
training by individuals with ASD.  However it seems that these skills do not 
translate to social competence (Chin & Benard-Opitz, 2000; Frith & Happe, 
1999; Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill, 1996, 1997; Klin, 2000; Ozonoff 
& Miller, 1995).  The present study found no significant differences between 
participants with ASD who had participated in social skills training and those 
who had not participated in social skills training on the first and second-order 
ToM tasks, with the exception that the second-order justification question 
approached significance. The social skills programs that participants attended 
may not have had enough emphasis on ToM skills.  Previous research has 
shown that children with more advanced ToM have more successful social 
relationships then their less advanced peers (Watson, Nixson, Wilson, & 
Capage, 1999). Focusing more directly and specifically on these skills (e.g. 
recognising and understanding emotions, desires and beliefs of others) might 
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increase the benefits that participants obtain from attending these social skills 
programs. 
 
The results from the present correlational study are consistent with previous 
intervention studies, finding no link between participation in social skills 
training and ToM ability.  However, the present study did not include data on 
the number, types or duration of social skills programs, which may be 
important in determining the relationship. More research needs to be 
conducted on social skills training to determine the most effective strategies, 
programs and curricula for improving the social skills outcomes for young 
people with high-functioning ASD. 
 
8.8 Limitations and strengths  
 
This study has provided some important information on self-understanding 
and ToM in high-functioning males with ASD.  However, it is not without 
limitations.   
 
Since this study was correlational research the results do not indicate 
causation. In addition, owing to difficulties with recruitment, the age range of 
participants was broad, which may have provided for more variance in the 
developmental levels of the participants.  The present study only recruited 
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male participants; therefore, generalisations cannot be made to females or 
other age groups. 
 
Studying self-understanding using a semi-structured interview has limitations. 
For example, the self-understanding interview relied on language ability and 
the ability to think in words.  Schopler et al (1980); Park and Youderian (1974) 
and Grandin (1992) have claimed that visual thinking is the preferred mode of 
problem solving for high-functioning individuals with ASD.  Therefore, for 
people with ASD, self-understanding may not be captured completely by 
descriptions in words.  Visual images may help individuals with ASD to think 
about psychological aspects of self (including their thoughts).  If the ASD 
participants had been given the opportunity to write down, draw or select 
pictures, they may have been able to describe themselves in more detail.  
 
A further limitation of the study was the reliance on false-belief tasks to 
measure ToM ability.  False-belief tasks are associated with language ability 
and cognitive functioning and may not capture all aspects of the broader 
construct of ToM (Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt, & Douglas, 1994; Lewis & 
Osborne, 1990). Furthermore, the first-order ToM task may have been too 
easy for the groups. First-order ToM was measured using the Sally-Anne 
task, the majority of participants in both groups passed and there was no 
difference between the two main groups.  
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In the present study language comprehension was measured using the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test–Third Edition (PPVT-III) (Dunn & Dunn, 
1997) and there was no difference between the two main groups.  However, 
the PPVT-III only measures receptive language and vocabulary size, and it 
lacks sufficient sensitivity for unravelling the depth of lexical knowledge and 
expressive language ability. 
 
Although the number of participants at the ASD/TD level was considered a 
strength, within the ASD groups of AD and HFA the sample was relatively 
small.  Furthermore, this was a correlational study designed to investigate 
new hypotheses therefore appropriate cautions are needed for replication 
with larger sample sizes.   
 
Despite its limitations, the present study has several strengths.  A pivotal 
strength of the study is that it included qualitative analysis which incorporated 
the voices of individuals with ASD, their self-descriptions, perspectives and 
concerns.  According to Smukler (2005) there is no better source of evidence 
about a person’s knowledge of self than what they say, because this gives a 
view into someone’s state of mind and depth of self knowledge. 
 
The sample size in the present study was large enough to detect statistical 
significance and allowed the researcher to confidently reject or accept the null 
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hypotheses.  Furthermore, a number of participants from the ASD group were 
from regional areas, making the sample more demographically 
representative. 
 
In the present study, participants were not accepted into the study without 
accompanying documentation supporting their diagnosis. In addition, all 
participants with an ASD were assessed by a psychologist (experienced in 
the assessment and diagnosis of ASD) to confirm diagnosis.  This ensured 
that all the participants with ASD were accurately diagnosed.  
 
Furthermore, in the key measures of receptive language ability and IQ, the 
ASD and TD groups were reasonably similar.  This ensured that the results 
were based on the characteristics of the groups rather than group differences 
in receptive language and IQ.  
 
8.9  Suggestions for future research  
Results from this study, and others, indicate the need for further research into 
the social functioning of individuals with high-functioning ASD.  The present 
study indicates a number of areas that still need to be investigated in the self-
understanding, social functioning and ToM abilities of children and 
adolescents with high-functioning ASD. 
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While the present study has found a relationship between self-understanding 
and ToM in young males with high-functioning ASD and the results support 
theory-theory as a useful theoretical framework, future research should 
attempt to replicate these results to confirm whether self-understanding and 
ToM are perhaps components of the same underlying mechanism, and 
possibly provide a reason why the relationship did not appear to exist for the 
AD group.  There may be a separate cognitive mechanism responsible for 
first person mentalising (self-understanding) and another separate 
mechanism for ToM for individuals with AD and cases in which one of these 
capacities (e.g. ToM) is impaired while the other is intact (e.g. self-
understanding) (Nichols & Stich, 2002).  
 
Further experimentation with different techniques, across a whole battery of 
tasks could be employed for probing self-understanding and ToM in ASD.  In 
addition, a useful aim would be to reduce the number of confounding 
variables so that attention can be more directly focused on the underlying 
mechanism.  For example, instead of using a measure of receptive language, 
a more broad measure could be used which includes both expressive and 
receptive language ability. 
 
It may prove beneficial for future research to move beyond a cross-sectional 
approach and examine self-understanding and ToM in the same individuals 
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over time, comparing the results with the developmental progression seen in 
those considered TD.  Furthermore, it would be useful to compare self-
understanding and ToM across different age groups such as preschoolers, 
school aged children, adolescents and adults and to compare the results with 
the developmental progression seen in TD.  It may also be of interest to 
investigate self-understanding and ToM in females with ASD for any evidence 
of gender differences. In addition, it may be of interest to investigate the role 
of siblings on self-understanding, ToM and social functioning. 
 
The relationship between ToM abilities, self-understanding and social 
behaviours needs to be explored in more depth in order to help identify 
specific abilities that facilitate improved social behaviour; these can then be 
targeted during social skills intervention. 
 
The present study did not find a significant relationship between ToM and 
social functioning in young people with ASD.  In addition, those who had 
participated in formal social skills training did not perform better on standard 
ToM tasks than those who had not participated in social skills training.  In 
contrast, there was a significant relationship between self-understanding and 
social functioning for the ASD group, and there was a trend towards a more 
sophisticated self-understanding for those who had participated in social skills 
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training.  It is possible that social skills improve as one develops a more 
sophisticated understanding of the self.   
 
There is a need for more studies of social skills intervention, including 
programs that aim to improve self-understanding.  Intervention studies should 
trial different models of intervention.  For example, individualised direct 
instruction versus small and large group sessions, and different strategies (for 
example, comic strip conversations, social stories, video taped self-
monitoring, role play or behavioural rehearsal). 
 
8.10  Implications 
The present study provides several significant implications for the treatment 
of young people with high-functioning ASD.  For example, the results provide 
a baseline of self-understanding for this population which is useful for clinical 
practice and future research. 
 
It appears that there are specific rather than “global” aspects of 
self-understanding that are selectively absent or impaired in young males with 
high-functioning ASD, in that they were less likely than TD individuals (of 
approximately the same age, receptive language and general intellectual 
ability) to view themselves in the context of their own social and psychological 
attributes  
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In addition, the ASD group were less aware of the control they have on their 
own actions.  Intervention programs for children with ASD should aim to 
increase their awareness of agency and teach ways to self-regulate emotions 
as this may translate to less problematic behaviour and reduce caregiver 
stress. 
 
The ASD group was less likely to report personal accomplishments than the 
TD group, and of those participants with ASD who mentioned their disorder, 
most had negative schemas and thoughts about their condition.  Intervention 
could aim to improve self-understanding and awareness of own mental states 
in young people with ASD.  Clinicians can help the child diagnosed with one 
of the ASD to have better access to his or her mental states and to identify 
them as mental states (beliefs, desires) by making them concrete (pictures, 
words). Keeping a diary about events or practising self-talk may also help 
improve self-understanding.  
 
In addition, it would be useful for therapeutic interventions to focus on 
improving self-efficacy and self-competence as well as improving the young 
people’s negative views about their condition.  The focus of intervention 
should be on positive ‘differences’ rather than deficits or problems.  Changing 
the negative social constructions of ASD may help improve the quality of life 
for people with ASD.   
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Although some researchers have found differences between HFA and AD, 
methodological issues are widespread.  Many studies including the present 
study have found few qualitative differences between the two groups.  These 
results support the hypothesis that AD is on a continuum with autistic 
disorder.  The present study supports the spectrum concept of autistic-type 
disorders, rather than being clearly distinct categories, with the spectrum 
based on severity of autistic symptoms (Prior et al., 1998).  Future research 
should consider investigating whether the two disorders can be combined; 
diagnostic classification systems may need to be revised. 
 
8.11 Conclusion  
It is clear that children with high-functioning ASD can talk about themselves, 
but when they do, they reveal how similar and different they are to children 
who do not have ASD.   They are similar in so far as they can describe their 
bodies, possessions and their activities.   They are different in so far as they 
do not talk about feelings, cognitive capabilities, and social relations and 
rarely compare and contrast themselves with others.   In addition, they lack 
insight into the control and self-monitoring of their actions.  Of those young 
people with ASD who mentioned their disorder, most did so in a negative 
way.   
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These findings suggest that young high-functioning males with ASD have 
difficulties integrating various aspects of themselves and are less aware of 
their own mental states.  Furthermore, the findings indicate a general delay in 
the development of self-understanding since relatively high proportions of 
physical self-statements and relatively few social and psychological 
statements have been reported for young TD children.  The results help to 
explain why individuals with ASD have difficulties relating to others and 
support the practice of teaching self-understanding and interventions aimed 
at improving the self-worth of children with high-functioning ASD.  Young 
people with high-functioning ASD should have their diagnosis explained to 
them as a “difference” rather than a disorder of deficits.  
 
The validity of AD as a distinct diagnostic entity from HFA has generated 
considerable debate and remains controversial.  The results from the present 
study suggest that HFA and AD were comparable in terms of self-
understanding and ToM ability.  However, there were some important 
differences in terms of the relationship between self-understanding, ToM and 
social functioning.   
 
A positive relationship was found between self-understanding and ToM for 
the HFA group suggesting that for young males with HFA, theory-theory is a 
constructive theoretical framework for explaining the relationship between 
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self-understanding and ToM.  It also suggests that the two abilities stem from 
a common underlying cognitive framework.  Consequently, treatments aimed 
at improving self-understanding may simultaneously improve ToM, or vice 
versa.   
 
There was a lack of association for self-understanding and ToM for the AD 
group and this may be explained by the presence of a separate cognitive 
mechanism responsible for self-understanding and another for ToM.  
Therefore, different interventions may be required; one to improve self-
understanding and another to improve the understanding of others’ minds.   
 
The present study found a significant positive relationship between agency 
self-statements (awareness of one’s own actions and behaviour) and social 
functioning for the HFA group only.  A more in depth awareness and better 
understanding of the control one has on his own actions and behaviour may 
translate to improved interpersonal skills and a reduction in behaviour 
problems in young males with HFA.  If the direction of causality pertains, self-
understanding (particularly agency) should be an essential part of social skills 
curriculum for young people with HFA.  The lack of association between self-
understanding and social functioning for the AD group suggests that self-
understanding is not valid in terms of actual social behaviour for young 
people with AD. 
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In conclusion, children with high-functioning ASD are less aware of their own 
and others’ mental states.  This study provided important information on the 
social deficits of young males with high-functioning ASD and presented 
evidence on self-understanding, ToM and social functioning which may assist 
clinicians developing individual social skills training programs and developing 
evidenced based practice parameters.  Future researchers and clinicians will 
benefit from this study as it has provided a baseline of self-understanding for 
young males with high-functioning ASD.  Intervention studies should further 
investigate how self-understanding and ToM can improve the social skills 
outcomes for young people with high-functioning ASD. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Appendix A1:  Participant information statement for participants   
 
You are invited to take part in a project on self-understanding in children with 
High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Disorder. It will help us understand 
young people with High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Disorder and 
assist in the development of interventions and theories on social functioning. 
The information will also provide helpful information for services. The 
researcher is Fiona Martin PhD candidate, with the help and supervision of 
Associate Professor Susan Hayes from the Centre for Behavioural Sciences 
in Medicine at The University of Sydney. If you agree to be involved in this 
project, we will ask you and your parent/carer or guardian some questions 
about what you are good at and what you are not so good at, to know more 
about you. The whole process will take between two and three hours and we 
can spread the interview over two sessions to suit you. The interview might 
be tiring, but you can decide to stop whenever you like.  
The answers to your questions will be kept private (confidential) and only 
Fiona Martin (the researcher) will have access to information on you, except 
as required by law. Also, a report of the study may be published, but your 
name will be removed so that you cannot be identifiable in such a report. 
Although, it is hoped that this project will help people with Autism and 
Asperger’s Disorder by providing information about them to service providers, 
it may not be of direct benefit to you.  However we will provide you with an 
up-to-date assessment. 
Participation in this study is entirely up to you- it is voluntary: you do not have 
to be involved, if you do get involved (participate) you can pull out or withdraw 
at any time. When you have read this information, Fiona Martin will talk to you 
and answer any questions you have. If you would like to know more about 
this project, please contact Fiona Martin on (02) 9351 2776. This information 
sheet is for you to keep. 
Anyone with concerns or complaints regarding the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Manager for Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney on  
(02) 9351-4811. 
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Appendix A2: Participant information statement for parents/carer/guardians 
 
You are invited to take part in a project on self-understanding in children with 
High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Disorder. It will help us understand 
young people with High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Disorder and 
assist in the development of interventions and theories on social functioning. 
The information will also provide helpful information for services. The 
researcher is Fiona Martin PhD candidate, with the help and supervision of 
Associate Professor Susan Hayes from the Centre for Behavioural Sciences 
in Medicine at the University of Sydney.  
We are asking that you agree for your child/ or person you are responsible for 
to participate in this study.  If you agree, and the person also agrees, we will 
do some psychological assessments and be asking some questions to you 
and the participant. The questions will be about: the sort of things the 
participant is good at and not so good at, the participant’s daily life and we will 
also gather information about the participant’s thoughts and behaviours. The 
whole process will take between two and three hours and we can spread the 
interview over 2 sessions to suit you. The interview might be tiring, but you 
can decide to stop whenever you like.  
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only 
the investigator named above will have access to information on participants, 
except as required by law. Also, a report of the study may be submitted for 
publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report. 
While we intend that this research study furthers medical and psychological 
knowledge and may improve interventions for young people with 
High-Functioning Autism and Asperger’s Disorder in the future, it may not be 
of direct benefit to you, but will provide the participant with an up-to-date 
assessment. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are in no way 
obliged to participate and – if you do participate – you can withdraw at any 
time. Whatever your decision, please be assured that it will not affect your 
relationship with The Autism Association of NSW. When you have read this 
information, Fiona Martin will discuss it with you further and answer any 
questions you have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel 
free to contact Fiona Martin on (02) 9351 2776. This information sheet is for 
you to keep. 
Anyone with concerns or complaints regarding the conduct of a research study can contact 
the Manager for Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811. 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B1: Consent form for the participant 
 
I,_________________________________________, understand this is a 
project about self-understanding in children with High-Functioning Autism and 
Asperger’s Disorder, as explained in the Information Statement. I consent 
(give permission) to participate in the project.  My consent is voluntary and I 
understand that all the information will be handled in the strictest confidence 
and that my participation will be kept private and my name will be removed 
from any reports. I understand I will be asked to answer some questions 
about myself in the past and at present. I also understand that I will be asked 
about things that I am good at and things that I am not so good at. I 
understand that my parent/carer or guardian will also be asked to answer 
some questions about me. This may take 2 to 3 hours. I understand these 
answers will be seen only by the researchers (Associate Professor Susan 
Hayes and Fiona Martin, PhD Candidate) in the Centre for Behavioural 
Sciences in the Department of Medicine at the University of Sydney and will 
be used only in this project, except as required by law.  Information, which 
would identify me, will be removed from the results at the University.  No 
information about me will be given to any government department, or anyone 
else. I understand that even after I have agreed to be in the study, I can 
decide at any time that I do not want to be in the study after all, and I can 
withdraw or pull out without any punishment or penalty.  If I pull out, any 
information about me will be destroyed. 
 
I agree to participate in the project. 
 
Participants Name (block letters) 
 
 
Signed ___________________  Witness’ signature _________________ 
 
Date _____________________  Name ___________________________ 
 
 Date ____________________________ 
 
 
Anyone with concerns or complaints regarding the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Manager for Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney on  
(02) 9351-4811. 
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Appendix B2: Consent form for Parent/Carer/Guardian or Person 
Responsible  
 
I,_________________________________________,understand the purpose 
of the study is about self-understanding in children with High-Functioning 
Autism and Asperger’s Disorder, as explained in the Information Statement. 
On behalf of the person for whom I am parent/carer/guardian consent to 
participation in the study.  My consent is voluntary and I understand that all 
the information will be handled in the strictest confidence and that my 
participation and the participant for whom I am responsible will be not be 
individually identifiable in any reports. I understand that both the person for 
whom I am responsible and I will be asked to answer some questions about 
the participant and do some psychological assessments, as explained in the 
information statement. This may take 2 to 3 hours. I understand these results 
will be seen only by the researchers (Associate Professor Susan Hayes and 
Fiona Martin, PhD Candidate) in the Centre for Behavioural Sciences in the 
Department of Medicine at the University of Sydney and will be used only in 
this project, except as required by law.  Information, which would identify the 
participant or me, will be removed from the results at the University.  No 
information about the participant or me will be given to any government 
department, or anyone else. I understand that even after the participant and I 
have agreed to be in the study, the participant and me can decide at any time 
that we do not want to be in the study after all, and can withdraw without any 
penalty.  If we withdraw, any information about the participant will be 
destroyed.  On behalf of the person for whom I am responsible agree to 
participate in the study. 
 
I, _____________________________________________am the  
guardian/person responsible for ____________________________________ 
 
I have read the Information and the Consent Form for this study and I consent 
on behalf of this person. 
 
Signed ___________________  Witness’ signature _________________ 
 
Date _____________________  Name ___________________________ 
 
 Date ____________________________ 
 
Anyone with concerns or complaints regarding the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Manager for Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney on  
(02) 9351-4811. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
General Questionnaire  
 
Completed as part of an interview with Parent/Carer/or Person 
responsible 
 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
Name:  
Date of Birth: (dd/mm/yy)______________________ 
ID:  
 
1. Residence 
Urban □ / Rural □  
 
2. Indigenous Australian 
Yes □ / No □  
 
3. Education level  
a. Primary  □ 
b. Secondary  □ 
c. TAFE  □ 
d. Finished School □ 
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Education Setting 
a. Mainstream school in regular class without teacher’s aide  □ 
b. Mainstream school in regular class with P/T teacher’s aide  □ 
c. Mainstream school in regular class with F/T teacher’s aide  □ 
d. Mainstream school in support class eg: ASD, IM   □ 
e. Special school     □ 
f. Not in educational setting      □ 
  
4. Siblings  
Lives with siblings      Yes □ / No □  
 
5. Parents 
Lives with biological parents    Yes □ / No □  
Lives with both parents     Yes □ / No □  
    
6. Socio-economic status 
(Based on occupation and education of parents) 
 
Education level: 
 
Occupation: 
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a. Upper or upper-middle class  □ 
b. Middle class     □ 
c. Lower-middle class    □ 
d. Lower class     □ 
 
7. Social skills training 
Participation in formal social skills training  Yes □ / No □ 
How many? 
 
8. Medications 
Use of Medication      Yes □ / No □ 
 
Type of medication: 
a. Stimulants     □  
b. Anti-depressant medication  □  
c. Anti-psychotics    □  
d. Anti-convulsants     □ 
e. Anxiolytic medication   □ 
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9. Behaviour 
Splinter skills      Yes □ / No □ 
Savant skills      Yes □ / No □ 
Hyperactivity      Yes □ / No □ 
Short Attention Span     Yes □ / No □ 
Aggressiveness to others    Yes □ / No □ 
Self-Injurious Behaviours    Yes □ / No □ 
Abnormalities in mood or affect   Yes □ / No □ 
Lack of fear in response to real dangers  Yes □ / No □ 
Excessive fearfulness to harmless objects Yes □ / No □ 
Odd responses to sensory stimuli   Yes □ / No □ 
Seizures      Yes □ / No □ 
Motor Clumsiness and awkwardness  Yes □ / No □ 
Symptoms of Depression    Yes □ / No □ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
